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WHY WEAK STATES BALANCE: 
NATIONAL MOBILIZATION AND THE SECURITY STRATEGIES 
OF POST-SOVIET STATES 
 
 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 14 post-Soviet states adopted 
dramatically differing security strategies towards Russia: some sought security by 
bandwagoning with Russia while others strove to balance against it. Why did states with 
similar experiences under Soviet rule and similar asymmetric power positions vis-à-vis 
Russia adopt such diverse security strategies in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s 
disintegration? In contrast to prevailing theories focusing on power, economic 
interdependence, and cultural similarities, I propose that these variations in post-Soviet 
states’ security strategies can be best explained by their diverse experiences with national 
mobilization. The central argument of this study is that particular historical developments 
prime national mobilization, leading nations to see themselves as unique socio-political 
units worthy of independence and driving their leaders to interpret their former ruler as a 
primary security threat they must balance against. I test this national mobilization theory 
against its main alternatives through an in-depth analysis of the historical processes of 
national identity formation and recent security strategies of the post-Soviet states, 
shedding new light on mobilized identities’ role in international security. This 
dissertation includes a broad correlational analysis between the proposed causal factors 
and the fourteen weaker post-Soviet states’ foreign policy choices as well as two chapters 
containing in-depth case studies of Georgia and Kazakhstan, utilizing process tracing 
methods to test the specific causal mechanisms at play. 
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
How do newly independent states confront their former ruler? Fifteen independent 
states emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, covering areas from 
Eastern Europe to Central Asia. As its primary legal successor state, Russia inherited the 
vast majority of Soviet land, population, and industry, emerging as a vastly superior 
economic and military power compared to the other fourteen post-Soviet states (Saxer 
1991, 702, Brzezinski and Sullivan 1997, 3). Despite occupying similar asymmetric 
power positions vis-à-vis Russia, however, the other fourteen adopted dramatically 
differing security strategies in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s disintegration. Where 
some prioritized cooperation with Russia, others sought to balance against it, and still 
other adopted ambivalent or neutral foreign policies. This variation is puzzling given the 
fact that they were all part of the same extremely interdependent system for decades and 
went through many similar social, economic, and political processes under centralized 
Soviet rule. Why did some post-Soviet states immediately seek to balance against Russia 
by reorienting themselves towards the West (e.g., the Baltic States, Georgia) while others 
preferred to bandwagon with Russia by maintaining their economic and military 
cooperation (e.g., Belarus and Kazakhstan)? 
Answering this question will help us understand what drives patterns of 
asymmetric international conflict and cooperation. This is particularly important because 
conventional theories of international relations are unable to offer a compelling solution 
to this puzzle. Perspectives that assume strong states largely dictate the course of 
international relations in their neighborhoods cannot explain why Russia’s influence in its 
neighborhood proved so imperfect. Those that see states as rational actors responding to 
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their position in the distribution of international power cannot explain why some post-
Soviet states treated Russia as their main security threat while others approached it as 
their main strategic partner. Contrary to conventional theories that prioritize strong states 
and structural factors in international relations, this study proposes a shift in focus to the 
national security strategies of weak states, which I argue are prominently influenced by 
their internal characteristics. 
I argue that the post-Soviet states’ diverse experiences with nationalism, the 
strongest collective identity within states, can explain variations in their foreign policy 
choices towards their powerful former ruler. This theory, which I call national 
mobilization theory, suggests that if a nation combines historical experiences such as 
struggles for independence and interstate conflicts with effective information 
dissemination mechanisms such as public education and mass media, its population 
becomes horizontally connected and primed to see itself as a unique socio-political unit. 
After gaining formal independence, populations mobilized in this manner exhibit a 
pronounced us-vs.-them mentality towards their former ruler, becoming especially likely 
to prize their independence, interpreting their former ruler as their primary security threat, 
and incentivizing their leaders to confront it with balancing policies. Although my 
primary purpose is to explain recent variations within the post-Soviet region, the logic of 
national mobilization theory may also apply to other regional or historical cases of weak 
states emerging from domination by a stronger state. 
Beyond its theoretical contributions, this study’s empirical contents address a 
subject of great importance for current affairs. Although Russia’s power cannot match the 
Soviet Union’s, recent actions such as its annexation of territory in Ukraine and Georgia, 
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its support of Assad’s regime in Syria, and its cyberattacks on Western democratic 
elections demonstrate that the post-Soviet space has once again become a center of 
regional and international turmoil. The region is not lacking for intrastate and interstate 
conflicts, and it has seen substantial realignment by some states (e.g., the expansion of 
NATO and the European Union and the contraction of the CIS). The multitude of past, 
current, and potential conflicts involving this part of the world combine with Russia’s 
current assertiveness on the global stage to merit further scrutiny of the region. 
This chapter proceeds in five sections. The first examines why weak state security 
strategies matter, situating this project within the broader international security literature. 
The second section summarizes my central argument regarding how national 
mobilization drove the various post-Soviet states to adopt differing security strategies 
toward Russia. The third section examines the current role of nationalism in international 
relations theory, shedding light on its often assumed but rarely systematically studied 
effects on interstate relations and defining my central concept of national mobilization. 
The fourth section examines conventional explanations for variations in asymmetric 
security strategies, highlighting their inability to persuasively explain the puzzle at the 
heart of this study. The fifth section offers a roadmap that previews the chapters that 
follow. 
1.1 Weak State Security Strategies 
As weak states have proliferated in the post-colonial and post-Cold War world, 
questions related to their foreign policy behavior have grown in importance, bearing on 
areas including alignment and re-alignment, nuclear proliferation, and interstate conflict 
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and cooperation. Yet research in international relations remains dominated by studies of 
the great powers as studies of weak states pale in comparison (Hey 2003, 5, Keohane 
1969, 291-292). The major international relations theories are often derived from the 
experiences of the great powers and tested with reference to them, with implications for 
weak states mentioned in passing as logical extrapolations if at all (Waltz 1979, 194-195, 
Walt 1987, 23-25). Moreover, many scholars continue to assume that the “domestic 
determinants of foreign policy are less salient in weak states” because their behavior is 
predetermined by systemic factors even more so than great powers, leaving them with 
“less room for choice in the decision-making process” (Handel 1981, 3-4, Sutton 1987, 
20). 
Even as a growing body of research has begun focusing on weak states, the 
dominant framework continues to portray them as unitary rational actors facing limited 
options, with scholars theorizing about how they suffer what they must within an 
international system dominated by the strong (Hey 2003, Rothstein 1968). Cases when 
weak states challenge stronger opponents are usually explained by appealing to particular 
strategic and material circumstances that warp cost-benefit calculations enough to enable 
such a seemingly irrational choice (Avey 2019). There is no denying great powers’ 
impressive capabilities to shape and reshape international systems, and as a result the 
often-treacherous seas that weak states must navigate with their foreign policy choices. 
That said, this study stands as a testament that approaches primarily concerned with 
systemic factors and power capabilities are at best insufficient to explain weak states’ 
foreign policy choices. 
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The primary focus of this study is the foreign policies and security strategies of 
weak states in the post-Soviet context. Despite possessing vastly superior economic and 
military capabilities, the strongest state in the region was unable to dictate its weak 
neighbors’ foreign policies. Moreover, I demonstrate that the primary driver of the 
weaker post-Soviet states’ foreign policy decisions lay with their internal characteristics 
rather than their external incentives. Although all weak states may face profound threats 
to their political autonomy, the extent to which they prioritize that autonomy over 
strategic, economic, and other concerns depends on their level of national mobilization, 
which shapes their threat perceptions and hence their security strategies. In making this 
argument, I contribute to the field of international relations by bridging the literatures on 
weak state foreign policy and nationalism, which offers the key to explaining the puzzle 
at the heart of this study—the variation of the post-Soviet states security strategies 
towards Russia. Although I test national mobilization theory in the context of the post-
Soviet states’ security strategies in the immediate aftermath of the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union, the logic by which it operates is general enough to be applied to other 
regions and time periods as well in future research. 
This study’s findings should be of interest to scholars of international relations as 
well as foreign policymakers. It sheds light on the dynamics behind weak states’ 
decisions to cooperate with or balance against their stronger peers and in so doing 
provides insights into the potential for regional systemic change via realignment. In 
contrast to conventional theories of international relations, which struggle to understand 
weak states that defy their structural incentives, national mobilization theory offers a 
more nuanced and historically rich account of weak states’ security strategies. Although 
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states’ identities and foreign relations are continuously made and remade, my research 
shows that particular patterns of national experiences can provide relatively stable effects 
enabling us to better explain and predict weak states’ behavior. 
1.2 My Argument 
I argue that weak states’ level of national mobilization profoundly shapes their 
security strategies towards their strong neighbor. More specifically, the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union saw its weaker successor states adopt radically different security 
strategies towards Russia because those states had manifested diverging levels of national 
mobilization by the end of 1980s. My theory’s central predictions are that those post-
Soviet states with highly mobilized national identities should have principally valued 
their political independence, exhibited a strong us-vs.-them mentality vis-à-vis Russia, 
perceived Russia as their primary security threat, and prioritized balancing against it. On 
the other hand, those post-Soviet states with relatively low national mobilization should 
not have valued their political independence as much, exhibited a markedly less 
antagonistic mentality towards Russia, been more likely to see Russia as a potential 
partner than as a uncompromising security threat, and hence prioritized cooperation with 
it. These divergences represent important contributions to international relations theory, 
showing that states confronted with similar external constraints nevertheless adopted 
vastly different interpretations and responses based on their internal characteristics—
specifically their level of national mobilization. 
Many factors bear on a state’s foreign policy formation, but not all factors are 
equally salient to all states all the time. I engage alternative theories that expect power 
7 
 
calculations, economic incentives, or cultural similarities to be the main determinants of a 
state’s foreign policy. I do not deny the potential importance of these factors for 
understanding state behavior in general—in some situations they might have strong 
explanatory and/or predictive power—but I demonstrate that there are also important 
cases when national mobilization overcomes those other factors to drive a state’s foreign 
policy. This implies that research that primarily looks at systemic factors and exogenous 
interests may benefit from incorporating states’ internal variations in order to eliminate 
blind spots that prevent more accurate predictions. 
This should be particularly clear when we consider this study’s two in-depth case 
study chapters, each of which analyzes a case when a state’s foreign policy choices 
directly violated conventional expectations. First, Georgia prioritized balancing against 
Russia after the Soviet Union’s dissolution despite being economically and military 
weak, lacking credible guarantees from external powers, and risking retaliation by 
ostracizing its most powerful neighbor. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan was arguably the post-
Soviet state that most prioritized cooperation with Russia despite being far more 
economically viable than the other post-Soviet states thanks to its oil and gas resources 
and despite having a potential path to unilateral security in the form of the nuclear 
weapons it inherited from the Soviet Union. 
The foreign policy choices of Georgia and Kazakhstan defy conventional 
expectations but accord with national mobilization theory owing to the stark contrast in 
national mobilization between the two. Georgian leaders’ interviews, official statements, 
and transcripts of congressional debates show that their positions were infused with 
nationalist sentiments, regularly bringing up self-determination and a historic duty of full 
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independence, referring to Russia as a centuries-old security threat that could not be 
trusted, mentioning honor and sacrifice as expected steps on the route to independence, 
and the like. Meanwhile, such sentiments were largely absent from Kazakhstan as its 
President Nazarbayev openly talked about sacrificing autonomy and sovereignty for 
material benefits. On rare occasions when he voiced potentially nationalist sentiments 
such as referencing a historic struggle against empires or the cultural heritage of Kazakhs, 
he would quickly clarify that Kazakhstan and Russia were kindred nations destined for 
peaceful coexistence and cooperation. These two experiences reflect a broader pattern 
visible across all fourteen post-Soviet states as those that had undergone deeper national 
mobilization strove to break away from Russia’s influence while those that had not were 
more likely to bandwagon with it. 
1.3 Nationalism and National Mobilization 
Despite near-consensus among scholars regarding causal connections between 
nationalism and international behavior, many major international relations theories still 
have not incorporated nationalism as an independent variable. For example, several 
prominent realist scholars recognize nationalism as a profoundly important phenomenon 
(Carr 1945, Mearsheimer 2001, 365), yet its effects are often taken for granted, 
“assuming it without proof or explanation” (Van Evera 1994, 5, Posen 1993, 80). 
Empirical works on nationalism remain exceptions in the field (Wimmer 2012, Schrock-
Jacobson 2012). Scholars often conflate nationalism and statism, but distinguishing 
between the two is essential for parsing out their causal effects (Gilpin 1981). While a 
state and a nation might sometimes have similar goals, they reflect two distinct concepts: 
states are political institutions, formed and acting in accordance with international norms, 
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while nations and national identities are formed by and refer to domestic societies. As 
Peter Katzenstein put it, “States’ identities are primarily external; they describe the 
actions of governments in a society of states. National identities are internal; they 
describe the processes by which mass public acquire, modify, and forget their collective 
identities” (Katzenstein 1997, 118). 
The most insightful and influential works on nationalism to date have considered 
the question of its origins (Kohn 1967, Smith 1983, Gellner 1983). There is a broad 
consensus among leading scholars in the field that nationalism is a socially constructed 
and relatively modern phenomenon associated with political, technological and social 
transformations (Anderson 1991, Hobsbawm 1992, Hroch 1985). These works gave rise 
to scholarship further highlighting the importance of economic, cultural, and political 
factors in the formation of nationalism (Hechter 2000; Laitin 2007; Hutchinson 2000; 
Smith 1986; Mann 1995; Tilly 1990), while scholarship on the consequences of 
nationalism for interstate relations has fallen behind. 
Nationalism’s significance has not readily translated into clear definitions. In 
Benedict Anderson’s (1991, 3) words, “Nation, nationality, nationalism—all have proved 
notoriously difficult to define, let alone to analyze.” In line with prominent works in the 
field, a nation is defined here as a large, socially-mobilized group of people who see 
themselves as sharing a common identity that justifies pooling their political interests and 
that differentiates them from other political entities enough to warrant their own state. 
Nationalism is the pride in and loyalty to their nation that inspires those people to 
maintain and strengthen their nationhood.  
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The main theoretical concept I develop throughout this study is national 
mobilization. Scholars of nationalism often mention phases of development in national 
consciousness and nation-building. It is a process associated with intellectuals 
conceptualizing national narratives, nationalist agitators spreading those narratives, and 
socio-economic changes enabling connectivity among ever larger numbers of individuals 
(Hobsbawm 1992, 10, Hroch 1985, 22-23, Anderson 1991). Building on these past works 
I use the term national mobilization to refer to the process of building a critical mass of 
people who are not only nationally conscious but politically active and eager to defend 
their national interests. Not all nations are similarly mobilized, and a given nation can be 
more or less mobilized depending on the time period under consideration.  
This study demonstrates how variation among states’ national identities and the 
forms through which those identities are primed and activated can explain otherwise-
puzzling variations in asymmetric security strategies. Explaining international relations is 
always challenging as relationships tend to evolve, change, improve or deteriorate due to 
various external and internal factors over time. This is particularly true when developing 
explanations based on phenomena that are socially constructed rather than material 
factors—when employing a cultural approach, there is a risk of ending up with 
idiosyncratic explanations. However, I argue that we can observe stable patterns in the 
processes of national mobilization across states, and that those patterns can help us 
explain post-Soviet states’ varying responses to similar structural constraints. 
Furthermore, it is essential that we do so despite the associated challenges given the 
significant gaps left by conventional theories. Most importantly, I aim to show in this 
study that some questions of international conflict and cooperation, arguably the core 
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research agenda of conventional international relations theories, are best answered not by 
material factors at the international systemic level like the distribution of power or 
economic interdependence, but rather by domestic-level ideological factors and the 
domestic political incentives they create for state leaders. As a result, the primary 
emphasis in this study rests with the mobilization of national identities that influences 
states’ interests, their perceptions of their powerful neighbor, and hence their foreign 
policy choices. 
1.4 Existing Approaches 
The two most conventional approaches to understanding international relations, 
realism and liberalism, share an overarching analytical framework that sees states as the 
most important actors in an anarchic international system, the structure of which affects 
their rational calculations (Powell 1994, 343-344, Jervis 1999, 43-44). Although the 
liberal approach relaxes some realist assumptions in examining the ability of international 
institutions to overcome international fear and uncertainty, both approaches treat states’ 
interests as exogenous and stable, and thus both approaches expect to see broad and 
predictable patterns in international behavior driven by international systemic 
characteristics (Katzenstein 1996, 11-15, Jervis 1999, 43-44). These similarities lie at the 
core of their inability to explain the stark variations in foreign policy choices among the 
weak post-Soviet states.  
1.4.1 Realism 
Realist theories base their analysis of international behavior on the distribution of 
military power among them, relegating other types of causal factors to a secondary status 
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useful primarily to explain divergences from the assumed baseline of rational strategic 
behavior. The realist tradition in international relations has generated an impressive 
number of seminal studies featuring substantial diversity and regular intra-paradigmatic 
debate. Yet it is nevertheless possible to isolate a shared set of assumptions and 
predictions about the international system across the realist tradition, “a set of normative 
emphases,” and in doing so to assess the ability of realist logic to explain the puzzle at the 
core of this study (Ferguson and Mansbach 1988, 79). 
 Realists emphasize the self-serving nature of human beings and the absence of 
international authority, leading to a perspective on international relations dominated by 
power and security concerns (Morgenthau 1946, Waltz 1979, Gilpin 1981, Schweller 
1997). Realists tend to treat states as unitary actors whose international behavior is driven 
by rational calculations regarding how to best achieve security given their relative power. 
Uncertainty regarding other states’ intentions fuels fear of those that are powerful, 
proximate, and potentially aggressive, driving them to see those states as the main threats 
to their continued survival (Walt 1987). As a result, the primary foreign policy challenge 
from the realist perspective consists of deciding how to deal with those threats—whether 
to balance against them through internal military buildups or external alliances, or to 
bandwagon with them and hopefully avoid their wrath (Mearsheimer 1994, Walt 1987, 
Waltz 1979). Seeking to control their own fate as much as possible, states should pursue 
internal balancing strategies where feasible, external balancing strategies where 
necessary, and bandwagoning strategies where desperate  (Parent and Rosato 2015). 
Accordingly, realists hold that states’ foreign policies and the resulting patterns of 
international conflict and cooperation can be best understood by the availability of 
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opportunities to employ balancing strategies with realistic hope of success (Rosato 2011, 
2).  
Although the most prominent realist works focus on great power dynamics, the 
conventional wisdom regarding weak states that emerges from the realist tradition is that 
weak states tend to bandwagon with threatening great powers. As Walt (1987, 24) puts it, 
“Small states bordering a great power may be so vulnerable that they choose to 
bandwagon rather than balance, especially if a powerful neighbor has demonstrated its 
ability to compel obedience.” Extreme power asymmetries place weak states at the mercy 
of their stronger peers, encouraging bandwagoning “simply because it is not sensible to 
tangle with them” (Waltz 1979, 113). Bandwagoning should be especially appealing to 
weak states facing overwhelmingly powerful neighbors, whose proximity makes them 
“capable of rapid and effective action” that maximizes the “special peril of defection” in 
international security (Walt 1987, 31). In seeking to explain variations among the weaker 
post-Soviet states’ policies towards Russia, realist logic looks for variations in the 
distribution of power among them and in the engagement of powerful third parties as 
potential allies, assessing the feasibility of balancing strategies for each post-Soviet state 
based on its external circumstances rather than examining its unit-level characteristics. 
 Applying realist logic to the post-Soviet region produces several predictions about 
the fourteen weaker post-Soviet states’ behavior towards Russia in the aftermath of the 
Soviet Union’s collapse. First, realism predicts that all fourteen newly independent states 
should have interpreted Russia as their greatest potential threat. After the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the asymmetry of the power distribution between Russia and its fourteen 
post-Soviet neighbors was overwhelming—Russia’s military and economic capabilities 
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were at least three times larger than the next strongest state in the group, Ukraine, and 
dwarfed the capabilities of most other post-Soviet states (Singer 1988). Given this 
extreme disparity, realist logic predicts a relatively uniform threat perception across the 
weaker post-Soviet states. 
Even using Stephen Walt’s broader conceptualization that accounts for not just 
aggregate power but also the geographic proximity of the threat, its offensive capabilities, 
and perceptions of its aggressive intentions, Russia should still have been considered the 
primary threat by all fourteen weaker post-Soviet neighbors (Walt 1987, 275). For each 
of the fourteen Russia met all of the above criteria, possessing far greater aggregate 
power, existing in close proximity (bordering most), maintaining substantial offensive 
capabilities, and having dominated those states under Soviet rule and also earlier under 
the Russian Empire. Yet not all of the fourteen weaker post-Soviet states did interpret 
Russia as their major security threat after the collapse of the Soviet Union, so this 
expectation should spark initial skepticism towards realism’s ability to explain these 
states’ behavior after the Soviet Union’s collapse. 
Given the proximate and overwhelming threat they faced, realism also predicts 
that the fourteen weaker post-Soviet states should have sought to balance against Russia 
if possible, or else to bandwagon with it if balancing seemed futile. Most realists maintain 
that “balancing, not bandwagoning, is the behavior induced by the system” (Waltz 1979, 
126). States can balance internally by increasing and mobilizing their own military forces 
or externally by forming alliances to counter their common adversary (Walt 1987, 5-6, 
Waltz 1979, 118). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, the power disparity 
between Russia and its neighbors was so high that none of the fourteen weaker post-
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Soviet states could realistically hope to counter the potential threat of Russia via internal 
balancing. Even a defensive alliance involving all fourteen weaker post-Soviet states—
assuming such a cohesive coalition was even possible—would not have possessed 
enough aggregate military power to counter Russia (Abdelal 2001, 5). 
That said, a peculiar set of circumstances in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet 
Union’s collapse did open the possibility of internal balancing to three post-Soviet states. 
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan inherited nuclear weapons from the former Soviet 
military, creating a unique opportunity to ensure their own unilateral ability to deter 
potential Russian aggression and enabling them to balance against it despite their 
relatively weaker economies and conventional militaries. According to the realist 
perspective, the leaders of these countries should have recognized this nuclear capability 
as a priceless guarantee of their states’ survival and hence should have pursued an 
internal balancing strategy towards Russia. As Mearsheimer (1993, 57) wrote at the time, 
“Ukraine’s nuclear weapons would be an effective deterrent against a Russian 
conventional attack or nuclear blackmail”. Contrary to realist expectations, however, all 
three countries chose to hand over their nuclear weapons to Russia rather than seize the 
opportunity to balance against it. Two of those states, Belarus and Kazakhstan, were 
actually among the most eager bandwagoners, prioritizing cooperation with Russia 
throughout the period during and after the Soviet Union’s collapse. Their conduct further 
calls into question the sufficiency of realist logic to explain international security 
behavior. 
For weak states that are incapable of dealing with their primary threat via internal 
balancing, realism predicts that they should pursue external balancing strategies wherever 
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those strategies offer a realistic chance of success. In other words, weak states should 
seek security through alliances wherever powerful partners are willing and where their 
combined strength appears sufficient to deter an attack. Where such allies are 
unavailable, however, weak states should seek to bandwagon with their overwhelmingly 
powerful neighbor, with the weakest among them trying hardest to secure any relief from 
their profound vulnerability. Balancing activities in the absence of external security 
guarantees are especially perilous because they give the powerful state an incentive to 
launch preventive actions, as has been demonstrated for example in situations of nuclear 
proliferation (Debs and Monteiro 2017) 
In the aftermath of the Soviet Union, the very opposite was the case. Some of the 
weakest post-Soviet states at the time of their independence (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, 
and Georgia) did not even consider bandwagoning with Russia as an option. Instead, 
those states urgently sought to cut ties with it and to secure external alliances even when 
potential allies were not forthcoming. Those states saw their path to salvation in aligning 
with NATO (the only possible countervailing alliance in the early 1990s), behavior that 
accords with realist logic to the extent that NATO membership appeared achievable. 
Despite the fact that the Baltic states later became members of NATO, though, during the 
early 1990s the United States was not willing to offer NATO membership to any post-
Soviet states (nor even central European states), as its leaders prioritized German 
reunification and verbally foreswore further NATO expansion to secure Russia’s 
acceptance of that objective (Shifrinson 2016, Maass and Shifrinson 2017). Without any 
reliable Western allies, the open pursuit of NATO membership by weak post-Soviet 
states risked immediate retaliation from Russian leaders seeking to regain regional 
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influence. Nevertheless, the three Baltic States remained resolute in their Westward 
orientation for more than a decade before they were finally admitted to NATO in 2004. 
Georgia, Ukraine, and to some extend Moldova, also pursued NATO membership (so far 
unsuccessfully) despite punishments from Russia. 
To summarize, after the collapse of the Soviet Union not all fourteen of the 
weaker post-Soviet states interpreted Russia as their major security threat. Those that 
inherited the strongest potential deterrent from the Soviet Union handed over their 
nuclear weapons to Russia instead of using them to balance against it, and some of the 
weakest post-Soviet states refused to bandwagon despite having no ready-and-willing 
allies guaranteeing their security against Russian retaliation. Realist theory fails to 
explain this variation in the fourteen weaker post-Soviet states’ security strategies, 
demonstrating a need to move away from explanations primarily concerned with the 
distribution of power among states in order to solve this puzzle. 
1.4.2 Liberalism 
The liberal approach to international relations encompasses a large variety of 
theories highlighting factors like economic interdependence, democracy, and 
international institutions. Although liberalism concurs with realism in viewing states as 
the primary actors in an anarchic world, two essential assumptions of the liberal approach 
lead it to see more room for cooperation between states than realists do. First, states are 
largely motivated by economic incentives and absolute gains that incline them to seek 
cooperation with other states. Second, this cooperation is facilitated by international 
institutions that dampen security concerns by providing channels of communication, 
reducing the costs of transactions, building mutual trust, and establishing a robust system 
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of norms (Keohane and Martin 1995, 41-42, Keohane 1984). As a result, liberal studies 
of international conflict and cooperation tend to center on states’ economic interests and 
complex interdependence (Moravcsik 1998, 3-4, Keohane and Nye 2011). Liberal 
explanations for the variations among the fourteen weaker post-Soviet states’ policies 
towards Russia should therefore focus on assessing the economic incentives and 
institutional arrangements available to them in the aftermath of the Soviet Union. 
Despite its own economic troubles during the 1990s, Russia represented a 
relatively large neighboring market that offered important opportunities for each of the 
other post-Soviet states as a trading partner, and even after the Soviet collapse Russia was 
willing to give large subsidies to the fledgling economies of its post-Soviet neighbors and 
to forgive their debts if they chose to cooperate (Abdelal 2001, 15). Among its 
constituent republics, the Soviet Union had operated an extremely interdependent 
economic system manifested in trade, cultural ties, transportation networks, people’s 
mobility, etc. (Kubicek 2009, 240). Liberal logic predicts that the widespread 
opportunities for economic gain by maintaining these institutionalized interdependences 
should have given most weaker post-Soviet states strong incentives for cooperation if not 
full economic reintegration after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As Matthew 
Evangelista writes, “It is hard to argue that the policies of the republics in trying to break 
away from Moscow were driven strictly by pursuit of economic utility” as “virtually all 
of them stood to lose” (Evangelista 1996, 183-184). 
Applying its logic to the puzzle of this study, liberalism predicts that the newly 
independent states that had strong incentives to continue preexisting economic ties 
should have cooperated with Russia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, both the 
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economic and institutional interdependence that liberal scholars identify as producing 
incentives for cooperation were far stronger between the weaker post-Soviet states and 
Russia than in most other contexts looking beyond the post-Soviet space. Most of these 
states emerged in the early 1990s with struggling economies, and they had a lot to lose 
and not much to gain by refusing to cooperate with Russia. The exceptions were oil-rich 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. While they too were part of the extremely interdependent 
Soviet system and had to work hard to develop into full-fledged independent economies, 
unlike the other twelve they stood to gain by cutting economic ties with Russia, leaving 
the ruble zone, and switching to world prices (Goldberg, Ickes, and Ryterman 1994, 310, 
Tarr 1994, 12-13). Thus, liberal logic would expect Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to be 
the only ones among the fourteen weaker post-Soviet states to seek economic 
independence from Russia.    
Liberal arguments rooted in economic and institutional interdependence appear 
inadequate to explain the variations among the fourteen post-Soviet states’ foreign policy 
choices towards Russia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, several of them 
interpreted cooperation with Russia as threatening to their independence instead of 
treating it primarily as a mutually beneficial economic arrangement. Some of the most 
heavily dependent economies, the three Baltic countries and Georgia, refused to join the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the organization that was put forward to 
facilitate cooperation among the Soviet Union’s various successor states, and even some 
of the states that joined the CIS opted not to join its various sub-institutions and refused 
to ratify some Russian-backed CIS agreements (Kuzio 2000). Meanwhile, Kazakhstan 
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disregarded its economic incentives for independence and emerged as one of the most 
fervent supporters of close economic cooperation with Russia.   
Liberal scholars may assume that some of the post-Soviet states expected other 
trade partners to offer viable alternatives for future economic growth that might 
overwhelm the short-term negative effects of cutting ties with Russia. However, their 
decisions to cooperate or not cooperate at the time of the Soviet collapse suggest that they 
made up their minds long before any guarantees of economic partnerships from external 
states were forthcoming. The Baltic States were very determined to cut ties with Russia 
and seek economic cooperation with the European Union (EU), never wavering from this 
path despite enduring economic punishments from Russia for their Westward orientation 
and achieving EU membership only in 2004. On the other hand, Belarus (geographically 
as close to Western Europe as the Baltic States) as well as some of the Central Asian 
states opted for tighter economic cooperation with Russia. These observations cast initial 
doubt on the sufficiency of liberal logic to explain post-Soviet foreign policy, and later 
chapters will further evaluate liberalism’s predictions against the evidence regarding the 
fourteen weaker post-Soviet states’ choices in regard to cooperation with Russia. 
1.4.3 Cultural Similarity 
While not as prominent as realist and liberal theories, some scholars and many 
pundits argue that international cultural similarities affect states’ foreign policy choices. 
Namely, this view holds that states sharing ethnic, linguistic, or religious similarities 
should be more inclined to cooperate, while culturally distinct states should be more 
conflict prone. The most prominent advocate of this approach was Samuel Huntington 
(1996, 155), who predicted that patterns of international conflict and cooperation in the 
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post-Cold War world would be driven most prominently by cultural differences and 
similarities because “countries tend to bandwagon with countries of similar culture and to 
balance against countries with which they lack cultural commonality.” He conceptualized 
cultural similarity as largely based on religion, classifying states into broad cultural 
identities as “civilizations,” three of which include post-Soviet states: Orthodox (Russia, 
Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia); Western (Lithuania, Latvia, and 
Estonia); and Islamic (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Azerbaijan). 
Following cultural similarity logic, states representing the Orthodox civilization 
should be more likely to bandwagon with Russia, while states representing the Western 
and Islamic civilizations should be more likely to balance against Russia. This prediction 
fails at face value. Although Huntington’s “Western” countries did interpret Russia as 
their primary threat in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, several countries 
representing the “Orthodox” civilization did so as well. Moreover, most of the states 
representing the “Islamic” civilization did not and instead developed positive 
relationships with Russia. 
Several major problems render Huntington’s theory inadequate to explain the 
security policies of the fourteen weaker post-Soviet states. First, it attempts to create a 
parsimonious theory while relying on context- and time-specific cultural variables. 
Second, it overlooks striking internal diversities within the broad cultural category of 
civilization. Third, its predictions are based on relatively passive cultural attributes (e.g., 
ethnicity, language, religion), which by themselves are not strong determinants of states’ 
behavior unless activated by more dynamic socio-political processes. 
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It is unfortunate that Huntington’s work garnered so much attention because more 
nuanced cultural approaches have much more to offer scholars of international security. I 
argue that the key to unlocking their potential lies in shifting the emphasis from passive 
distributions of cultural attributes to more dynamic domestic ideological processes such 
as shared experiences that mobilize communities and unify them into nations. Those 
processes affect their self-image, their perceptions of even an overwhelmingly powerful 
neighbor, and hence their foreign policy choices. In other words, cultural attributes such 
as ethnicity, religion, language, are not static factors—they evolve, change, are activated 
and deactivated. The best way to study the effects of cultural factors is not by adopting a 
primordial perspective but by building on the recent constructivist tradition in 
international relations. In the following chapter I situate national mobilization theory in 
the scholarship of constructivism and outline its theoretical arguments and predictions. 
1.5 Roadmap 
The chapters that follow examine the role of national mobilization in driving 
variations across the weaker post-Soviet states’ security strategies. Chapter 2 lays out 
national mobilization theory, detailing how nations mobilize and how the processes 
involved in their mobilization affect their subsequent foreign policy choices. It goes on to 
contrast the testable predictions of national mobilization theory against those of the 
various current conventional theories discussed above. Finally, it discusses the 
methodologies used in the chapters that follow as well as the reasoning behind the case 
selection. 
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Chapters 3-5 test the empirical validity of national mobilization theory against the 
conventional approaches in two ways. First, Chapter 3 conducts a correlational analysis 
across all fourteen post-Soviet states’ foreign policy choices towards Russia in the 
aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse. Operationalizing each theory’s core concepts 
using multiple relevant proxy variables, it seeks to establish which theory best predicts 
the variations in security strategies by investigating their correlations with the theories’ 
respective independent variables. Although the relatively small number of cases 
precludes more robust statistical analysis, these comparisons provide useful overviews of 
the patterns of incentives facing the fourteen weaker post-Soviet states and ultimately 
offer substantial evidence in favor of national mobilization theory. 
Chapters 4 and 5 test the causal logic of national mobilization theory more deeply 
against those of the alternative theories through in-depth case studies of Georgia and 
Kazakhstan. Chapter 4 answers the question: why did Georgia prioritize balancing 
against Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union? My central argument is that 
Georgia’s relatively high national mobilization by the year 1990 was the primary factor 
driving its post-Soviet foreign policy choices towards Russia. Across several in-depth 
case studies focusing on the historical development of Georgian nationalism and 
Georgia’s post-Soviet foreign policy decision making, this chapter reveals how high 
national mobilization drove Georgia’s leaders to prioritize balancing strategies against 
Russia despite the fact that their strategic and economic incentives as well as cultural 
similarity all should have inclined them towards bandwagoning. 
Chapter 5 similarly asks: why did Kazakhstan prioritize bandwagoning with 
Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union? In contrast to the Georgia case, 
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Kazakhstan’s relatively low level of national mobilization by the year 1990 enabled its 
leaders to drive its post-Soviet foreign policy towards Russia rather than away from it. 
Across case studies of Kazakhstan’s national history and post-Soviet foreign 
policymaking, this chapter establishes how Kazakhstan’s political development resulted 
in a far less mobilized nation than Georgia in 1990 and, as a result, how nationalism 
played a relatively minor role in Kazakh leaders’ approach to foreign policy which freed 
them to respond more strongly to other incentives. 
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes by summarizing the main findings of the study, 
discussing its main scholarly contributions, and exploring possible applications of its 
theoretical framework beyond the former Soviet Union. 
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CHAPTER 2. NATIONAL MOBILIZATION THEORY 
Although their omnipresence in current international politics and daily vocabulary 
make them seem antique, the concepts of nation, nationality, and nationalism are fairly 
modern phenomena (Anderson 1991, 5, Hobsbawm 1992, 3). Due to its ideational nature, 
the most relevant perspective for exploring nationalism’s effect on state behavior is 
constructivism, which advances the view that core aspects of international relations are 
socially constructed through historic processes and interactions rather than given by 
nature or dictated by structure (Wendt 1999, 1-5, Adler 1997). Constructivism shifts IR 
theory’s emphasis from power politics and material forces to ideas, identities, norms, and 
international society (Katzenstein 1996, Ruggie 1998). The constructivist 
conceptualization of structure sees it as “a social rather than material phenomenon” with 
ideas as an essential determinant of both state power and interests (Wendt 1999, 20).  
The essential departure of the constructivist approach from other conventional 
approaches to international relations is the endogenization of state interests. Instead of 
treating interests as exogenous and fixed, it holds that social actors are actively engaged 
within the domestic and international cultural contexts where identities and norms are 
formed, shaping their interests and actions (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, Wendt 1992). 
Constructivist scholars have produced middle range theories on numerous issues of 
international relations, and over the past few decades their research has filled both 
theoretical and empirical gaps left by the realist and liberal approaches (Adler 2013, 
Katzenstein 1996). Constructivism has produced particularly robust theoretical and 
empirical research on the creation and diffusion of ideas and norms as well as on the 
formation of international society, state identities, and security communities of states 
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(Tannenwald 2007, Finnemore 2004, 1996, Checkel and Katzenstein 2009, Reus-Smit 
2011, Pouliot 2010). 
While much constructivist research has focused on international norms and 
society, there has also been a growing emphasis on how domestic societal and cultural 
factors affect states’ foreign policy choices (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996). 
Kier (1997) has provided a detailed account of how historical experience and local 
cultures, not rational material calculations or the demands of the international system, 
shape choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines. Berger (1998) has 
analyzed how international and domestic forces ingrained antimilitarism into Japan’s and 
Germany’s national culture, affecting the subsequent national security strategies of those 
states. Such works make a strong case that, for a better understanding of international 
relations, we need to investigate how states’ historical and domestic contexts shape their 
identities in ways that affect their foreign policy choices. 
Even as they criticize conventional approaches for treating state interests as 
exogenous, however, studies that highlight the causal role of cultural factors only rarely 
explore how cultural norms and identities are formed, making them frequently prone to 
treat those cultural factors as exogenous themselves despite acknowledging the socially 
constructed nature of identities (Kowert and Legro 1996). I argue that if we are to 
construct a reliable theory connecting national identities to foreign policy, we need to 
show where these national ideas and identities come from and why they drive foreign 
policy differently in different states. This can be accomplished by going deeper into the 
causal story and exploring the particular sources of nationalism within states, their 
predictive powers, and the level of generalizability across similar cases.  
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I build on constructivist approaches and works in the scholarship of nationalism in 
exploring national mobilization—the processes of the formation of collective national 
identities—and how those processes affected the post-Soviet states’ interests, 
perceptions, and foreign policy choices. This is not to say that material resources or 
institutional factors are irrelevant; international behavior does not happen in isolation and 
various material and ideational factors affect foreign policy choices simultaneously. 
However, as discussed in Chapter 1, basing our analysis solely on structural material 
factors does not take us very far in explaining the puzzle at the heart of this study. I argue 
that state-level variations in national mobilization can have stronger explanatory power 
than conventional material logics in accounting for the diverse asymmetric security 
strategies adopted towards Russia by the fourteen weaker post-Soviet states. 
2.1 National Mobilization Theory 
This study aims to explain why weak states choose to adopt balancing or 
bandwagoning strategies when confronting a much more powerful neighbor. Unlike 
conventional theories that see the distribution of power or economic and institutional 
interdependence as the central determinants of states’ foreign policy choices, the theory 
advanced here proposes that a state’s history and domestic ideological environment 
profoundly affect its security strategy. In short, the national mobilization of a state can 
dramatically shape how it perceives a powerful neighbor, influencing the way its leaders 
confront the decision between balancing and bandwagoning. 
My central argument is that particular historical developments prime national 
mobilization, leading nations to see themselves as unique socio-political units worthy of 
28 
 
independence, and driving their leaders to interpret their former ruler as an unparalleled 
security threat they must balance against. If national mobilization is strong in a given 
country, it means that a critical mass of that country’s population considers itself distinct 
enough from other groups to champion its own self-government, striving for a higher 
level of political autonomy than might be demanded by a nation that is less highly 
mobilized. This occurs in two ways—one internal to national leaders and another 
embedded in the relationship between leaders and the national public. First, leaders who 
have personally internalized their society’s nationalism are more likely to see their nation 
as fundamentally distinct from their neighbors and hence to prioritize their nation-state’s 
policy autonomy vis-à-vis those neighbors. Second, leaders of highly mobilized nations 
enjoy fertile domestic political conditions to reinforce their control of the state by further 
inciting nationalism among their population and anchoring their personal authority in 
national unity and independence. Regardless of their personal convictions, leaders of 
highly mobilized nations are constrained by public pressures and incentives to adopt 
policies that are in line with widespread national narratives. 
This ideological prioritization of autonomy (both within leaders themselves and 
across society) makes it more likely that leaders will interpret an overwhelmingly 
powerful neighbor as a threat that must be balanced against even in the face of a stark 
military disadvantage. As a result, states that have experienced a high degree of national 
mobilization should be more likely to rule out the prospect of bandwagoning and adopt 
balancing strategies instead, while those that are not highly mobilized should be more 
likely to accept bandwagoning as the path of least resistance. Figure 1 depicts the logic of 
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national mobilization theory in the form of an arrow diagram, which the following 
sections develop in greater detail. 
 
Figure 2.1  National Mobilization Theory Arrow Diagram 
 
2.2 Sources of National Mobilization 
Why do some states experience national mobilization differently from others? 
Nationalist sentiments among modern international leaders may seem nearly ubiquitous, 
yet there exists considerable variation in the depth and style of nationalism across states. 
Seminal works trace the emergence of nationalism to only the eighteenth century, 
implying that it is unlikely to have already saturated all societies in identical ways and to 
the same degree (Anderson 1991, Gellner 1983, Hobsbawm 1992, Hroch 1985). 
Certainly there have always been shared cultures, solidarities, and kinships among 
people, but until technological and political transformations made it possible for larger 
numbers of people to connect directly or indirectly and replace hierarchical political 
systems with more horizontal ones, individuals’ primary identification was much 
narrower than the nation—often they were commanded by presumedly divine rulers 
rather than nations  (Mann 1995, 44-45, Hall 1995, 10, Breuilly 1994). 
Nationalism is a modern phenomenon, but even in the modern world it is not 
uniformly experienced. Its emergence is linked not only to particular national 
characteristics such as ethnicity, language, and religion, but more importantly to the 
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processes of modernization and industrialization that connect people horizontally 
(Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983, Gellner 1983). Nationalism is created and strengthened 
through processes of economic growth, urbanization, expanding education and literacy, 
and the spreading of standardized cultural narratives. Under these conditions, a large 
group of people become socio-politically mobilized, creating the solidarity of an 
“imagined community” through their access to similar information and shared 
experiences (Anderson 1991, Hobsbawm 1992). These underlying processes responsible 
for driving nationalism’s emergence do not happen simultaneously everywhere or take 
the same form in every context, and thus every nation goes through its own path of 
formation (Connor 1990, Hroch 1985). 
Instead of treating nationalism as a uniform concept, national mobilization theory 
distinguishes among three sources of national mobilization: national characteristics, 
national experiences, and national information. This more nuanced conceptualization of 
nationalism helps us to parse out causal processes, as well as to clarify why earlier studies 
relying solely on national characteristics have proven inconsistent at best in explaining 
states’ international behavior. Alongside the relatively stable descriptive characteristics 
that national populations frequently use as markers to distinguish themselves from other 
groups, national mobilization theory builds on seminal works in the field in proposing 
that two other sources of nationalism—shared experiences and information dissemination 
mechanisms—are even more important determinants of a nation’s mobilization and hence 
its threat perception and foreign policy choices. 
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2.2.1 National Characteristics 
Shared characteristics such as ethnicity, language, and religion have frequently 
acted as important building blocks of national identity, used by members of the nation 
and its leaders to distinguish themselves from other nations and to justify their social and 
political uniqueness. Some scholars argue that ethnicity is the core of all forms of 
nationalism, emphasizing blood ties to the community and seeing “the boundary of the 
nation as circumscribed by the boundary of a particular ethnic group”  (Motyl 2001, 151, 
Smith 1991, 19-42, Connor 1994). Yet while ethnic kinship may be subjectively 
experienced as something concrete to unite around, ethnic identities themselves are 
socially constructed—based more on a shared belief in common ancestry than on any 
fact-based origin common to all members of an ethnic group. Some emphasize the 
importance of shared language as a central element of nationalism, while others point out 
that what matters is not what specific language a given group speaks but how accessible 
that language is as a medium to connect people and create the “imagined community” 
(Anderson 1991, 69-84, Hobsbawm 1992, 58-60). Religion is another factor often closely 
intertwined with nationalism given that its ancient roots and standardized rituals offer a 
strong unifying experience (Hobsbawm 1992, 67-68). That said, no specific religion, 
ethnicity, or language is either necessary or sufficient to produce a nation and 
nationalism. There are far more ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups than there are 
nations, and many nations include multiple ethnicities, languages, and religions. In fact, 
such characteristics can sometimes dampen national loyalties as they cut across national 
lines (e.g., pan-Slavic or pan-Islamic identities). 
32 
 
As a result, while such national characteristics are important elements of nation-
building, their predictive power for international behavior is limited. I argue that such 
attributes become relevant when they are activated in conjunction with other elements in 
processes of national mobilization. What matters more than such relatively static 
characteristics are the more dynamic shared experiences and shared information that 
emotionally connect large numbers of people, construct the social meanings of their 
cultural attributes, and generate horizontal national mobilization.  
2.2.2 National Experiences 
National experiences are significant historical events and processes experienced 
in common by large numbers of people, which offer a foundation of collective memories 
on which those people can unite into a distinct and coherent socio-political unit. Through 
the memories of these experiences (both positive and negative), members of the 
community become emotionally linked, laying the groundwork for a collective identity 
(Calhoun 1997, 51-53). Even as current retellings often mix myth and reality in 
exaggerating and glorifying past experiences, having specific factual reference points that 
the entire national population recognizes and with which it identifies is crucial for 
successful national mobilization. More traumatic or jubilatory events that affected broad 
swathes of the national population serve this purpose more strongly. Interstate wars 
regularly rank among the most important junctures, prompting leaders to frequently latch 
onto those conflicts in their efforts to anchor their nation’s collective memory and sense 
of community. As scholars of state formation have argued, national sentiments can be 
created through wars, which are used as assets for further mobilization (Mann 1993, 117, 
Tilly 2002, Posen 1993).  
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Another example of a shared experience that bonds societies into nations and 
helps them define themselves as distinct from others is the past experience of being an 
independent political entity. When a nation is directly associated with a state possessing 
recognized sovereignty over a particular territory, its citizens’ self-image as a nation 
becomes grounded in a physical presence and a shape on the map. As Hans Kohn (1939, 
1013) described it, “The most important outward factor in the formation of nationalities is 
a common territory, or rather the state. Political frontiers tend to establish nationalities. 
Many new nationalities, like the Canadian, were formed entirely because they comprised 
a political and geographic entity.” Like wars, leaders incorporate past experiences of 
independence into efforts to craft their nation’s current self-image, motivating their co-
nationals to see themselves as part of a unique group, to strive to maintain their 
nationhood, and to restore and/or defend their independence. 
2.2.3 National Information 
Societies and their leaders translate shared experiences and characteristics into a 
collective identity by cultivating national information, a broad pool of common 
knowledge, memories, and understandings spread throughout society by mechanisms 
such as public education and mass media. These information dissemination mechanisms 
facilitate the horizontal diffusion of national identity across large numbers of people, 
reinforcing their feelings of membership in and their allegiance to wider communities 
than the ones with which they interact on a daily basis (Anderson 1991, Breuilly 1994). 
Through such dissemination, the national public accesses similar information about its 
shared history, symbols, and myths—the building blocks of collective identity—and this 
common mentality reinforces its members’ feelings of belonging and directs them 
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“toward a common mental preparedness for common attitudes and common actions” 
(Kohn 1939, 1009, Gellner 1983).  
National experiences such as struggles for independence and international 
conflicts are essential elements for nation-building as described in the previous section, 
but they would not live up to their potential as shared national memories without widely-
disseminated national information about those past events. Thus, national mobilization 
results from a synergy between shared characteristics, shared historical experiences, and 
the horizontal spread of shared information. Only when many people have access to the 
same information can human characteristics and historical events unite nations.  
In sum, while all three sources of national mobilization play a part, they differ in 
their roles and relative importance and hence their effects on states’ foreign policies. A 
weak state might or might not share some national characteristics with a powerful 
neighbor, but ultimately what should most affect its foreign policy choices are not any 
cultural similarities but rather the degree to which shared experiences and effective 
information dissemination carried it through processes of national mobilization. Nations 
with past experiences of autonomous control over specific territories, international 
recognition of their independence, and active social and political participation by large 
portions of their populations should be particularly mobilized and prone to see 
themselves as unique socio-political units. States representing nations mobilized in this 
way should also be particularly prone to see powerful former rulers as threats that must 
be balanced against. 
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2.3 From National Mobilization to Threat Perception 
How does national mobilization affect threat perception? Despite the relative 
theoretical hegemony of realist approaches based on the distribution of power among 
proximate states, their unique historical and domestic processes of national mobilization 
offer a more compelling explanation for the diverging threat perceptions and security 
strategies of the fourteen weaker post-Soviet states. Two states might have similar 
experiences of being occupied by the same imperial power and after achieving 
independence occupy similar regional positions of asymmetric weakness, yet varied 
histories of national mobilization may cause them to hold distinct interpretations of their 
past experiences of domination and the current threat posed by their powerful neighbor, 
leading them to adopt contrasting security strategies. 
  National mobilization affects states’ threat perception in several ways. The most 
significant characteristic of highly mobilized nations is their prioritization of political 
autonomy. Unlike cultural communities of past eras, the modern nation-state that 
emerged parallel to the industrial revolution during the eighteenth century is distinct in 
prioritizing political autonomy as the central mobilizing principle (Gellner 1983, 1-5, 
Kohn 1967). Forming a nation implies a large number of people becoming socially 
mobilized as they create a shared popular culture, feeling connectedness and solidarity 
with each other. Higher mobilization translates into stronger solidarity among co-
nationals and a collective self-image distinct enough from other nations to merit self-rule, 
as well as the aspiration to protect and strengthen their nationhood and political 
autonomy. Through the processes described in the previous section, highly mobilized 
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nations grow particularly determined to strive for sovereignty, and once they have gained 
political independence remain particularly determined to preserve it. 
Not all nation-states are highly mobilized, and not all prioritize political autonomy 
above other preferences. Nations can exist without possessing their own sovereign states, 
and sometimes their desire for autonomy may be limited to cultural autonomy (Smith 
1991, 74). Even after gaining formal independence, nations vary in how much they 
cherish their political autonomy, and since national mobilization is historically and 
socially constructed, this variation exists not only across nations, but also across time 
within each nation. This is an important distinction: in contrast to conventional systemic 
perspectives assuming that states uniformly value their survival as autonomous political 
units (e.g. Mearsheimer 2001, Waltz 1979), the perspective adopted here expects 
significant variations across nation-states in this regard which then produces notable 
variations in their threat perceptions and behavior. 
How does the relative value of autonomy for highly-mobilized and less mobilized 
nations affect the way they perceive and react to international threats? Mobilized nations 
that prioritize autonomy will be more inclined to perceive powerful states that used to 
dominate them as irredeemable threats to their nationhood. It is important to clarify that 
the heightened value of autonomy amplifies a state’s skepticism and fears of its past foes, 
so not just any powerful state would attract the same attention. This is because a nation 
does not emerge in a vacuum—national mobilization takes place within historical context 
and in relation to other nations. As a nation mobilizes, its collective identity becomes 
defined not purely through internal processes of shared experiences and developing 
unique characteristics, but also through interactions with other nations. In fact, the 
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formation of national identity is the very process of a nation comparing itself to other 
nations and differentiating itself from them: “national identity becomes meaningful only 
through contrast with others” (Triandafyllidou 1998, 593). 
A powerful nearby state that has threatened or violated its autonomy in the recent 
past naturally becomes a significant “other” for the mobilizing nation to define itself 
against, and the memories of that past threat to its identity live on through national 
mythology and rhetoric, driving present perceptions of that state as an enduring threat 
(Triandafyllidou 1998). National mobilization actively cultivates the memories of 
negative past interactions with former adversaries, incorporating them into current 
narratives surrounding the nation’s self-image. As the importance of autonomy and the 
“us vs. them” divide grow starker, so do the perceptions of a powerful former ruler as an 
existential threat to the nation’s current autonomy. 
This argument—that national mobilization drives states to view certain peers as 
more threatening due to their role as “others” in the construction of national identity—
represents a substantial contribution to the existing literature regarding how states assess 
each other’s intentions. Intentions have been taken seriously as a component of threat 
perception dating back to Stephen Walt’s (1987) balance-of-threat theory, but recent 
scholarship on this subject has tended to paint all states with the same broad brush. For 
example, Sebastian Rosato (2015) has argued that states can never reliably discern the 
intentions of their powerful peers, forcing them to rely on worst-case assumptions if they 
want to survive. Other scholars maintain that such worst-case assumptions and the 
policies they provoke are almost always inefficient wastes of state resources, instead 
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arguing that states seek to discern each other’s intentions based on their actions, words, 
domestic characteristics, etc. (Glaser et al. 2016). 
Yet it is far from clear why we should expect all states to approach the assessment 
of intentions in the same way—whether always assuming the worst or rationally 
predicting the most probable. This study suggests that a state’s experience of national 
mobilization has a profound impact on the way it assesses the threat posed by a powerful 
former ruler. State power and the fact of past domination are no doubt important, but the 
diversity of security strategies among the weaker post-Soviet states provides ample 
evidence that even nations with a similar past experience of domination and similar 
power asymmetries can interpret the current intentions of their former ruler very 
differently. Highly mobilized nations that have defined their national identity in 
opposition to their powerful neighbor and who prioritize their own political autonomy 
will be fearful of once again being dominated by that powerful neighbor, and hence will 
be more likely perceive it as a major security threat even where it has shown minimal 
provocation in its words or actions. On the other hand, less mobilized nations placing less 
emphasis on political autonomy will be less concerned with the risks of sacrificing 
autonomy and hence less likely to perceive their former ruler as an overwhelming 
security threat. 
2.4 From Threat Perception to Security Strategy 
The next question concerns how national mobilization affects states’ foreign 
policy choices. When dealing with a powerful potential threat, states may choose between 
two fundamental strategies: balancing and bandwagoning. Balancing involves a state 
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directly opposing the threat by strengthening its internal military, economic, and 
organizational capabilities or forming external allies to jointly confront the threat. In 
contrast, bandwagoning involves joining forces with the threat in the hope that 
cooperation may divert its wrath and even generate spoils  (Mearsheimer 2001, Walt 
1987, Waltz 1979). The realist perspective expects that states seeking to survive in the 
international system will pursue internal balancing strategies when possible, external 
balancing when internal balancing is not sufficient, and bandwagoning strategies only 
when all balancing seems futile (Mearsheimer 2001, Morrow 1991, Rosato 2011). But 
this standard account of states’ preferences, threat perceptions, and foreign policy 
strategies requires reassessment when taking into account their nationalist mobilization.  
As described above, states vary in how much importance they assign political 
autonomy and how they interpret both the past domination and current threat posed by 
their former ruler. Highly mobilized nations will see a powerful former ruler as a current 
major security threat, and hence it makes sense that they would like to balance against it 
if possible. But national mobilization theory goes a step further in proposing that highly 
mobilized nations should prioritize balancing strategies even when a stark power 
asymmetry and lack of available external allies might imply that such strategies will 
prove futile. In such cases, a realist balance-of-power approach expects weak states to 
adopt bandwagoning strategies as the only option available to them with any chance to 
avoid attracting hostile attention from the powerful threat. 
Yet national mobilization alters how these strategies are interpreted. Highly 
mobilized nations will not see bandwagoning with a powerful threat as a viable option for 
political survival. At minimum, bandwagoning inherently involves a sacrifice of external 
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autonomy—aligning foreign policies and subordinating military forces—that national 
leaders who prioritize autonomy will consider too much of a compromise of their 
sovereignty to tolerate. To them, such a strategy would appear to pursue survival by 
undermining that very survival. In addition, the emotional components of nationalism 
such as pride and loyalty to their nation will create potent domestic political conditions 
casting as treacherous leaders who adopt the unpopular position of advocating 
cooperation with a former ruler (widely perceived as a current enemy). 
Less-mobilized nations do not prioritize political autonomy as much and hence 
feel less compelled to interpret a former ruler as their major security threat. As a result, 
less-mobilized nations might see bandwagoning as a preferred strategy—not necessarily 
as a desperate option to avoid attack from a powerful state, but as a potentially profitable 
option offering a lucrative economic and military partnership with a powerful ally. In 
consequence, while less nationally mobilized states’ behavior might match the predicted 
outcome of the realist perspective on bandwagoning, the causal logic behind this foreign 
policy choice will be in line with the nationalist perspective—they bandwagon with a 
powerful state not because they care about survival per se, but because they are more 
willing to sacrifice autonomy in pursuit of other interests. 
How do these national perceptions and preferences translate into state policies? 
After all, the state is not synonymous with the nation: the “state refers to a set of 
autonomous institutions in a given territory, while the nation denotes a type of cultural 
and historical community” (Smith 2008, 144). Within state institutions, particular 
individuals have the power to make foreign policy decisions. Conventional state-centric 
theories expect states to have fixed preferences (survival and economic gain being central 
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among them), and state leaders should act rationally to meet these preferences under 
given constraints. National mobilization theory departs from this view by arguing that 
states’ preferences and behavior are not independent of their history and domestic 
context, that they can vary across states and time periods, and that a nation’s self-image 
and prevalent public perceptions of its former ruler affect both the states’ preferences and 
its leader’s foreign policy decisions.  
This can happen through two different mechanisms that connect national 
mobilization to leaders’ decision making. The first mechanism is the direct one where 
state leaders emerging from a nationally mobilized society themselves embody the 
nationalist views prevalent within their society. Their own internalized nationalism 
makes such leaders see their nation as profoundly distinct from others and prioritize its 
political autonomy, driving them to interpret their former ruler as the primary current 
threat to balance against. In fact, it is particularly common in newly independent states to 
see the emergence of charismatic nationalist leaders, who become formal leaders of their 
respective states after demonstrating their devotion to national values and galvanizing 
society with their rhetoric and actions. The uncertainty associated with newly-gained 
independence is fertile ground for the emergence of leaders who manage to induce a 
sense of continuity by connecting themselves to past national heroes and a sense of 
national mission—they become “a bridge between the discredited past and the uncertain 
future” (Willner and Willner 1965, 81). These leaders utilize their status to further 
popularize nationalist agendas that they genuinely believe in and work to advance their 
nationalist goals through both their domestic and foreign policy choices.  
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The second mechanism is the indirect one where, regardless of their personal 
stance, state leaders decide to adopt nationalist views because those views are prevalent 
among their constituent populations. The leaders of highly mobilized nations recognize 
that in order to stay in power and strengthen their authority they should reflect popular 
sentiments, further stimulate nationalism in their respective states, and amplify calls for 
internal unity and independence from external powers. These leaders have incentives to 
harvest public support by actively targeting a powerful former ruler as their primary 
security threat, and in order to further strengthen their domestic political capital they 
prioritize balancing strategies over bandwagoning. In this scenario, the public and leaders 
have both incentives and opportunities to reinforce each other’s nationalist perspectives 
and threat perceptions. A nationally mobilized society incentivizes its leaders to reflect 
prevalent sentiments, while leaders themselves have a unique position to influence public 
opinion thanks to their platform and authority, which they can use to further incite 
national mobilization. Thus, both mechanisms produce the same effects on state leaders’ 
threat perceptions and their foreign policy choices.  
Leaders’ foreign policy choices that may seem irrational when viewed through the 
lens of power politics (such as balancing against an overwhelmingly powerful neighbor) 
become reasonable when taking into account their domestic ideological context. In cases 
of high national mobilization, conventional power and material calculations become 
secondary for state leaders’ foreign policy decisions. Their behavior remains rational 
insofar as it is based on their preferences, but instead of preferences as conventionally 
understood to reflect the material interests of the state as a whole, they are guided by the 
preferences of their respective nations that are formed in distinct historical and local 
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contexts. A state representing a mobilized nation might be weak and lack allies to 
effectively balance against the powerful neighbor, but in the national ideological context 
where political autonomy is highly valued and a former ruler is perceived as a major 
security threat, bandwagoning with it is simply deemed unacceptable, inclining leaders to 
prioritize balancing despite their military disadvantage. Leaders of weak states might well 
know that ostracizing a powerful neighbor can have negative economic and even military 
consequences, but strong domestic ideological forces may override cold strategic 
calculations in driving their foreign policy choices. Just as nationalism motivates 
individuals to risk their lives for their identity, so does it motivate nations to fight for 
their autonomy. 
High national mobilization alters state leaders’ calculations by narrowing the pool 
of foreign policy options seen as acceptable by their society. Nationalism has an 
emotional component to it expressed in peoples’ pride, loyalty, and readiness for sacrifice 
for their respective nations  (Strenski 2002, Stern 1995). Leaders will fear being labeled 
traitors if they attempt to bandwagon with a former ruler widely suspected of aiming to 
dominate them again. In addition, a nationally mobilized population will incline leaders 
towards balancing strategies by displaying a willingness to risk retaliation and forgo 
hardships if they believe it is a necessary step towards their collective goals of 
independence, and even if only future generations will reap the benefits of this sacrifice. 
Thus state leaders in such cases are not acting irrationally; instead, they are responding to 
a domestic ideological environment saturated by national mobilization, which limits their 
available foreign policy choices while making public support for their preferred policies 
resilient.  
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Conversely, when nations are not highly mobilized and political autonomy is not 
the central priority, the main preferences of such societies center on the economic and 
physical wellbeing of individuals, and state leaders may adopt foreign policies based on 
these material calculations. The individuals whose wellbeing leaders care about may be 
more or fewer depending on regime type, but the role of low national mobilization is the 
same. Less nationally mobilized states are less likely to interpret their former ruler as a 
major security threat and instead free to consider it as a potential economic and security 
partner. State leaders have the freedom to choose cooperative strategies without fear of 
being framed as traitors by their respective populations if they decide to bandwagon. 
From this analysis it logically follows that leaders of states with high national 
mobilization should be more likely to interpret their former ruler as a major security 
threat and adopt balancing strategies against it, while leaders of states with lower national 
mobilization should be more likely to base their policies on material calculations and 
potentially bandwagon with their former ruler. 
2.5 Predictions and Tests  
National mobilization theory proposes that high levels of national mobilization 
within newly independent states influence their choices between bandwagoning and 
balancing strategies towards their powerful former ruler by elevating their prioritization 
of autonomy and their perceptions of that former ruler as a threat. Testing this theory 
requires demonstrating the existence of the proposed association between its independent 
and dependent variables, as well as showing that this association is a result of the 
theorized causal mechanism. In addition to demonstrating the proposed causal association 
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and mechanisms at play, I evaluate the theory against the most prominent alternatives to 
determine to what degree each of them is confirmed or disconfirmed and to evaluate their 
relative explanatory powers. The analysis proceeds in two parts, including one broader 
and two more narrowly-focused empirical chapters. The first empirical chapter examines 
the correlations between the various hypothesized causal factors and the fourteen weaker 
post-Soviet states’ foreign policy choices towards Russia after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. The latter two empirical chapters conduct in-depth case studies of Georgia and 
Kazakhstan that test the specific causal mechanisms at play. 
The central puzzle under investigation is the variation of newly independent post-
Soviet states’ foreign policy choices towards Russia in the immediate aftermath of the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union. Some post-Soviet states decided to balance against 
Russia, while others prioritized bandwagoning with it. Can national mobilization theory 
explain this variation better than the alternative theories? To determine the relative 
predictive powers of each theory, we need to evaluate their theoretical predictions against 
the data. Below I list the central predictions from each theory analyzed in the earlier 
sections. 
Realist theory predicts that the newly independent post-Soviet states should 
choose bandwagoning or balancing strategies towards Russia based on balance of power 
logic given the opportunities and constraints created by their positions in the distribution 
of international power. States should balance against Russia if they possess a credible 
internal path to fielding a competitive military or sufficient deterrent, or if they enjoy 
potential allies capable of jointly deterring Russia. On the other hand, realist logic 
predicts that weak states incapable of balancing internally and lacking options for 
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external alliances should bandwagon with Russia as their best chance to avoid possible 
attack from that powerful neighbor. In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union, 
realist theory therefore predicts that the three post-Soviet states which inherited nuclear 
capabilities (Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan) should have balanced against Russia, 
while the other post-Soviet states should have bandwagoned with Russia due to their 
overwhelming weakness unless offered a credible and quick path to membership in an 
alliance capable of deterring potential Russian aggression. 
Liberal theory predicts that states’ foreign policy choices are primarily influenced 
by economic incentives and institutional interdependence. All fourteen states were highly 
interdependent during the Soviet Union and almost all of them, with the exception of oil-
rich Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, had very tangible economic incentives to remain 
engaged in Russia’s market. Thus, liberal theory predicts that after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan should prioritize economic independence, 
while the other twelve states should prioritize bandwagoning and cooperation with 
Russia. 
Cultural similarity approaches propose that states base their balancing and 
bandwagoning choices on cultural similarities. As a result, this perspective predicts that 
post-Soviet states representing the Orthodox civilization (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, 
Georgia, and Armenia) should have bandwagoned with Russia, while those representing 
the Western and Islamic civilizations should have viewed Russia as a greater threat and 
hence worked to balance against it. 
In contrast, national mobilization theory proposes that states with highly 
mobilized nations should especially value political autonomy, be more likely to view 
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their former ruler as an existential threat, and prioritize balancing, while states with less 
national mobilization should be more likely to bandwagon with their powerful neighbor. 
Therefore, it predicts that the post-Soviet states that were highly mobilized as nations by 
the time the Soviet Union was disintegrated (e.g., the Baltic states and Georgia) should 
balance against Russia, while the post-Soviet states that were less nationally mobilized by 
that time (e.g., the Central Asian states and Belarus) should be more likely to bandwagon 
with Russia.  
In Chapter 3, I utilize historical data on these dependent and independent 
variables to examine whether states’ respective levels of national mobilization are 
associated with their balancing/bandwagoning choices towards Russia, comparing that 
correlation with those produced by alternative explanatory factors such as the post-Soviet 
states’ relative power and alliance prospects, economic incentives and interdependence, 
or cultural similarities to Russia. Demonstrating a strong association between its 
proposed independent and dependent variables while simultaneously showing the relative 
weakness of alternative explanations, this comparative analysis represents an important 
test for the theory that establishes a baseline of plausibility for it. This confirmation is 
especially significant given that the alternative theories represent the established 
conventional wisdom, and by contradicting their logic national mobilization theory enters 
the analysis with relatively low prior confidence in the existence of a causal relationship 
between its proposed independent and dependent variables. 
The reasoning behind selecting these fourteen post-Soviet states for the general 
correlational analysis is manifold. First, it provides substantial variation in the 
phenomenon that the study aims to explain: the weaker successor states’ balancing and 
48 
 
bandwagoning choices towards their powerful former ruler. National mobilization theory 
may also be applied to other cases of empires splitting into fewer successor states, but our 
ability to test it benefits greatly from this variation in the dependent variable. Second, this 
selection of states displays significant variation in the experience of national 
mobilization, the central independent variable of the study theorized to be the key 
predictor of states’ foreign policy behavior. In addition, the fact that the post-Soviet states 
endured many similar experiences under centralized Soviet rule for multiple generations 
controls for many potential socio-institutional factors, offering rich ground for most-
similar case comparisons. Finally, the many conflicts and enduring instability of the 
region, combined with Russia’s importance on the global political stage merit further 
scrutiny to better understand these dynamics.  
This correlational analysis offers only an initial corroboration of the theory. It 
alone is insufficient to make persuasive inferences about whether the post-Soviet states’ 
security strategies were driven by national mobilization theory’s causal logic. Good 
theory testing requires not only the demonstration of the existence of the hypothesized 
association between variables, but showing that the proposed causal mechanism is in fact 
what is connecting the cause and effect. Chapters 4 and 5 conduct in-depth case studies 
that empirically test whether the course of events and decisions in Georgia and 
Kazakhstan reflect national mobilization theory’s causal logic or whether factors 
highlighted by the alternative theories offer a better explanation for those countries’ 
behavior. 
Why were these two cases selected for deeper analysis? The in-depth case studies 
serve a different goal from the correlational chapter in testing the causal logic between 
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variables, and thus the relevant criteria for selecting cases are different. When testing a 
theory’s causal mechanisms through process tracing, one of the most meaningful avenues 
for analysis is to select representative cases—where both the proposed cause and effect 
are either present or absent—and to evaluate whether one is in fact connected to another 
through the theorized causal logic. The cases of Georgia and Kazakhstan represent clear 
cases of balancing and bandwagoning security strategies toward Russia as well as distinct 
cases of high and low national mobilization. Georgia was one of the first states to declare 
independence from the Soviet Union even before it officially disintegrated and Georgia 
also declined to join the CIS, the Russia-led organization to facilitate cooperation among 
newly independent post-Soviet states. In contrast, Kazakhstan was the last member to 
reluctantly leave the Soviet Union, and it immediately joined the CIS with the goal of 
reintegration with Russia. 
In addition, both Georgia’s and Kazakhstan’s foreign policies towards Russia 
represent puzzles for conventional perspectives. Each of the alternative theories predicts 
that the militarily and economically weak Georgia which shared Orthodox civilization 
with Russia should have bandwagoned with it. Yet Georgia prioritized balancing against 
Russia in defiance of balance-of-power calculations, economic incentives, and cultural 
similarity. In the case of Kazakhstan, the realist, liberal, and cultural-similarity theories 
predict that this post-Soviet state rich with natural resources, representing the Islamic 
civilization, and emerging from the Soviet Union with nuclear capabilities should have 
balanced against its powerful former ruler. Yet Kazakhstan prioritized bandwagoning and 
was enthusiastic to reintegrate with Russia both economically and militarily in the 
aftermath of the Soviet Union. 
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These case studies utilize process-tracing methodology, which is the best tool 
available to establish causality by tracing within-case empirical material demonstrating 
the workings of causal mechanisms at play (Beach and Pedersen 2019, George and 
Bennett 2005, Mahoney 2012). This approach requires explicit theoretical unpacking of 
the causal logic as well as empirical demonstration of the presence or absence of the 
expected observables at each step of the causal chain (Beach 2017, Russo and 
Williamson 2007, Illari, Russo, and Williamson 2011, Machamer 2004). Process tracing 
conducted in this manner allows us to establish a strong case for causality between the 
independent and dependent variables by demonstrating that the sequence of events and 
the available evidence of actors’ motivations match the theorized expectations. 
In the case study of Georgia, I seek to answer the following question: Why did 
Georgia prioritize balancing against Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union? The 
central task is to establish whether Georgia’s high national mobilization was in fact what 
led it to prioritize balancing strategies against Russia, or if other theories provide better 
explanations for this outcome. In brief, national mobilization theory predicts that 
Georgia, having undergone a relatively intense process of national mobilization, should 
have experienced a correspondingly intense national identity framed in “us vs. them” 
terms against Russia. Its people and leaders should have placed an especially high value 
on their national political autonomy. Seeing Russia as the greatest threat to that 
autonomy, they should have rejected bandwagoning as entailing an unacceptable sacrifice 
of autonomy and instead prioritized balancing against their powerful former ruler. In 
contrast, realist theory predicts that Georgian leaders should have based their threat 
perceptions on power realities and their security strategies on systemic incentives and 
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constraints; liberal theory predicts that Georgian leaders should have chosen their 
partners and adversaries on the basis of economic opportunities and international 
institutions; and cultural-similarity theory predicts that Georgian leaders should have seen 
states sharing their Orthodox civilization as less threatening than those embodying alien 
civilizations.  
The second in-depth case study, on Kazakhstan, seeks to answer the question: 
Why did Kazakhstan prioritize bandwagoning with Russia after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union? In answering this question I test the prediction that a state’s low national 
mobilization makes it more likely to bandwagon with its former ruler. Here national 
mobilization theory predicts that Kazakhstan, as a less-mobilized nation by the 1990, 
should have a less pronounced “us vs. them” mentality towards its powerful former ruler. 
Its people and leaders should assign less value to their national political autonomy, 
allowing their leaders to reach a more benign interpretation of Russian intentions and 
view the sacrifice of foreign policy autonomy involved in bandwagoning as a worthwhile 
tradeoff to achieve economic and security benefits. In contrast, realist theory predicts that 
Kazakh leaders should have based their threat perceptions on power realities and should 
have seen their nuclear inheritance as a profound balancing tool; liberal theory predicts 
that Kazakh leaders should have prioritized economic and institutional considerations; 
and cultural-similarity theory predicts that Kazakh leaders should have seen powerful 
neighbors not sharing their Islamic civilization as profound threats.   
Each of these in-depth case studies provide an opportunity for more credible 
inferences about the theory’s proposed causal logic by unpacking causal components that 
can be confirmed or disconfirmed by the gathered data. This approach requires more 
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nuanced historical data on the sequence of events under investigation as well as the 
motivations behind leaders’ decisions. I use primary and secondary sources to assess the 
prevalent national preferences in states, public and leaders’ threat perceptions, leaders’ 
foreign policy choices, and their motivations and reasoning for selecting particular 
policies. While secondary sources provide valuable information about the sequence of 
important events, actions, and contextual motivations of actors, primary sources such as 
transcripts of congressional debates, official statements, and testimonies of actors offer 
unique evidence bearing on which causal logic was at play. The detailed elaboration of 
causal mechanisms on one hand leads to better causal theories as they allow thorough 
logical scrutiny, and on the other hand by making possible the empirical study of each 
causal component it leads to the possibility of stronger causal inferences about the 
theorized causal process (Beach 2017). 
In addition to secondary sources, the Georgia case study benefited from two 
summers of field work in Tbilisi, Georgia, including research at the National 
Parliamentary Library of Georgia and the Central Archive of Contemporary History. 
From these two main sources I was able to gather theoretically important historical data 
on nineteenth- and twentieth-century Georgia, as well as primary accounts of Georgia’s 
leaders decision-making processes in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. The Kazakhstan 
case study was bolstered by numerous primary and secondary sources made available by 
a research fellowship at the Russian, East European, and Eurasian Center at the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 
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CHAPTER 3. EXAMINING POST-SOVIET SECURITY STRATEGIES 
What explains variations in the weaker post-Soviet states’ foreign policy choices 
towards Russia in the aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union? As Chapter 2 
discussed, national mobilization theory aims to improve upon the shortcomings of 
previous explanations based on realism, liberalism, and cultural similarity. For first-cut 
correlational analysis across all fourteen weaker post-Soviet states, this chapter 
operationalizes the dependent variable as well as the central predictors of each theory 
using relevant proxy variables. The resulting correlations and comparisons illustrate clear 
patterns against which each theory’s predictions can be tested. 
The reminder of this chapter is divided into six sections. The first provides a brief 
historical appraisal of the weaker post-Soviet states’ foreign policy choices (the 
dependent variable), including the rationales for operationalizing them with the specific 
proxy variables used here. The next four sections take the four competing theories in turn, 
constructing relevant proxy variables for the causal factors highlighted by each theory 
and analyzing their predictive powers. The final section concludes by comparing the 
theories’ relative performance on these tests, which offer substantial evidence that 
national mobilization theory represents an improvement over the conventional wisdom. 
3.1 Post-Soviet Security Strategies: The Dependent Variable 
To capture the variations across the weaker post-Soviet states’ security strategies 
toward Russia, I construct a categorical proxy variable assessing the relative prevalence 
of balancing vs. bandwagoning in their foreign policies after the Soviet Union’s collapse. 
I assign each state to one of four categories: committed balancing (Lithuania, Latvia, 
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Estonia), balancing (Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova), ambivalent/neutral (Azerbaijan, 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan), and bandwagoning (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Armenia). Countries were coded based on a combination of sources including 
their efforts to join and their participation within regional and international organizations 
such as the CIS and NATO, their United Nations General Assembly voting records, and 
their security strategies as developed and applied during the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and its aftermath. 
Although membership in international organizations does not tell us everything, 
the efforts of these states to join major regional organizations offer a strong first-cut 
proxy for their post-independence security strategies. Russia sought to channel regional 
policies through the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) during the early 1990s, 
and it proceeded to create several other economic and security organizations that offered 
ready avenues for bandwagoning including the Commonwealth of Independent States 
Free Trade Area (CISFTA), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the 
Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), and the Union State of Russia and Belarus. 
Meanwhile, NATO and the European Union (EU) remained the most prominent Western 
security and economic organizations, though their doors were not initially open for 
membership, and some CIS members created the sub-group GUAM to counter Russian 
influence within that organization. Table 3.1 shows the membership choices of the 
fourteen weaker post-Soviet states, assigning each state 2 points for joining each pro-
Russian organization, -1 point for seeking to compromise Russian influence within the 
CIS by joining GUAM, and -2 points for pursuing membership in the major Western 
organizations. 
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Table 3.1 Post-Soviet States’ Organization Membership Choices 
Countries CIS CISFTA CSTO EEU 
Union 
State 
GUAM EU NATO Total Security Strategy 
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 -2 -4 Committed Balancing 
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 -2 -4 Committed Balancing 
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 -2 -4 Committed Balancing 
Georgia 2 0 0 0 0 -1 -2 -2 -3 Balancing 
Ukraine 2 2 0 0 0 -1 -2 -2 -1 Balancing 
Moldova 2 2 0 0 0 -1 -2 -2 -1 Balancing 
Azerbaijan 2 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 1 Ambivalent/neutral 
Turkmenistan 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 Ambivalent/neutral 
Uzbekistan 2 2 0 0 0 -1 0 0 3 Ambivalent/neutral 
Tajikistan 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 6 Bandwagoning 
Armenia 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 8 Bandwagoning 
Kazakhstan 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 8 Bandwagoning 
Kyrgyzstan  2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 8 Bandwagoning 
Belarus  2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 10 Bandwagoning 
 
As Table 3.1 reflects, the committed balancers (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) 
consistently rejected membership in any of the Russia-led organizations that emerged 
after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Instead, they consistently pursued membership in 
the EU and NATO even before those organizations themselves openly contemplated 
expansion into the post-Soviet sphere, eventually securing membership in both 
organizations in 2004. The balancers (Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova) also sought 
membership in those Western organizations (so far unsuccessfully) but also demonstrated 
some engagement with Russia-led organizations. These three states each joined the CIS, 
though Georgia joined late and then withdrew, while Ukraine was a CIS associate rather 
than a full member. Ukraine and Moldova also joined the CISFTA. Within the CIS, 
however, they formed the GUAM Organization for Democracy and Development to chart 
a course beyond Russian influence. 
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The ambivalent/neutral states (Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) 
exhibited the least interest in participating in regional organizations, whether pro-Russian 
or Western. Turkmenistan was only an associate member of the CIS. Azerbaijan and 
Uzbekistan joined the CIS (the latter joined the CISFTA as well) but both of those states 
also participated in GUAM (temporarily for Uzbekistan, during which time the 
organization changed its name to GUUAM to reflect its additional member). Finally, the 
bandwagoners (Tajikistan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Belarus) consistently 
bandwagoned with Russia, not only joining both the CIS and the CISFTA but also 
participating in one or more of Russia’s desired avenues of deeper security and economic 
integration (the CSTO, the EEU, and the Union State with Belarus).  
To check the robustness of these classifications by examining whether these 
states’ broader foreign policy behavior mirrored their organizational membership choices, 
I also examined two other variables based on the United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) voting data of these states. The UNGA represents a unique forum where 
countries disclose their policy preferences on a wide range of issues over a long period of 
time, and as a result UNGA voting data has become a popular tool for research in 
international politics (Gartzke 1998, Bearce and Bondanella 2007, Kim and Russett 1996, 
Lai and Morey 2006). I use the voting similarity index (agree3un) found in the UNGA 
voting dyadic dataset. The index (0-1) is calculated for each dyad-year by dividing a total 
number of votes on which a given dyad agreed by total number of joint votes—in 
addition to “yes” and “no” votes, “abstentions” are counted as half-agreements (Voeten 
2013). Most UNGA votes concern issues on which most states share uniform positions, 
making indicators based on the full voting record imply general harmony among states, 
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but nevertheless substantial variations can be observed. The column labeled similarity in 
Table 3.2 provides each state’s average similarity scores to Russia on UNGA votes 
between 1991 and 2013. While the similarity index for each dyad fluctuates across years 
due to various internal and external changes, these average scores show each state’s 
overall relative distance from Russia across foreign policy issues. 
Table 3.2 Post-Soviet States’ Security Strategies 
Country Similarity Distance  Membership Choices Security Strategy  
Estonia 0.778737  -4 Committed balancing  
Latvia 0.778092  -4 Committed balancing  
Lithuania 0.782451  -4 Committed balancing  
Georgia 0.789153 21.5 -3 Balancing 
Ukraine 0.795068 20.63636 -1 Balancing 
Moldova 0.787418 22.27273 -1 Balancing 
Azerbaijan 0.853278 16.18182 1 Ambivalent/neutral 
Turkmenistan 0.842823 20 2 Ambivalent/neutral 
Uzbekistan 0.835683 18.875 3 Ambivalent/neutral 
Tajikistan 0.877047 14 6 Bandwagoning 
Kazakhstan 0.868489 14.18182 8 Bandwagoning 
Armenia 0.862187 13.6 8 Bandwagoning 
Kyrgyzstan  0.861317 15.22222 8 Bandwagoning 
Belarus  0.884128 11.18182 10 Bandwagoning 
 
The column labeled Distance in Table 3.2 provides another measure that captures 
the distance in foreign policy choices between Russia and the eleven post-Soviet states 
that were CIS members (excluding the Baltic states). This proxy is also based on UNGA 
voting data but constructed based on different criteria (Hansen 2015). Only the roll-call 
votes for entire resolutions that were passed between 1992 and 2013 were used, and if a 
state was absent for more than one-third of total votes in a single session that dyad-year 
was dropped from the analysis. Each state received a score for its foreign policy distance 
from Russia between 0 (minimum distance) and 100 (maximum distance), calculated by 
58 
 
assigning 0 points for agreement, ½ point for partial disagreement when voting against 
the absolute majority in a two-way split, and 1 point for full disagreement when voting 
against absolute majority in a three-way split. The combined total scores are presented as 
a share of the total number of votes in the section (Hansen 2015, 71-74). The country 
scores in the Distance column of Table 3.2 were constructed by averaging Hansen (2015, 
75) yearly indicators for the eleven states. 
It is notable that the Similarity and Distance columns produce comparable 
orderings of the post-Soviet states. The similarity measure shows a clean break between 
the committed balancers and balancers on one hand and the ambivalent/neutral states and 
bandwagoners on the other, as well as less significant but still appropriate distinctions 
between each of those pairs of groups. The Distance measure also sorts the fourteen 
weaker post-Soviet states into the same four groups, though their orderings within those 
groups would slightly change if using this as a primary measure. As a result, these 
measures reinforce the appropriateness of my four-part typology of post-Soviet state 
security strategies. 
Finally, my classifications of the fourteen weaker post-Soviet states into these 
four categories accurately reflects their security strategies as developed and applied 
during the collapse of the Soviet Union and its aftermath. The three Baltic states were 
frontrunners of the secessionist movements within the Soviet Union during the late 1980s 
that sparked the cascade of declarations of sovereignty and then independence from the 
union (Walker 2003a, 64, 140). They outright rejected the New Union Treaty, a proposal 
for structural changes within the Soviet Union that would have decentralized the union in 
favor of its constituent republics, as this concession fell short of their goal of achieving 
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full-fledged political independence. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Lithuania, 
Latvia, and Estonia refused to cooperate with Russia under the newly established CIS 
(Gleason 1992, 154-155). Instead, they explicitly oriented their foreign policies against 
Russia and toward the West, never wavering in their determination to join NATO and the 
European Union, which they eventually did more than ten years later (Kramer 2002, 
O'Connor 2003, 191-193). 
Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine also displayed balancing, though these three 
states were not as cohesive in their foreign policy choices as the Baltic states were. 
Nevertheless, each of them resisted pressure to bandwagon with Russia and pursuing 
balancing strategies, even if those strategies took different forms and fluctuated across 
administrations. Georgia was the most fervent balancer among the three, boycotting the 
New Union Treaty during the twilight of the Soviet Union, rejected CIS membership in 
1991 alongside the Baltic states, and openly orienting itself toward the West (Remnick 
1990, Sakwa and Webber 1999, 393-394). Despite this balancing behavior, Georgia 
belongs in this second group because it reversed its early stance and joined the CIS in 
1994, operating as a member of that organization until 2008 when it withdrew. Even 
within the CIS, however, Georgia continued seeking to counter Russia’s influence by 
forming the GUAM Organization for Democracy and Development along with Ukraine, 
Azerbaijan, and Moldova (Cameron and Orenstein 2012, 33). 
Moldova also boycotted the New Union Treaty, and Ukraine ultimately refused to 
ratify that treaty after initially involvement in the process of negotiating it. Both Ukraine 
and Moldova joined the CIS after the collapse of the Soviet Union, though Ukraine 
refused to ratify its charter and thus had only associate status before announcing its intent 
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to withdraw after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. Despite all three of these states 
participating in the CIS, they worked to counter Russian influence within its ranks and 
displayed distinct foreign policy positions vis-à-vis Russia on many issues (Hansen 2015, 
74, 77, Kuzio 2000, 81-82). 
Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan adopted security strategies after the 
breakup of the Soviet Union that were ambivalent/neutral toward Russia. More so than 
any other post-Soviet states, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan have fluctuated between 
balancing and bandwagoning behavior. Neither of those states actively balanced during 
the twilight of the Soviet Union, as both participated in drafting and then signing the New 
Union Treaty. Both went on to join the CIS as independent states in 1991. UNGA voting 
data also reveals that these two states’ similarity index with Russia fluctuated greatly, 
showing greater convergence with Russia over time after initial divergences. On the other 
hand, Azerbaijan has been a member of GUAM since its creation in 1997, and 
Uzbekistan joined that forum as well between 1999 and 2005 (Kubicek 2009, 245-248). 
Due to that participation some scholars have included Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan in a 
pro-Western category along with Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova (Kuzio 2000, 82-83), 
but considering their particularly ambivalent foreign policy preferences it makes more 
sense to separate them into a distinct category. Turkmenistan arguably represents a closer 
match due to its consistently neutral foreign policy approach regarding Russia, its steady 
record of neutrality charting a middle course amidst the wavering perspectives of 
Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan. 
Finally, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia demonstrated 
bandwagoning behavior toward Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Belarus 
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and Kazakhstan were the most consistent and enthusiastic bandwagoners, advocating the 
maintenance of the Soviet Union during its twilight and supporting the New Union 
Treaty (Hale 2009). Once the union disintegrated, Belarus and Kazakhstan also displayed 
the closest strategic cooperation with Russia in economic and security affairs, not only as 
active CIS members but also promoters of its various sub-organizations and initiatives 
including the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(Olcott 2010, 35, Nazarbayev 1996, 98). 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan also consistently bandwagoned with Russia starting in 
1990, when they supported the New Union Treaty and held referendums that exhibited 
overwhelming popular support for the union. Since 1991, both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
have been CIS members and have participated in other organizations under the CIS 
umbrella. Among this group of post-Soviet states, Armenia alone was actively pro-
independence and anti-union in 1990, rejecting the New Union Treaty and holding a 
referendum on independence in 1991. Nevertheless, independent Armenia has 
consistently and reliably bandwagoned with Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and has been an active member of the CIS and other Russia-led military and economic 
organizations. 
3.2 Military Power: Realism’s Independent Variable 
As detailed in the preceding chapters, realist theories base their analysis of states’ 
foreign policy choices primarily on the distribution of military power among them. From 
this perspective international behavior is largely understood as driven by states’ rational 
calculations on how best to achieve security in the anarchic international system. In order 
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to explain the variations among post-Soviet states’ security strategies towards Russia, 
therefore, realist logic looks to the distribution of military power among these states. 
I use two proxies to gauge variations in military power among the post-Soviet 
states. The first, Army, which assesses the size of each state’s armed forces in 1992 based 
the Correlates of War project’s National Material Capabilities dataset (V5.0) (Singer 
1988, Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). Russia’s army of 1,900,000 troops was more 
than three times the size of the next strongest state in the group (Ukraine), dramatically 
overshadowing all of the weaker post-Soviet states. Clearly none of those other post-
Soviet states possessed “sufficient military assets to put up a serious fight in an all-out 
conventional war” against Russia, Mearsheimer’s (2001, 5) threshold for 
competitiveness. Nevertheless, he and other realists recognize that even a far weaker 
conventional power may pose a sufficient threat to deter aggression by maintaining a 
survivable nuclear arsenal. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, 
and Belarus inherited nuclear weapons alongside Russia, offering those three states a 
unique opportunity to balance against Russia despite their relative weakness in terms of 
conventional military capabilities (Table 3.3). 
 
 
 
 
 
63 
 
Table 3.3 Post-Soviet States’ Military Capabilities 
Countries Army Nuclear Security Strategy 
Ukraine 438,000 1 Balancing 
Belarus  102,000 1 Bandwagoning  
Azerbaijan 43,000 0 Ambivalent/neutral 
Uzbekistan 40,000 0 Ambivalent/neutral 
Kazakhstan 40,000 1 Bandwagoning  
Turkmenistan 28,000 0 Ambivalent/neutral 
Georgia 25,000 0 Balancing 
Armenia 20,000 0 Bandwagoning  
Kyrgyzstan  12,000 0 Bandwagoning  
Lithuania 10,000 0 Committed balancing 
Moldova 9,000 0 Balancing 
Latvia 5,000 0 Committed balancing 
Tajikistan 3,000 0 Bandwagoning  
Estonia 3,000 0 Committed balancing 
Russia 1,900,000 1  
 
Table 3.3 indicates that military power is a poor predictor of variations among the 
post-Soviet states foreign policy towards Russia. The asymmetry between Russia and 
each of the fourteen other post-Soviet states is stark: Russia’s army of 1,900,000 is so 
much larger than its peers’ that even if all fourteen weaker post-Soviet states 
hypothetically joined forces (ignoring their lack of shared desire or 
logistical/organizational capability to do so), their combined army would still number less 
than half of Russia’s (778,000). Based on this proxy, realist logic clearly predicts that all 
of these weak states should have bandwagoned with Russia. If any significant qualitative 
differences emerged among their security strategies, Ukraine appears the most likely to 
have potentially stood out from the pack as the only weaker post-Soviet state even within 
striking distance of investing in a capable defensive force. 
Beyond conventional military capabilities, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus each 
inherited nuclear arsenals when the Soviet Union collapsed. These offered a unique 
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opportunity to avoid the risks of conventional military vulnerability by investing in a 
survivable nuclear deterrent. Realist logic predicts that those states should have sought to 
retain their nuclear weapons rather than trust Russia to respect their sovereignty in the 
future regardless of any paper guarantees it might offer (Mearsheimer 1993). Not only 
did those three states fail to seize this unique opportunity, however, two of them 
(Kazakhstan and Belarus) prioritized bandwagoning with Russia rather than even attempt 
to provide security for themselves. Even Ukraine turned over its nuclear weapons to 
Russia despite orienting its foreign policy more towards balancing. 
To be sure, there were other factors affecting those states’ decisions to give up 
their nuclear weapons such as external pressure from both Russia and the West as well as 
economic and political incentives including international recognition and significant 
financial compensation for giving up nuclear weapons. While these factors loom larger 
for liberal and constructivist perspective, however, when looking through the realist 
prism they are all secondary to the credible guarantees of national survival they would 
have held by maintaining their nuclear weapons. Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea 
from the no-longer-nuclear Ukraine and its subsequent role in sponsoring separatist war 
in Ukraine’s eastern regions illustrate this point vividly. As a result, the fact that all three 
states gave up their nuclear weapons violates realist predictions. 
Realist logic expects all fourteen states to interpret Russia as a primary threat, to 
seek to balance against it if possible and resort to bandwagoning only if necessary. Yet 
their actual foreign policy behavior after the breakup of the Soviet Union violates this 
prediction as well. Not all of the other fourteen post-Soviet states interpreted Russia as a 
primary threat. Even states that were relatively well positioned to pursue their security 
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independently like Belarus and Kazakhstan were among the most enthusiastic 
bandwagoners, prioritizing unwavering cooperation with Russia. In contrast, many of the 
weakest post-Soviet states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Georgia, and Moldova) prioritized 
balancing despite their extreme power asymmetry and the risk of Russian retaliation. 
Besides a state’s own military capabilities, realist logic also considers the 
possibility of external balancing. A state might be too weak to feasibly confront a 
threatening adversary alone but might still pursue balancing if it can find one or more 
powerful allies that are willing and able to provide credible security guarantees on its 
behalf. none of the fourteen weaker post-Soviet states had credible security guarantees 
from external powers as they were making fundamental decisions to balance or 
bandwagon with Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, however. Lithuania, 
Latvia, and Estonia did become members of NATO, but the door to NATO membership 
initially appeared closed, only inching open as the 1990s progressed and with their 
membership ultimately coming in 2004, more than a decade after the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union. 
When the Baltic states decided to reject cooperation with Russia and participation 
in the Russia-led CIS during the early 1990s, they did so without any hint of security 
guarantees from the West capable of satisfying realist predictions. On the contrary, most 
Western governments feared regional destabilization and nuclear proliferation amidst the 
Soviet Union’s collapse, and hence went out of their way not to encourage secessionist 
movements within the Soviet Union. Several Western leaders had also developed positive 
relationships with Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev and openly expressed their desire 
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to see him continue with the liberalization and democratization of the Soviet Union rather 
than oversee its dissolution (Walker 2003a, 65-66). 
While Western leaders and publics alike were generally sympathetic to the 
principle of self-determination and hence to the Soviet republics’ struggles for 
independence, the official message rejecting any potential security guarantees was 
nevertheless clear. For example, U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Jack Matlock warned 
representatives of Lithuania’s popular front in 1989 that “under no circumstances” should 
they assume that “the United States or any other foreign country would be able to help 
them directly if their action brought on military and economic sanctions from Moscow” 
(Matlock 1995, 230-231). Some leaders in the Soviet Union’s Eastern European republics 
may have dreamed of NATO membership, but no realist would equate the desire for 
allies with security, and all of these states knew that any potential admission to NATO 
was not immanent and definitely not immediate. Thus, their balancing behavior 
contradicts realist predictions that weak states lacking allies will bandwagon with 
powerful neighbors (Waltz 1979, 113, Walt 1987, 24, 31). 
In sum, realist predictions based on states’ relative military power are largely 
unsubstantiated and incapable of explaining variations among the weaker post-Soviet 
states’ foreign policy choices toward Russia. We need to look to other approaches for 
help explaining why two of the relatively stronger post-Soviet states that possessed 
nuclear capabilities enthusiastically bandwagoned with Russia (Kazakhstan and Belarus) 
while several of the weakest that lacked external allies nevertheless chose to risk 
retaliation by balancing against Russia (Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Georgia and 
Moldova). That said, threat perceptions and strategic logics cannot be directly observed 
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nor directly inferred from state behavior, so Chapters 4 and 5 investigate further the role 
of strategic considerations in leaders’ decision-making processes through case studies of 
Georgia and Kazakhstan. 
3.3 Economic Incentives and Interdependence: Liberalism’s Independent Variables 
Liberal approaches emphasize the roles of economic incentives and 
interdependence driving international behavior. Liberal logic expects states to value 
absolute gains, which inclines them towards cooperation for mutual gain, and liberal 
scholars look to international institutions to facilitate that cooperation by providing 
channels of communication, reducing costs of transactions, and establishing shared 
system of norms for cooperation (Keohane and Martin 1995, 41-42, Keohane 1984). This 
chapter uses two proxies to test liberal predictions regarding the post-Soviet states’ 
foreign policy choices (Table 3.4). One of them captures the level of states’ economic 
interdependence by measuring the percentage of each Soviet republic’s total trade in 
1990 (imports and exports) that was conducted within the Soviet Union with Russia and 
the other thirteen states (Intraunion Trade). I constructed this variable using data from the 
World Bank’s 1992 report on trade of the states of the former USSR (Michalopoulos and 
Tarr 1992, 37). 
The second proxy assesses the extent to which each post-Soviet state’s terms of 
trade would benefit or lose by leaving the ruble zone and switching to world prices (Price 
of Exit). I adopted this measure from Abdelal (2001, 70-72), who constructed it based on 
Tarr’s (1994) analysis of the effect of switching to world prices on the post-Soviet states. 
Russia continued subsidizing the other newly independent states after the breakup of the 
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Soviet Union, enabling them to pay 60-70% below world prices for energy and other 
materials, but it was not willing to subsidize those that prioritized economic 
independence and chose to leave the ruble zone, facing those states with a direct and 
significant economic loss. Despite the removal of Russian subsidies, leaving the ruble 
zone and switching to world prices stood to benefit energy-rich states by generating much 
higher revenues for their exports (Tarr 1994). This proxy (Price of Exit) is based on cost-
benefit analysis for each of the post-Soviet states, and thus represents a strong proxy 
showing each state’s dependence on Russia/region and the related economic incentives 
behind their decisions to cooperate with Russia or not (Table 3.4). 
Table 3.4 Post-Soviet States’ Economic Incentives and Interdependence 
Countries 
Intraunion 
Trade 
Price of 
Exit 
Security Strategy 
Ukraine 82.08 -18 Balancing 
Kyrgyzstan  85.71 1 Bandwagoning  
Georgia 85.88 -21 Balancing 
Tajikistan 86.48 -7 Bandwagoning  
Belarus  86.76 -20 Bandwagoning  
Azerbaijan 87.67 -7 Neutral/ambivalent 
Moldova 87.69 -38 Balancing 
Latvia 88.56 -24 Committed balancing 
Kazakhstan 88.68 19 Bandwagoning  
Uzbekistan 89.45 -3 Neutral/ambivalent 
Lithuania 89.71 -31 Committed balancing 
Armenia 90.12 -24 Bandwagoning  
Estonia 91.64 -32 Committed balancing 
Turkmenistan 92.54 50 Neutral/ambivalent 
Russia  60.61 79  
 
As Table 3.4 indicates, interdependence among the Soviet republics was 
extremely high (as expected within any domestic economic system). More than 80 
percent of total trade for each of the fourteen smaller Soviet republics occurred within the 
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Soviet Union. Such a high level of interdependence, combined with extremely limited 
external trade connections, suggests that all of the newly independent post-Soviet states 
faced strong incentives to maintain their mutual economic ties and hence to cooperate 
with Russia. Yet such a uniform outcome did not come to pass as their prior 
interdependence (Intraunion Trade) fails to predict the post-Soviet states foreign policies 
towards Russia. 
The second proxy (Price of Exit) indicates which states stood to benefit from 
economic independence from Russia and leaving the ruble zone. Since most post-Soviet 
states were heavily dependent on Russia, especially in the energy sector, only three 
energy-rich states could anticipate a net positive outcome from leaving the Russia-led 
economic zone (Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan). While Kyrgyzstan’s net 
positive is marginal and fails to offer a clear economic incentive, Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan faced significant incentives to pursue economic independence. As a result, 
liberal logic would predict that Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan should have been far more 
likely to chart their own foreign-policy course and prioritize balancing, a middle set 
consisting of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan faced no clear 
economic incentive, while the other post-Soviet states should have leaned strongly 
toward bandwagoning with Russia. 
These predictions are strongly disconfirmed. None of the three states expected to 
balance by liberal logic actually did so: two proved to be reliable bandwagoners while 
Turkmenistan opted for a neutral foreign policy towards Russia. Moreover, the states that 
stood to lose the most by leaving the post-Soviet economic sphere were the ones that did 
exactly that. All six post-Soviet states that adopted security strategies of balancing or 
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committed balancing faced significant economic penalties by leaving the ruble zone. In 
sum, the liberal approach appears at best insufficient to explain post-Soviet states’ 
security strategies toward Russia. 
 As with the realist approach, however, skeptics might argue that the prospect of 
forming new economic partnerships abroad might have factored into the decision-making 
of the states that chose to defect from the ruble zone. While the Baltic states eventually 
became members of the European Union as well as NATO, their EU memberships 
likewise materialized only in 2004, more than a decade after they rejected the Russia-led 
CIS. Moreover, the early 1990s saw major economic actors within each state advocating 
against a Westward orientation and instead lobbying for the maintenance of pre-existing 
economic ties or even reintegration with Russia and the other post-Soviet states. 
Even the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank encouraged the 
post-Soviet states to continue regional cooperation with Russia and the other successor 
states in the early 1990s. IMF representatives advised the post-Soviet states against 
abruptly leaving the ruble zone and introducing their own currencies (Granville 2002, 61, 
75-78), while World Bank economists recommended that they partake in a Russia-led 
multilateral free trade area or a customs union that would “incentivize trade, thereby 
reducing unemployment costs during the transition” (Michalopoulos 1993, 13, 12-14). 
Thus, those post-Soviet states that chose to prioritize balancing and economic 
independence did so against their own internally-recognized economic incentives, against 
the advice of the West and its major international monetary and economic organizations, 
and against the desire of Russia and some other post-Soviet states to maintain close 
economic ties in the region. 
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Retrospectively, the argument can be made that the decisions by Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Estonia to pursue EU membership eventually paid off, though it is worth 
remembering that Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine have still not been granted 
membership thirty years later. Moreover, considering the pressures and incentives facing 
those states in early 1990s it is hard to argue that their decisions at that time were dictated 
by economic incentives. In fact, as Chapter 4 shows, those countries were willing to bear 
“the stomach’s sacrifices to the soul,” as one Georgian parliamentarian put it. Their 
leaders were well aware that choosing to balance against Russia would contradict their 
economic incentives, yet they were making that sacrifice for the sake of their national 
independence. As Estonian President Lennart Meri said of Estonia’s newly introduced 
currency, “The kroon is not a piece of paper; the kroon is the flag of Estonian economic 
and political independence,” and jubilant Estonians even bought new wallets for their 
new national currency (Abdelal 2001, 47-48). Chapters 4 and 5 offer more detailed 
analysis of the role played by economic incentives alongside other factors in the decision 
making processes in Georgia and Kazakhstan. 
3.4 Cultural Similarity: A Third Independent Variable 
Beyond realism and liberalism, a third prominent approach argues that states’ 
ethno-linguistic or religious similarities shape their interactions. According to this 
perspective, states are more likely to cooperate when they share cultural characteristics 
but tend to “balance against countries with which they lack cultural commonality” 
(Huntington 1996, 155). This section uses two proxies to capture the fourteen post-Soviet 
states’ cultural similarities with Russia. One of them, Civilization, is based on 
Huntington’s (1996) classification of states into broad civilizational categories based 
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largely though not exclusively on religious differences. That classification divides the 
post-Soviet states among three categories: Orthodox, including Russia as well as Belarus, 
Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia; Western, including Lithuania, Latvia, and 
Estonia; and Islamic, including Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Azerbaijan (Table 3.5). Theories that expect greater cooperation 
between states that share these identities and greater conflict between dyads that cross 
civilizational lines predict a higher likelihood of bandwagoning among the Orthodox 
states and a higher likelihood of balancing among the Western and Islamic states. 
The second proxy is a demographic measure derived from Flynn (2004, 14) data: 
the percentage of ethnic Russians residing in each of the fourteen weaker post-Soviet 
republics in 1989 (Ethnic). The various republics’ demographic compositions fluctuated 
greatly throughout the tenure of the Soviet Union and across different administrations due 
to various intentional and unintended processes (Flynn 2004). During the twilight of the 
Soviet Union, as the various republics started becoming increasingly autonomous from 
Moscow, the extent of shared ethnic heritage with Russia may have influenced their 
policies toward it. 
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Table 3.5 Post-Soviet States’ Cultural Similarity to Russia 
Countries Civilization Ethnic Security Strategy 
Kazakhstan Islamic 37.8 Bandwagoning  
Kyrgyzstan  Islamic 21.5 Bandwagoning  
Tajikistan Islamic 7.6 Bandwagoning  
Azerbaijan Islamic 5.6 Ambivalent/neutral 
Turkmenistan Islamic 9.5 Ambivalent/neutral 
Uzbekistan Islamic 8.3 Ambivalent/neutral 
Estonia Western 30.3 Committed balancing 
Latvia Western 34 Committed balancing 
Lithuania Western 9.4 Committed balancing 
Armenia Orthodox 1.6 Bandwagoning  
Belarus  Orthodox 13.2 Bandwagoning  
Georgia Orthodox 6.3 Balancing 
Moldova Orthodox 13 Balancing 
Ukraine Orthodox 22.1 Balancing 
Russia Orthodox   
 
Table 3.5 indicates that neither cultural similarity (Civilization), nor the share of 
ethnic Russians in the state (Ethnic) can account for the post-Soviet states’ security 
strategies toward Russia. The three states representing Western civilization balanced 
against Russia, but only two of the five states labeled as sharing Orthodox civilization 
actually bandwagoned with Russia (Belarus and Armenia), while the other three directly 
violated the prediction by balancing (Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia). Despite being 
predicted to balance against Russia due to their contrasting cultures, none of the Islamic 
states did so, and three of them did the very opposite by bandwagoning. Culture, religion, 
and other related factors may not be irrelevant, but they are evidently neither necessary 
nor sufficient to explain these states’ balancing and bandwagoning choices. 
The second proxy (Ethnic) tests a different argument: that the share of ethnic 
Russians in the post-Soviet states affected their foreign policy choices toward Russia. 
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Although some scholars have argued that a high percentage of ethnic Russians can 
incline states toward stronger cooperation, such claims are often based on single-country 
studies without accounting for divergent behavior by other states despite similar 
demographic compositions (Zardykhan 2004, Olcott 1995b). Three of the fourteen Soviet 
republics contained populations composed of at least 30% ethnic Russians in 1989, yet 
while Kazakhstan bandwagoned with Russia, Estonia and Latvia were committed 
balancers. Extending the cutoff to include states with over 20% ethnic Russians fails to 
help this perspective because one of the two additions balanced (Ukraine) while the other 
bandwagoned (Kyrgyzstan). 
To make a more fine-grained comparison, ethnic composition cannot explain the 
divergent policies of Kazakhstan and Latvia despite similar portions of their populations 
composed of ethnic Russians. Moreover, whereas Kazakhstan exhibited a clear pattern of 
ethnic Russian emigration since the 1970s, such outflow began in the Baltic states only 
after 1989. Therefore, Kazakh leaders made their foreign policy decisions in the early 
1990s well aware that their country’s demography was changing in favor of its titular 
ethnic group, and hence should have been less sensitive to Russian interests, while any 
future demographic trends in Latvia were more uncertain. Finally, all of the post-Soviet 
states experienced waves of emigration by ethnic minorities after achieving their 
independence, but we do not see any corresponding wave of balancing against Russia 
associated with the declining share of ethnic Russians among their populations. 
This outcome does not mean that demography does not matter. Ethnic Russians in 
the other post-Soviet states held political views that differed from those of their titular 
ethnic groups on average, and they did tend to be more pro-unionist and supportive of 
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cooperation with Russia. However, this effect was not uniformly present. In Estonia and 
Latvia, for example, majorities of voters chose independence in March 1991 including 
significant portions of ethnic Russians, especially those in big cities (Bungs 1991, Kionka 
1991). In Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, however, Kyrgyz and Kazakhs along with ethnic 
Russians overwhelmingly voted to preserve the Soviet Union (Walker 2003a, 118). 
Neither religion nor ethnicity has much predictive power for these states’ security 
strategies, and their effects on public opinion differed significantly by context. 
Another cultural similarity variable that is often described as important in the 
post-Soviet context is Slavic culture. Only two weaker post-Soviet states, Ukraine and 
Belarus, represent the Eastern Slavic ethno-linguistic family alongside Russia, and 
various scholars and politicians have predicted that these three Slavic Republics would 
prioritize partnership and cooperation with each other. As late as February 1989, with the 
Soviet Union deep in crisis, Gorbachev argued that Ukraine and Belarus were 
qualitatively different from the non-Slavic republics and unlikely to seek separation from 
the Soviet Union. Describing them as “closely bound up with Russia,” their people 
occupying “authoritative positions in society, in production, in administrative and party 
organs, and in the cultural sphere” of the Soviet Union, he mused that “given their 
historically rooted similarity with Russians and the closeness of their languages” it was 
often “difficult to determine who is Russian, Ukrainian, or Belarussian” (Beissinger 
2002, 95).  
Such expectations were only partially met: Belarus emerged as one of the most 
enthusiastic unionist states and actively prioritized cooperation with Russia to the point of 
entertaining reunification after the breakup of the Soviet Union. In contrast, Ukraine 
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actively sought independence from and prioritized balancing against Russia, with the 
antagonism between the two states eventually breaking out into military conflict in 2014. 
Pan-Slavic ideas and even dual identities are prevalent in Belarus and present in eastern 
Ukraine as well, but they have not translated into a unified pan-national identity. 
The context and social priming of similarities and differences offers a better 
understanding of state behavior than such descriptive cultural attributes. First tsarist and 
then Soviet Russia tried to fully assimilate Ukrainians and Belarusians into a Greater 
Russia, purposefully and systematically exaggerating ethnic similarities while 
downplaying distinctions between the three peoples. To this end, Moscow implemented 
aggressive Russification efforts in these two republics, including banning Belarusian and 
Ukrainian schools, limiting publications in their native languages and replacing them 
with Russian books and newspapers, and systematically attempting to eliminate those 
languages as means of communication (Marples 2012, 50-51, Suny 1993, 26). Moreover, 
Soviet historiography restricted the collective memory and identity of Belarusians and 
Ukrainians, and in 1947 and 1954 official Soviet policies reinforced this long-employed 
“all-Russian” narrative by no longer defining Ukrainians and Belarusians as separate 
peoples, but instead as regional Russians (Kuzio 2002, 245-246). 
Despite Russia’s efforts, Ukraine was able to resist its pressure and sustain its 
own nationalist narratives, especially in its western regions that became part of the Soviet 
Union much later (in 1940) and were less affected by Soviet-Russian propaganda, and the 
1980s ignited Ukrainian national mobilization and secessionist mass demonstrations 
against Soviet rule. Even Belarus had nationalist writers and activists trying to reclaim 
their past by highlighting their cultural uniqueness, distinctiveness from Russia, and 
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historic ties to Europe in the early twentieth century and again in the 1980s, despite being 
one of the least nationally mobilized republics in the Soviet Union and arguably the one 
where Russia’s denationalization efforts were most successful (Marples 2012, 47-49, 51-
53). When considering the role of cultural similarities as determinants of state behavior, 
what matters most is not those similarities writ large but rather their historical and socio-
political context as well as how existing cultural similarities are primed, exaggerated, or 
diluted to serve specific socio-political goals. National mobilization theory provides such 
a constructive view, capable of explaining why some states with high levels of cultural 
similarity forge antagonistic relations while others become trusted allies despite deep 
cultural distinctions. 
Chapters 4 and 5 carry this analysis further by investigating how leaders in 
Georgia and Kazakhstan wielded their cultural identities. Sharing Orthodox Christianity 
did not prevent Georgia from framing Russia as its primary security threat and working to 
balance against it, while Islamic Kazakhstan had no problem framing Christian Russia as 
a kindred nation and treating it as its main strategic partner. Although individual 
politicians and activists in both Georgia and Kazakhstan have made arguments in line 
with cultural similarity approaches, they have routinely failed to gain as much traction as 
this perspective predicts. 
3.5 National Mobilization: A New Independent Variable 
National mobilization theory suggests that when particular historical experiences 
prime the people of the nation to see themselves as unique socio-political units worthy of 
independence and the critical mass of the nation is politically mobilized to defend 
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national interests, we should see a strong us vs. them mentality, prioritization of political 
independence, and the perception of a formal ruler as a security threat, inclining leaders 
of such nations to adopt balancing policies. In other words, national mobilization theory 
predicts that the post-Soviet states that displayed high national mobilization by 1990 
should be more likely to prioritize their independence, perceive Russia as an essential 
security threat, and balance against it. Alternatively, those post-Soviet states that 
exhibited low national mobilization by 1990 should be less likely to prioritize the 
independence they gained, more likely to downplay Russia as a security threat, and hence 
more likely to pursue cooperation with it. 
To test these predictions through a correlational analysis across all fourteen post-
Soviet states in this section, I construct a categorical variable (National Mobilization) that 
captures their relative levels of national mobilization by 1990. The result is three 
categories: high national mobilization (including Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and 
Georgia), medium/contested national mobilization (including Ukraine, Moldova, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan), and low national mobilization (including Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan). I justify these categorizations by 
providing brief historical appraisals of these states’ differing processes of national 
mobilization. 
Nation-building can vary as a process in terms of its content and intensity both 
across nations and across time within a given nation. It can occur gradually over a long 
period of time or in more accelerated bursts due to internal or external shocks, such as 
interstate conflict or rapid modernization. The theoretically important questions here are: 
Where did each of the fourteen weaker post-Soviet states stand in terms of its national 
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mobilization in 1990? How strong was its self-awareness as a unique socio-political 
entity worthy of independence? What were its main nationalist narratives and how 
coherent were they? In addressing these questions, I highlight these states’ varying 
experiences of nation-building during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as well as 
the ways in which the mass national agitations of the late 1980s manifested in each. The 
second half of the 1980s saw accelerated processes of national mobilization in several of 
the post-Soviet states, including spillover effects as events in some amplified parallel 
processes in others. Still, not all nations displayed similar levels of mobilization: some 
were early instigators of the national awakenings and mass agitations of the late 1980s, 
others were primed to catch the fire of nationalism as it spread, while still others 
experienced little meaningful mobilization and instead resisted the secessionist elements 
within and outside their borders. While Chapters 4 and 5 provide more in-depth analysis 
of these processes and their effects on post-independence foreign policymaking in the 
cases of Georgia and Kazakhstan, this section offers a condensed appraisal of all fourteen 
states in this regard. 
First, the high national mobilization category includes Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, 
and Georgia. These four states exhibit many differences in terms of their cultural 
characteristics and historical trajectories, but they also share some important similarities 
in the ways that internal and external processes during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries drove them to belong in this category. All four had long histories of battles, 
repressions, imperial occupations, and multicultural influences before forming as modern 
nation-states. Georgia had the most coherent experience of nationhood in its initial 
contact with the Russian Empire: the Georgian Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti sought tsarist 
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Russia’s support against Ottoman and Persian invaders in 1783, becoming a Russian 
protectorate through a bilateral treaty (Kandelaki 1953, 173-179). Despite internal 
conflicts among Georgian principalities and frequent external intrusions, Georgia by that 
time had not only clear cultural characteristics such as a unique language, a long literary 
tradition, and a dominant religion in Christianity that distinguished it from many non-
Christian neighbors, it was also a political unit (responsible for its internal and external 
politics) built on a centuries-old royal dynasty. Thus, when Russia violated its treaty 
responsibilities in 1801 by overthrowing Georgia’s royal dynasty and annexing its 
historic territories, those actions were widely perceived as a betrayal and prompted 
decades of conspiracies and rebellions against the Russian occupation (King 2008, 27-30, 
148, Lang 1962, 37-41). 
The Baltic nations’ initial contacts with Russia were different. Latvians, 
Estonians, and Lithuanians were dominated and influenced by German and Polish rulers 
and cultures during the centuries preceding Russian rule (O'Connor 2003, 35). Under 
tsarist Russia, the Baltic German nobility continued to largely run local governments in 
the provinces containing Latvian and Estonian populations, while Poles comprised the 
upper class in Lithuanian territories (O'Connor 2003, 17-19, 36-38, Kasekamp 2010, 55-
60, 61-67). The people of these three nations thus largely comprised subject peasant 
populations during that period. Moscow began instituting a Russification process in the 
second half of the nineteenth century, but it remained merely one of several cultural 
pressures these nations resisted. Thus, as their national awakening began to gather 
momentum the three Baltic nations’ self-awareness and nation-building formed us-vs.-
them perspectives not only against Russian but also German and Polish cultures.  
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The early nineteenth century saw several uprisings against tsarist Russia in 
Georgia involving both peasants and nobles, and Lithuanians rebelled a couple of times 
as well (alongside Poles), but the provinces dominated by the German Baltic nobility 
remained loyal to Russia, which was willing to accommodate the traditional privileges of 
Baltic Germans over Latvians and Estonians in the region (Kasekamp 2010, 68-72, Suny 
1994, 70-72). As that century progressed, however, all four nations experienced 
processes of national awakening. In Georgia, the early nineteenth century was dominated 
by patriotic romanticism as prominent Georgian poets and writers, mostly from the 
higher social strata, glorified Georgian culture and the lost kingdoms, even if many of 
these aristocrats tolerated Russian rule as the lesser evil compared to potential Persian or 
Ottoman rule (Jones 2005, 6, 33, Suny 1994, 124-127). From the mid-1850s a new 
generation of Georgian nationalist intellectuals, often educated abroad, began modern 
nation-building rooted in improving general literacy and disseminating national 
narratives among the masses through books and newspapers that were written in 
Georgian and hence escaped tsarist censorship (Jones 2005, 34, Lang 1962, 109). 
Interestingly, Baltic German intellectuals in the early nineteenth century supported the 
Estonian and Latvian languages not to promote nationalism but as a basis for assimilating 
German culture (Kasekamp 2010, 76, O'Connor 2003, 45-46). Latvian and Estonian 
literacy societies were established in 1824 and 1838 respectively, and a Lithuanian 
literacy society followed in 1879 in East Prussia and in Vilnius (under Russian rule) only 
in 1907 (Kasekamp 2010, 76).  
The dramatic socio-political changes of the nineteenth century were key 
preconditions of national movements as modernization, urbanization, and the rapid 
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development of communication systems facilitated interpersonal connections and enabled 
nationalists to shape broader ethnic and national identities beyond people’s localized 
lived experiences (Kasekamp 2010, 77). The abolishment of serfdom, improved 
education, literacy, printed press, and upward mobility of the late nineteenth century 
facilitated these processes, which were particularly important for ethnic Latvians and 
Estonians seeking to break into higher social strata dominated by Baltic Germans 
(O'Connor 2003, 46-53). Nationalist intellectuals began actively reviving significant 
cultural experiences from history (Georgians glorifying their medieval kings, for 
example, and Lithuanians their grand dukes) as well as constructing new national 
narratives and mythology (for example, Estonian and Latvian writers produced national 
epics such as Kalevipoeg in 1857 and Lacplesis in 1888) (Kasekamp 2010, 77-78). Of the 
four states in this high mobilization category, Lithuanian national awaking lagged the 
others by several decades during the nineteenth century due to the division of historic 
Lithuanian territories between Germany and Russia, the centuries-long assimilation of 
Polish culture, and more aggressive Russification efforts toward Lithuanian culture than 
the others. Lithuania’s national awakening began gaining ground only toward the end of 
the nineteenth century, driven largely by Lithuanians who left their homeland (especially 
during the famine of 1867-1868) but continued publishing and smuggling books and 
newspapers in Russian Lithuania (O'Connor 2003, 58-60). 
By the early twentieth century the Baltic areas and Georgia were highly 
industrialized and modernized, and the titular ethnic groups gradually reclaimed cities 
that used to be dominated by Germans, Russians, and Poles as well as Jews, Armenians, 
and others who had made up much of the urban working class (O'Connor 2003, 67-68). 
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Political parties became more active, often voicing demands for greater autonomy within 
the Russian Empire and sometimes even full independence. Russian military defeats by 
Japan in 1905 and Germany in World War I sparked internal upheavals that provided a 
window of opportunity for these nations to assert themselves, and between 1917 and 
1918 all four declared independence. Georgia’s Social Democratic Party successfully 
mobilized its population and involved the masses in nation and state-building during 
those years. The Baltic states were initially hindered by wars of independence against 
German, Russian, and Polish occupations, but the victorious Allied powers persuaded a 
weakened Germany and Russia to tolerate their independent existence as buffer states 
after 1920, enabling a sustained period of nation-building during the two decades that 
followed. In contrast, Georgia was relatively removed from the major battlegrounds of 
World War I and enjoyed a relatively peaceful period between 1917-1921, during which 
its leaders promoted an intense period of nation-building and created a well-functioning 
democratic republic before Bolshevik Russia forcibly annexed it in 1921. 
Thus, all four of these nations experienced national mobilization prior to their 
annexations by the Soviet Union. Georgia had a short-lived but intense experience of 
modern statehood between 1917-1921, during which it held free and fair elections, 
formed a multiparty government, organized an effective legislative body, drafted a 
constitution, and garnered international recognition (Lee 2017, 48). The three Baltic 
states had more chaotic experiences during those years but enjoyed two decades of 
independence and nation-building between 1920 and 1940 (O'Connor 2003, 85-110). 
Soviet totalitarian rule could suppress but not erase nationalism in these four states. As a 
result, they were the most active republics during the late 1980s in organizing mass 
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political demonstrations, electing nationalist parliaments while still under the Soviet rule, 
and demanding national liberation (Beissinger 2002, 166-186). 
Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, and Azerbaijan exhibited medium/contested national 
mobilization. While each of these states also displayed national mobilization by 1990, 
their experiences were not as strong or consolidated as in Georgia and the Baltic states. 
Ukraine had a distinct culture, language, and history tracing its origins to the medieval 
Kievan Rus (Suny 1993, 43-44, Shevelov 1980), but its development into a modern 
nation-state during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was uneven and contested for 
several reasons. The territory of modern Ukraine was occupied by Austria, Poland, and 
Russia for centuries and not unified in its current scope until 1939. Its national awakening 
began in the early nineteenth century under tsarist Russian rule as in other parts of 
Eastern Europe, but its upper and middle classes were dominated by Russians, Poles, and 
Jews, making it difficult for Ukrainian intellectuals to spread national narratives among 
their rural, peasant population (Guthier 1979, 31-32). Moreover, the Russian Empire 
considered Ukraine as sharing a broader Russian identity due to their Slavic ethno-
linguistic roots, and tsarist authorities actively guarded against formation of distinct 
Ukrainian identity and nationalism on its territory (D'Anieri 1997, 7-8, Guthier 1979, 31). 
Western Ukraine, on the other hand, was never part of the Russian Empire or the Soviet 
Union until 1939, and under the relatively liberal rule of the Habsburg Empire it became 
a cradle of nation-building during the late nineteenth century as Ukrainian nationalists in 
Habsburg territories sustained cross-border contacts with their brethren under Russian 
rule (Magocsi 2002, 55-64).  
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Ukraine seized the opportunity to declare independence in 1917 alongside 
Georgia and the Baltic states, but instead of one unified Ukrainian state there were 
several smaller ones that were each denied any significant opportunity for modern state-
building as they were quickly absorbed by either the Soviet Union (central and eastern 
Ukraine) or Poland (western Ukraine) (Abdelal 2001, 107). When western Ukraine was 
annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940, its nationalism was strong enough to resist Soviet 
Russification efforts and sustain Ukrainian nationalist narratives including perceptions of 
Russia as a threatening “other,” but these sentiments were not widely shared in Ukraine’s 
eastern areas. Ukrainian nationalists became active during the perestroika period of the 
late 1980s as well through the Popular Movement of Ukraine for Reconstruction, but its 
demands were largely limited to cultural and economic autonomy rather than 
independence from the Soviet Union (Magocsi 2002, 63). National mobilization in 
Ukraine remained uneven and contested, reflecting the divergent historical experience of 
Ukraine’s regions: western Ukraine was highly mobilized and saw Russia as the primary 
threat to its cultural autonomy and later to its independence, but the new state’s eastern 
and southern parts were less mobilized—even as they generally supported Ukraine’s 
autonomy and independence a majority in these regions did not share the strong anti-
Russian perspective so prevalent in the west (Beissinger 2002, 191-195). 
Moldova represents another peculiar case of highly contested national identity. 
Ruled by the Ottoman Empire from the fifteenth century until its annexation by the 
Russian Empire in 1812, Moldova’s strongest historic, cultural, and linguistic ties lay 
with Romania—to the point that debate endures over the arbitrariness of the division 
between the two (Baar and Jakubek 2017, 61). Prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union 
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its experience with independence was exceedingly brief, having declared independence 
(as Bessarabia) in 1917 only to willingly unify with Romania after less than four months 
(Baar and Jakubek 2017, 63-64). The Soviet government refused to recognize Romanian 
authority there, designating the region on the left bank of the Dnestr the Moldavian 
ASSR in 1924. After the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Bessarabia was occupied by the 
Soviet Union and united with the Moldavian ASSR to form the Moldavian Soviet 
Socialist Republic (Crowther 1991, 184). 
Unlike their policies elsewhere, Soviet leaders worked to foster Moldovan 
identity in order to reinforce their rule by undermining the region’s strong cultural and 
political ties to Romania. The Moldovan alphabet was changed from Romanian to 
Cyrillic, and historic ties to Romania were downplayed while ties to Slavic peoples were 
exaggerated (Kuzio 2002, 256). Soviet promotion of Moldova’s distinctiveness from 
Romania did not translate into better social or economic status for ethnic Moldovans, 
though, who were often dominated by Russians and Ukrainians in social, economic and 
political spheres. This was partially because many Moldovan intellectuals had left for 
Romania during the post-World War II period, and Soviet authorities remained 
distrusting of ethnic Moldovans’ loyalty especially in the political sphere (Crowther 
1991, 85-86). In addition, Moldova’s relatively low levels of urbanization, educational 
attainment, and economic productivity further hindered its nation-building under Soviet 
rule (Crowther 1991, 184-185). Although Moldova saw mass demonstrations demanding 
autonomy from the Soviet Union in 1989 and onward, its national mobilization remained 
regionally uneven and its national identity contested between pro-Romanian and pro-
Russian narratives. 
87 
 
Much like Georgia, Armenia had a distinct and coherent national identity based 
on a long historical memory of its ethno-cultural roots. For several centuries preceding its 
Russian occupation, however, Armenia was divided among different empires with its 
diaspora scattered across various cities and countries. Like Moldova its experience with 
political independence before the breakup of the Soviet Union was brief: Armenia only 
reluctantly declared independence in 1917 as a last resort after the breakup of the 
Transcaucasia Federative Republic, left it to face an impending Ottoman attack alone 
(Hovannisian 1971, 35-37). While its experience of independence during 1918-1920 
remains meaningful for the nation, that period was so turbulent for Armenia that it stifled 
much potential state-building. As Hovannisian (Hovannisian 1971, 38) describes, “In 
mid-1918 the remnants of the Armenian people were left a mangled bit of land that, for 
lack of a better term, they called a republic… The Armenians were soon to find that they 
faced far greater tribulations in making independence something more than a declaration. 
The new government turned to the barren and isolated land, abounding with rocks and 
mountains, orphans and refugees, heartache and misery.” 
In 1920 Armenia lost its independence to Soviet Russia, but despite its history of 
tsarist and then Soviet occupation Armenians perceived not Russia but the Ottoman 
Empire (later Turkey) as their main enemy, which had taken Armenia’s historic 
territories, executed a genocide of ethnic Armenians, and contributed to refugee flows 
and famine in the short-lived Armenian republic. By contrast, its years under Soviet rule 
were relatively peaceful for Armenia. Even as its national mobilization grew during the 
late 1980s, Armenia’s threat perception focused primarily on its conflict with Azerbaijan 
over the contested territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. As a result, while several other Soviet 
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republics were reasserting their national identities by defining themselves against Soviet 
Russia, Armenia faced a different immediate enemy in neighboring Azerbaijan that 
shaped its conception of security as it pursued independence (Beissinger 2002, 188-189). 
For its part, Azerbaijan had fewer historic antecedents for national mobilization 
than the other states in this category, but it experienced sufficient national mobilization 
during the late 1980s to distinguish it from the third category and warrant its place here. 
Azerbaijan offers a good example of how even people with a relatively loose, incoherent 
national identity can forge one relatively quickly under the right circumstances. Its 
current territory was populated by a kaleidoscope of ethnic, linguistic, and religious 
groups over the centuries including Zoroastrians, Christians, Muslims, Albanians, Turks, 
and Persians. Prior to its incorporation into Russian after the Russo-Persian War of 1804-
1813, it had been ruled by Iran for several centuries (with brief intrusions by the Russian 
and Ottoman Empires) (Dowling 2015, 728-729). The Azerbaijani nation as distinct from 
both Russia and Iran was essentially created by this separation, but until the early 
twentieth century its people did not possess a distinct national identity and instead saw 
themselves as part of the larger Muslim world. Even as Baku started to industrialize and 
modernize as an oil-rich city, the Azerbaijani population remained largely rural and the 
city was dominated by ethnic Russians and Armenians, and these inequalities led to 
bloody clashes between them as early as 1905 (Suny 1993, 38-40). Azerbaijani 
intelligentsia produced several political parties in the early twentieth century promoting 
ideas such as socialism, Pan-Turkism, and Pan-Islamism, but none garnered much 
popular support (Suny 1993, 41). The Armenian threat proved Azerbaijan’s main source 
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of ethnic mobilization, strengthening its connection with Turkey against their shared 
enemy and affecting the national mobilization of both states to this day. 
Azerbaijan declared independence from Russia in 1918 with Ottoman support, 
and although its nationalists were not able to garner as much popular support as those in 
other countries, this brief period of independence offered an early incubation period for 
nationalist ideas to begin crystalizing apart from direct attachments to Iran, Turkey, or 
Pan-Islamism. The late 1980s saw mass demonstrations in the streets of Baku, but while 
some Soviet republics were mobilizing around ideas of autonomy and independence from 
the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan’s ethno-national mobilization was shaped by the conflict 
with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. Thus, Armenia and Azerbaijan reinforced each 
other’s national mobilization. While Azerbaijani attitudes were not as anti-Russian as 
those in some other Soviet republics, however, they were conditional on Russia’s position 
toward the conflict with Armenia, which Russian leaders tended to support. 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan fall 
into the third category, low national mobilization. Although each of these states has seen 
nationalist movements advance narratives and gain varying levels of support in different 
time periods, they all had very low levels of national mobilization by 1990. As a result, 
nationalists were unable to garner much popular support as the Soviet Union 
disintegrated and sporadic secessionist demands and demonstrations did not translate into 
sustained mass movements. Due to the socially-constructed nature of national identities 
and mobilization processes, some of these countries may have belonged in different 
categories during different time periods and could reach higher levels in the future, but 
the theoretically important question here is where these states stood by 1990. 
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The territories of the Central Asian post-Soviet states were ruled by tsarist Russia 
before being incorporated into the Soviet Union. Although they have rich and distinct 
cultural attributes (including language, religion, and various cultural traditions), before 
their conquests by the Russian Empire most Central Asian peoples did not resemble 
nations in the modern sense, with loosely defined borders and primary loyalties held by 
tribes and clans. The evolution of nationalism in these states was undermined by Pan-
Islamic ideas, Russification policies emanating from Moscow, and the region’s relatively 
low levels of literacy, urbanization, and socio-economic modernization. Among the 
Central Asian states, Kazakhstan alone had experienced national independence prior to 
the Soviet Union’s dissolution, having maintained autonomy under the Alash movement 
between 1917 and 1920. Although this experience was central to future nationalist 
narratives in that country, however, it failed to produce mass national mobilization before 
giving way to Soviet occupation in 1920. The Soviet period saw relatively low national 
mobilization and a lack of dissident movements in Central Asia, and broadly successful 
Russification and Sovietization efforts translated into weak national mobilization by the 
late 1980s when waves of mobilization and mass demonstration were commonplace in 
other parts of the Soviet Union (Abdelal 2001, 77-78, Suny 1993, 41).  
Belarus stands alongside the five Central Asian states in displaying low national 
mobilization. The current territory of Belarus was ruled by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania 
and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth before being incorporated into the Russian 
Empire during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. During the nineteenth 
century most Belarusians were peasants with low levels of literacy, the area’s cities were 
dominated by Russians, Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews, and only a small educated 
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Belarusian gentry had started to articulate nationalist narratives by the end of that 
century, without much traction (Suny 1993, 31). Belarus’ experience of independent 
statehood in 1918-1919 was accompanied by minimal nation-building—scholars describe 
the Belarusian Democratic Republic of that period as an “unsolicited gift” of the Russian 
Revolution and Austro-German goodwill rather than a product of internal movements, 
noting that “the self-appointed administration lacked the elements necessary for 
international recognition” (Vakar 1956, 105). 
That period was followed by Belarus’ incorporation into the Soviet Union, though 
some of its western areas were parts of Poland until 1939, and nation-building remained 
minimal on both sides of the border. Furthermore, as noted above, Russian leaders 
applied particularly aggressive Russification policies to populations sharing Slavic ethno-
linguistic roots, including those in Belarus as well as Ukraine. In accordance with these 
policies, Moscow made concerted efforts throughout its centuries controlling those 
territories to prevent distinct cultural expressions among them, banning non-Russian 
languages and downplaying historic ties with Western states as opposed to Russia, 
(Kuzio 2002, 244-246). 
In the 1980s, Belarus and the Central Asian states remained mostly passive 
spectators of the nationalist movements sweeping other Soviet republics. This is not to 
say that there were no nationalists in these states, but they were unable to broadly 
galvanize the unenthusiastic masses to embrace national autonomy. Each of these 
republics had undergone modernization and urbanization processes producing diverse 
cultural intelligentsia by the 1980s, and some nationalist parties did emerge such as the 
Birlik (Unity) Movement of Uzbek writers and scientists, which initially focused on 
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ecological and economic issues before moving to issues of sovereignty and autonomy by 
late 1989 (Beissinger 2002). Belarus also saw nationalist demonstrations focused on 
cultural issues with the foundation of the Belarusian Popular Front in 1988, and the 
discovery of mass graves near Minsk left by the Stalinist purges radicalized many 
Belarusians against Moscow (Zaprudnik 1989). While both of these movements paid 
attention to the nationalist mobilization already underway in the Baltic states and 
elsewhere, however, neither of them managed to garner similar levels of sustained mass 
support (Zaprudnik 1993, 130, Beissinger 2002, 258). In highly mobilized nations like 
Georgia and the Baltic states, even Communist leaders either proved sympathetic to their 
respective nationalist causes or quickly fell from power and were forced to adapt their 
platforms to reflect the new nationalist visions. In contrast, the nationalist movements in 
Belarus and Uzbekistan were largely rejected by elites and masses alike and harshly 
suppressed by the Communist leaderships of these republics (Garnett and Legvold 1999, 
3-5, Fierman 1997). 
Table 3.6 National Mobilization in the Post-Soviet States 
Countries 
National 
Mobilization 
Years of Pre-1990 
Independence 
Security Strategy 
Georgia High 3 Balancing 
Estonia High 20 Committed balancing 
Latvia High 20 Committed balancing 
Lithuania High 20 Committed balancing 
Ukraine Medium/contested 1 Balancing 
Moldova Medium/contested 1 Balancing 
Armenia Medium/contested 2 Bandwagoning  
Azerbaijan Medium/contested 2 Neutral/ambivalent 
Uzbekistan Low 0 Neutral/ambivalent 
Turkmenistan Low 0 Neutral/ambivalent 
Kazakhstan Low 2 Bandwagoning  
Kyrgyzstan  Low 0 Bandwagoning  
Tajikistan Low 0 Bandwagoning  
Belarus  Low 1 Bandwagoning  
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Table 3.6 displays the strong correlation between levels of national mobilization 
across the fourteen weaker post-Soviet states and their security strategies towards Russia. 
As national mobilization theory predicts, all four states with high national mobilization 
chose to balance against Russia, while four of the six states with low national 
mobilization chose to bandwagon. All three committed balancers ranked among those 
with high national mobilization (the Baltic states), while those that adopted neutral or 
ambivalent policies displayed contested or low national mobilization. 
The timing of events surrounding the breakup of the Soviet Union also aligns with 
the expectations of national mobilization theory, as highly mobilized Soviet republics 
were the first ones to declare independence while the least mobilized were the latest and 
most reluctant to leave the union (Walker 2003a, 64, 140). Six of the mobilized states 
outright rejected participation in Gorbachev’s New Union Treaty negotiations (Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia, Armenia, and Moldova), and while Ukraine was initially 
involved in those negotiations it too ultimately backed out (Beissinger 2002, 417-432). 
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Georgia all held referendums on independence in early 
1991, as did Armenia and Ukraine a few months later. In contrast, the states with low 
national mobilization held referendums on the preservation of the Soviet Union, with 
turnout and support for the preservation of the union ending up higher in each of these 
republics than even in Russia itself (Walker 2003a, 118, 140). 
Azerbaijan’s and Uzbekistan’s ambivalent foreign policy toward Russia marks 
only a slight divergence from the predicted outcomes, and ultimately unsurprising ones. 
Azerbaijan was the least mobilized among the middle group, showing some national 
mobilization by the end of 1980s but without other strong predictors and mostly reactive 
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to its escalating territorial conflict with Armenia. In a similar fashion, Uzbekistan had the 
highest mobilization level in the late 1980s among Soviet republics in the low 
mobilization category, most notably represented through its Birlik movement. As another 
borderline case, its choice to pursue a relatively ambivalent foreign policy toward Russia 
instead of outright bandwagoning as the other Central Asian states did is understandable 
within national mobilization theory. The nationalist movement in Uzbekistan was harshly 
repressed by the Communist establishment during the late 1980s and early 1990s, but 
independent Uzbekistan’s leaders continue to reflect contested national narratives and 
anti-Russian sentiments remain among sections of its population.     
The only significant divergence from national mobilization theory’s predictions is 
Armenia’s bandwagoning behavior. Despite its limited experience of independent 
statehood prior to Soviet rule, Armenia displayed relatively strong national mobilization 
by 1990. As expected, Armenia joined other mobilized Soviet republics in rejecting the 
New Union Treaty and actively striving for independence, but it proceeded to bandwagon 
with Russia instead of balancing against it. Although the intensity of its national 
mobilization alone cannot account for this behavior, the content of Armenian nationalism 
does offer a likely explanation. Whereas the other nationally mobilized post-Soviet states 
clearly understood Russia as their primary threat, Armenia’s formative nation and state-
building during the twentieth century took place in the context of other existential threats 
emanating from the Ottoman Empire (1915-1920) and Azerbaijan (1918-20 and again in 
the late 1980s over Nagorno-Karabakh). Thus, while Armenian national mobilization 
produced clear incentives for independence from the Soviet Union, it drove Armenian 
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leaders not to reject economic and political partnership with Russia but rather to view it 
as a crucial partner against immanent threats from its east and west. 
To summarize this chapter’s main findings I constructed a truth table assessing 
the coincidence between the post-Soviet states’ decisions to adopt balancing security 
strategies and the central causal conditions of each of the alternative theories discussed 
earlier. To facilitate this, I recoded each variable into a dichotomous format: Nuclear 
Weapons – the presence of nuclear capabilities at the breakup of the Soviet Union (see 
Table 3.3), Economic Incentive – the presence of economic incentives for independence 
from Russia (see Table 3.4), Civilizational Difference – the presence of a civilizational 
difference with Russia as conceptualized in the cultural similarity section (see Table 3.5), 
National Mobilization – the presence of either high or medium/contested national 
mobilization as opposed to low national mobilization (see Table 3.6), and finally 
Balancing – the adoption of a balancing security strategy (committed or not) as opposed 
to neutral/ambivalent or bandwagoning strategies (see Table 3.2). The resulting truth 
table (Table 3.7) sacrifices some of the nuances and variations among the variables 
discussed in the preceding sections, but it provides a concise means to compare the 
relative fit between this chapter’s findings and the predictions of the alternative theories. 
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Table 3.7 Truth Table on Post-Soviet Balancing Toward Russia 
W E C N B Cases 
1 0 0 1 1 Ukraine  
0 0 1 1 1 Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 
0 0 0 1 1 Georgia, Moldova 
1 1 1 0 0 Kazakhstan 
0 1 1 0 0 Turkmenistan 
0 0 1 1 0 Azerbaijan 
0 0 0 1 0 Armenia 
1 0 0 0 0 Belarus 
0 0 1 0 0 Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan 
1 1 1 1 -  
1 1 0 1 -  
1 0 1 1 -  
1 1 0 0 -  
1 0 1 0 -  
0 1 1 1 -  
0 1 0 1 -  
0 1 0 0 -  
0 0 0 0 -  
Note: W = Nuclear Weapons, E = Economic Incentive, C = Civilizational Difference,  
N = National Mobilization, B = Balancing 
 
Table 3.7 clearly shows that all six post-Soviet states that chose to balance against 
Russia also had moderate to high national mobilization. The other potential causal 
conditions hypothesized by the alternative theories failed to generate such empirical 
support. Only one state out of the six balancers (Ukraine) possessed nuclear weapons 
during the early 1990s, and the other five lacked any comparable military capability that 
might have deterred powerful Russia from retaliation and hence might have explained 
their balancing behavior. Only three states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) out of the six 
balancers had cultural differences with Russia in line with cultural similarity arguments, 
while the other three (Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova) prioritized balancing despite sharing 
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Orthodox civilization with Russia. Finally, none of these six states had economic 
incentives to balance against Russia. 
Two states, Azerbaijan and Armenia, had moderate or high national mobilization 
but did not balance against Russia. Although these outcomes do not perfectly reflect the 
predictions of national mobilization theory, its logic is capable of explaining them by 
taking into account the directionality of national mobilization, as emphasized earlier in 
this chapter. During the nation-building process, states define their emerging identities in 
contrast to threats by intertwining their own positive self-image with the enemy image of 
another state. During the transformative periods of national mobilization for Armenia 
both in early twentieth century and as well as in late 1980s, Turkey and Azerbaijan 
represented existential security threats while Russia was seen as a lesser evil or even 
more as a friend, warranting neutral to positive attitudes. Similarly, although the national 
mobilization of Azerbaijan lagged that of its peers, its development as a modern nation-
state was largely intertwined in its conflict with Armenia, in the context of which Russia 
represented only a secondary threat. These observations suggest that a promising avenue 
for the future of national mobilization theory lies in further developing and 
operationalizing the directionality of national mobilization. 
Finally, Table 3.7 also offers a useful tool for identifying least-likely cases for 
deeper analysis. Out of the states that prioritized balancing, Georgia and Moldova 
represent least-likely cases that defied the expectations of conventional approaches that 
these states with weak military capabilities, economically dependent on Russia, and 
sharing Orthodox civilization should bandwagon. National mobilization offers a plausible 
alternative driver of these states’ foreign policy strategies, and Chapter 4 examines 
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Georgian leaders’ decision-making to clarify its causal role relative to the factors 
emphasized by conventional theories as they were formulating Georgia’s balancing 
strategy toward Russia. 
Similarly, Kazakhstan represents a least-likely case for national mobilization 
theory given that it was the only country among the fourteen weaker post-Soviet states to 
exhibit the presence of the main causal factors identified by all three alternative theories. 
Given its possession of nuclear weapons, economic incentives for independence, and its 
cultural distinctiveness from Russia, the three conventional theories predict that 
Kazakhstan should have been the post-Soviet state most predisposed toward balancing 
against Russia. Yet contrary to these conventional expectations and in line with national 
mobilization theory, it prioritized cooperation with Russia. In order to clarify the causal 
logic behind its security strategy, Chapter 5 examines the motivations of Kazakh leaders 
in charting their foreign policy course amidst the breakup of the Soviet Union. 
Overall, national mobilization demonstrates very strong predictive power for the 
post-Soviet states foreign policy choices toward Russia. This is particularly important 
considering the failure of the three alternative theories to account for variations in their 
security strategies. This is not to say that military capabilities, economic incentives and 
interdependence, and cultural similarity do not help shape international relations, but it 
does indicate that the content of national identity and levels of national mobilization 
affect states’ interests, perceptions, and actions. It does not mean that states do not act 
rationally, but it does strongly suggest that their past experiences and current domestic 
ideological environments affect leaders’ calculations. In short, national mobilization has a 
significant effect on state behavior, and traditional approaches to international relations 
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would benefit from more directly taking into account the role of historically and socially 
constructed national identities. 
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CHAPTER 4. “THE STOMACH’S SACRIFICES TO THE SOUL”: NATIONAL 
MOBILIZATION AND GEORGIA’S POST-COLD WAR FOREIGN POLICY 
When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, Russia inherited vastly superior 
economic and military power compared to the other 14 post-Soviet states, and it actively 
started reclaiming its leadership position in the region and developing new avenues for 
political, economic and security cooperation among the newly independent states 
(Brzezinski and Sullivan 1997, 3-9, Willerton and Cockerham 2003, 185-186). However, 
not all post-Soviet states were enthusiastic about reintegration and cooperation with 
Russia (Kubicek 2009, 237, Kuzio 2000, 81-82, Sakwa and Webber 1999, 379-380). 
Georgia, militarily and economically one of the weakest post-Soviet states, was one of 
the first to declare independence from the Soviet Union (Slider 1991, 63). With its 
economy heavily dependent on Soviet integration, Georgia had much to lose by 
antagonizing Russia. Given the steep military power asymmetry between the two 
countries and the lack of willing external allies for Georgia, its leaders had every reason 
to consider balancing a futile endeavor. Yet despite its weakness Georgia’s leaders 
interpreted Russia as their main security threat and maintained an anti-Russian foreign 
policy position (with some variations across different leaders), an approach that defied 
the expectations of conventional international relations theories. 
In this chapter I seek to answer the following question: why did Georgia prioritize 
balancing against Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union? My central argument is 
that Georgia’s relatively high national mobilization by the year 1990 was the primary 
factor driving its post-Soviet foreign policy choices towards Russia. This chapter 
conducts in-depth case studies of the historical development of Georgian nationalism and 
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Georgia’s post-Soviet foreign policy decision making in order to determine whether 
Georgia’s high national mobilization was in fact what led its leaders to prioritize 
balancing strategies against Russia, or whether theories rooted in power, economic 
interdependence, or static cultural factors provide better explanations for this outcome. 
National mobilization theory predicts that Georgia, having undergone a relatively 
intense process of national mobilization, should have developed a correspondingly 
intense national identity framed in “us-vs.-them” terms against Russia. Its people and 
leaders should have placed an especially high value on their national political autonomy. 
Perceiving Russia as the greatest threat to that autonomy, they should have rejected 
bandwagoning as entailing an unacceptable sacrifice of autonomy and instead prioritized 
balancing against their powerful former ruler. High national mobilization makes it more 
likely for nationalist leaders who see the powerful former ruler as a primary security 
threat and not as a strategic partner to assume key decision-making roles. At the same 
time, the citizens of nationally mobilized states should share such views and push their 
leaders to adopt foreign policies in line with them regardless of their leaders’ own 
personal convictions. In Georgia, if a critical mass of the population perceived Russia as 
their enemy, the leaders of independent Georgia should have had incentives to reflect 
those sentiments in their foreign policy decision-making. 
Alternatively, realist logic predicts that a newly emergent weak state like Georgia, 
lacking external alliances to balance against its powerful neighbor, should bandwagon 
with Russia for fear of its vastly superior capabilities. Liberal logic also predicts that 
Georgian leaders should have sought cooperation with Russia due to preexisting 
economic interdependence among the former Soviet states and the urgent economic 
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incentives facing a weak state like Georgia. On its surface Georgia’s balancing strategies 
toward Russia defy both realist and liberal predictions, but thoroughly testing these 
theories requires establishing whether Georgian leaders’ decision-making was fueled by 
the types of concerns these theories highlight. Were they informed by power distribution 
calculations and expectations of security guarantees from external powers, seeing 
balancing against Russia as a rational choice in line with realist logic? Did they expect to 
develop better economic partners elsewhere, hence seeing balancing against Russia as a 
rational choice in line with their country’s economic interests? 
Last, approaches emphasizing cultural similarity expect that Georgian leaders 
should have seen states sharing their Orthodox Christianity as less threatening, and hence 
should have been predisposed towards cooperation with Russia. To test this prediction, 
the case study will examine whether Georgian leaders’ decision-making towards Russia 
was informed by the cultural similarities between the two countries and the extent to 
which those similarities factored into their foreign policy choices. 
In testing national mobilization theory against these alternative theories, this 
chapter examines several important historical junctures in Georgia’s national 
development along with its leaders’ decision-making processes during the post-Soviet 
period. Its first section focuses on establishing the presence of the independent variables 
highlighted by national mobilization theory by exploring Georgia’s transformation into a 
modern nation-state with a strong and distinct national identity, examining its cultural 
and political independence and pre-Soviet nation building in late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century Georgia, before it was absorbed by the Soviet Union. The second 
section of this chapter demonstrates the revival of nationalism in Georgia during the late 
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1980s and its struggle for political independence from the Soviet Union, which directly 
informed the role of national mobilization in post-independence Georgia. 
The third section investigates Georgian leaders’ motivations for adopting 
balancing strategies towards Russia during the twilight and aftermath of the Soviet 
Union. To this end, I examine several important episodes during which Georgian leaders 
were faced with decisions that would shape their country’s foreign policy towards Russia. 
In each of these cases Georgian leaders chose to balance against Russia instead of 
bandwagoning: rejecting the New Union Treaty (1990) and its successor, the CIS (1991); 
rejecting participation in the union-wide referendum and staging an alternate referendum 
on Georgia’s independence (1991); pursuing Western partnerships via membership in 
NATO and the European Union (1990-1991); and continuing to treat Russia as its 
primary threat across successive administrations moving forward. In each of these case 
studies, I examine Georgian leaders’ decision-making processes to establish the relative 
importance of national mobilization, power, economic interdependence, and cultural 
similarity in informing their decisions. 
4.1 The Mobilization of Georgian Nationalism 
Eighteenth-century Georgian kings sought support from the Russian Tsars against 
Ottoman and Persian invaders, leading to a bilateral treaty in 1783 that made the 
Georgian Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti a protectorate of the Russian Empire (Kandelaki 
1953, 173-179). Russia did not respect its treaty responsibilities guaranteeing the 
protection of Georgia’s territorial integrity and the reign of its royal dynasty, however, 
annexing its historic territories in 1801 and overthrowing its Bagrationi dynasty (King 
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2008, 27-30, Lang 1962, 37-41). This action struck many Georgians as a betrayal, 
prompting conspiracies and rebellions against the Russian occupation in 1802, 1804, 
1812-1813, 1819-1820, 1832, and 1841 (King 2008, 148, Suny 1994, 70-72). 
Anti-tsarist bitterness persisted both among Georgia’s peasants and its aristocrats, 
but rebellions were too sporadic and localized to challenge the new status quo of Russian 
rule and they failed to galvanize large segments of Georgian society due to its 
hierarchical structure. Nevertheless, these uprisings represented national experiences—
even if limited in scale—that expressed a longing for the restoration of the Georgian 
Kingdom and contributed to an us-vs.-them mentality especially among certain segments 
of Georgian nobles. As historian Ronald Suny puts it, “out of such unreconciled 
aristocrats the first generation of the Georgian oppositional intelligentsia was formed in 
the 1820s,” and the resentment towards tsarist rule had “a specific ethnic and cultural 
dimension” (Suny 1994, 70). 
In December 1832, a group of well-connected, highly educated Georgian nobles 
and intellectuals planned a conspiracy with the goal of reasserting Georgia’s 
independence and restoring the Bagrationi royal dynasty to the throne, and some of the 
conspirators even advocated for a liberated Georgia to become a constitutional monarchy 
or a republic (Suny 1994, 71-72). Although the conspiracy was unsuccessful, it 
demonstrated that even in the early 1830s there were Georgian intellectuals who wanted 
not merely to restore their own status by reviving the Georgian Kingdom; they were 
concerned with questions of national self-determination, imported the insights of political 
thought and experience from the Europe of that time, and debated the major concepts of 
constitution and republicanism (Jones 2005, 32-33). Even as many of the conspirators 
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were still clinging to the hierarchical monarchy and their own superior social status, there 
were intellectuals like Solomon Dodashvili and others who were envisioning and 
advancing alternative governmental formations for a nation-state, with an emphasis on 
individual freedoms, limited sovereign powers, and promoting a national language and 
mass education as a foundation for the nation’s progress (Jones 1987, 58, 71-72). 
By the time Georgia was annexed by the Russian Empire in 1800, it had already 
developed clear national characteristics including a unique language and literary 
tradition, a dominant religion that distinguished it from non-Christian neighbors, and a 
long line of royal dynasties including kings that had been able to unite historic Georgia at 
different times. Despite centuries of prolonged occupations by various empires and 
internal conflicts among various Georgian kings and princes, Georgians had a shared 
sense of historic continuity and imagined nationhood. That said, the hierarchical 
character of Georgian society proved an obstacle to horizontal national mobilization, 
making it easier for the tsarist administration to co-opt a significant section of the 
Georgian nobility by granting their traditional status and benefits—even if now Georgian 
kings were replaced by Russian tsars (Suny 1994, 71-72). Thus, between the 1830s and 
the 1840s there were two parallel processes in Georgia: on one hand, many Georgian 
nobles developed a symbiotic relationship with the Russian nobility, advancing in the 
academic and military ranks of the empire and becoming part of the same urban elite 
communities in Tbilisi and Moscow; on the other hand, literary genres also emerged 
during this period highlighting patriotic romanticism, depicting nostalgia and pride in the 
glorious past of the Georgian kingdom, questioning and criticizing the union with Russia, 
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and providing a cohesive image of the Georgian nation and its history (Suny 1994, 124-
125, Jones 2005, 33).  
The process of Georgian national mobilization began to gather momentum in the 
1850s and 1860s while still under tsarist rule. This awakening coincided with the 
emergence of a new generation of Georgian nationalist intellectuals as well as processed 
of modernization, urbanization, and the advancement of general education and printed 
press, which are essential components in the process of modern nation-building and the 
creation of “imagined communities” (Anderson 1991). The core of the new generation of 
intellectuals was a group called tergdaleulni,1 members of which began galvanizing 
Georgian society with ideas of equality and individual rights combined with national self-
identification and self-government. These intellectuals supported a changing landscape of 
hierarchical society despite largely being aristocrats themselves, advocating for peasant 
land ownership and criticizing the older generation of Georgian elites for its embrace of 
Russian culture at the expense of Georgian culture. 
The tergdaleulni were clear and purposeful in their efforts to build a modern 
nation and generate unity based on the strong foundation of Georgian cultural heritage. 
As Stephen Jones (Jones 2005, 34-35) writes, “The tergdaleulni, in their search for a new 
Georgian identity, overturned the old world of aristocratic patriotism with explosive 
concepts of nationalism, equal rights, realism, and scientific progress.” One of the 
essential transformations pushed by the group’s leader, Ilia Chavchavadze, and the other 
tergdaleulni was replacing the archaic literal Georgian language with a vernacular one 
 
1 Tergdalaulni literally means “those who drank from Terek.” Terek is the river that 
separates the Caucasus from Russia, and here it was used to describe Georgian 
intellectuals who travelled to Russia to receive their education. 
107 
 
that made culture and literature accessible to the wider public instead of only a small 
intellectual elite. Chavchavadze along with Dimitri Kipiani and other like-minded men 
and women went on to establish the Society of the Spreading of Literacy among 
Georgians in 1878, which developed into an extremely powerful network of thousands of 
educators, schools, libraries, newspapers, and journals throughout Georgia (Lang 1962, 
109). Georgian nationalists succeeded in spreading national narratives through poems, 
novels, and newspaper articles that escaped imperial censorship, especially when written 
in Georgian and/or conveyed through hidden patriotic messages (Jones 2005, 35). 
Georgian nationalist intellectuals fostered and capitalized on the socio-economic 
and technological transformations that were taking place at the time, recognizing how 
industrialization and urbanization enabled greater mobility and connectivity among large 
numbers of people and facilitated their active participation in nation-building, which 
previously primarily revolved around elites. They hoped that developments such as new 
roads and railways would overcome regionalism and work towards national harmony—as 
the prominent tergdaleuli Sergo Meskhi put it, “destroy the isolation and 
misunderstandings between compatriots and establish greater communication and unity 
between brotherly people” (Jones 2005, 15). 
These revolutions in social mobility, horizontal connectivity, and the exchange of 
information were facilitated by various developments that started to erode regional and 
social barriers within Georgia’s population. General education experienced a significant 
boost beginning in the late 1840s as regional and parochial schools significantly 
increased in number, and hundreds of students received annual stipends sponsoring 
higher education outside of Georgia. Public libraries, theaters, numerous professional 
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societies, hundreds of factories and merchandise shops, and a growing number of journals 
and newspapers in both Russian and Georgian provided additional channels of 
connectivity and information exchange from the 1850s onward (Lang 1962, 85-86, 89-
90). Tbilisi grew into an energetic industrial center, attracting large numbers of people 
from rural areas as well as from other cities, and its population more than doubled 
between 1886 and 1914 (Jaoshvili 1996). Banks started offering loans that boosted 
business from the 1870s, while railroads facilitated social and economic networks 
connecting the Caspian coast with Black Sea (Lang 1962, 130, Jones 2005, 28). 
To summarize, the late nineteenth century can be aptly described as an era of 
modern nation-building in Georgia. The tergdaleulni emphasized Georgia’s national 
characteristics (expressed in Chavchavadze’s widely popular slogan “language, 
homeland, religion”), highlighted national experiences including its historical struggles 
against foreign invaders and enduring colonial Russian rule, and widely disseminated 
national information. The combined effect of these developments was to replace old 
allegiances to kings and tavads (Georgian nobles governing regions) with a broader 
concept of national identity encompassing an “imagined community” of Georgians, even 
if still under Russian rule. The resulting awakening remained mostly confined to cultural 
independence until the Russian Revolution of 1917, when the right combination of 
internal and external circumstances enabled Georgia to translate it into political 
independence and to build a modern self-governing nation-state. 
4.1.1 Experiencing National Independence 
Following the Russian Revolution of 1917, Georgia’s Social Democratic Party 
refused to recognize the Bolshevik central government and disarmed Russian defense 
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forces in Tbilisi, establishing a temporary Transcaucasian Republic with Armenia and 
Azerbaijan before declaring independence on May 26, 1918 (Lee 2017, 36-40). Georgia’s 
demonstrated readiness to establish an independent nation-state was a logical 
continuation of its accelerating nation-building process. Chavchavadze and the 
tergdaleulni had laid a strong foundation for national awakening and unity during the late 
nineteenth century, and in the early twentieth century the Social Democrats led by Noe 
Zhordania mobilized Georgia’s population with political visions and grassroots activism. 
The Social Democrats initially hoped to see a democratic transformation within tsarist 
Russia, but after the Bolshevik takeover they quickly moved to secure Georgia’s full 
independence. In doing so, they chose to follow the European path of social democracy, 
designating Bolshevik Russia as a threatening “other” (Matsaberidze 2014, 141). 
The 1917-1921 period represents arguably the most important period of modern 
Georgian nation- and state-building despite its brevity. After more than a century of 
imperial rule, Georgian leaders forged a culturally united and horizontally mobilized 
independent political unit responsible for its own internal and external affairs. As the 
eldest member of the newly elected Constituent Assembly, Silibistro Jibladze, declared in 
his opening remarks on March 12, 1919, “The people, who were not frightened by the 
freezing winter of the North, who showed their capacity for political and citizenry growth 
and development under a thick and cold layer of the ice of occupation, are not going to be 
destroyed nor destroy the independence they have gained” (Iakobashvili, Khositashvili, 
and Jgerenaia 2019, 20). 
In sharp contrast to the Bolshevik dictatorial takeover in Russia and other 
authoritarian developments of that time, the new Georgian state was represented by a 
110 
 
freely elected multi-party government under democratic principles delineated in the Act 
of Independence (May 26, 1918). Its Constituent Assembly proved effective, adopting 
over 100 laws culminating in a constitution of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in 
1921 (Matsaberidze 2014, 41-57). As Jones (2005, 48-49) describes, this group of 
Georgian intellectuals produced a unique model of “socialist-led national liberation” 
inspired by the nineteenth-century writings of the tergdaleulni, their own shared colonial 
experience, and imported ideas of European socialism. 
Georgia’s newly established state met all the essential criteria of statehood under 
international law such as permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and 
the ability to enter relationships with other states (Dixon 2007, 115). More importantly, 
several qualities of Georgia’s short-lived statehood made it possible for this period to 
become a particularly meaningful national experience with lasting effects for the nation. 
Particularly important were mass political engagement and popular support of the newly 
established government, which gave it important legitimacy and a broad mandate for 
internal affairs, as well as the international recognition of Georgia’s independence by 
several significant world powers, which enhanced its ability to pursue an effective 
foreign policy.  
Social Democrats had popular support in Georgia long before taking the lead in 
its independent government. The November 1917 Constituent Assembly elections held 
across the entire imperial territory demonstrated that while Bolsheviks were gaining 
foothold in many areas that was not the case in Georgia, where Social Democrats enjoyed 
overwhelming popular support (Lee 2017, 37-38). The Social Democrats remained the 
primary political authority during the years of independence and earned 109 out of 130 
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seats in independent Georgia’s Constituent Assembly. Suffrage was universal (age 20 and 
up), the electoral system was proportional in one nation-wide constituency, and the 
election results led to the formation of a multi-party government (Nohlen, Grotz, and 
Hartmann 2001a, 372-375). The elections were held on February 14, 1919, with 60% 
turnout despite bad weather (Lee 2017, 44-45). Popular support and political engagement 
among the people were not limited to elections. Public enthusiasm and engagement was 
displayed in organized celebratory parades that attracted hundreds of thousands to the 
streets of Tbilisi, most notably on the first- and second-year anniversaries of the 
declaration of independence (NationalArchivesofGeorgia n.d.). 
International recognition of Georgia was a paramount concern for its leadership, 
and they worked tirelessly towards that end through bilateral and multilateral 
engagements including sending a delegation with that primary objective to the Paris 
Peace Conference in January 1919 (Lee 2017, 76-80, Lang 1962, 219-222, Kobakhidze, 
Silakadze, and Vacharadze N.D., 51, 54, 59, 61). Between 1918 and 1921 Georgia gained 
de facto and later de jure recognition from several important international powers 
including Turkey, Germany, England, and France. True to form, the Georgian 
government turned these into another tangible and memorable national experience for its 
people by organizing a mass public celebration in the streets of Tbilisi on February 6, 
1921, where invited foreign diplomats joined the celebration of Georgian independence 
(Kobakhidze, Silakadze, and Vacharadze N.D., 96-97). 
Most notably, Georgia managed to gain de jure recognition of its independence 
even from Soviet Russia. Formalized in the Treaty of Moscow in May 7, 1920, this 
included declarations that “Russia unreservedly recognizes the independence and 
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sovereignty of the Georgian state” and that “Russia undertakes to refrain from any kind 
of interference in the internal affairs of Georgia” (Beichman 1991, 64-65).2 This treaty 
did not stop Russia from annexing Georgia several months later, but its legal recognition 
of Georgian independence marked another meaningful national experience at the time, 
and it continues to be a reference point for Georgian leaders highlighting the country’s 
past independence and Russia’s failure to uphold its commitments towards Georgia. 
Unlike the old days when political affairs concerned elites while serfs and 
peasants remained uninvolved and uninformed, these crucial national experiences of 
independence and state-building were shared not only by a small group of leaders but by 
a large population which was better informed and mobilized thanks to the various 
information dissemination channels in place as well as purposeful reforms implemented 
by Georgia’s new government to keep the population informed and involved in state-
building. As Lee (2017, 48) describes it, despite Georgia’s internal and external 
weaknesses, “they now had a state of their own for the first time in more than a century 
and it was the democratic republic they promised, one with a multi-party system, free and 
fair elections, freedom of speech and assembly, an independent judiciary, and local 
government.” Suny (1993, 63-66) argues that post-revolutionary Georgia was “the most 
viable and stable states in Transcaucasia,” where “class and ethnic identities overlapped 
and reinforced each other” in the process of national mobilization and state-building. 
 
2 The treaty was not perceived uniformly positively—while some saw it as a diplomatic 
success of Georgia, others denounced it over the concessions made to Moscow. 
According to the treaty, in exchange for recognition of Georgia’s independence and 
sovereignty by Soviet Russia and its commitment to refrain from any kind of interference 
in Georgian affairs, Georgia committed to not allowing troops of powers hostile to Russia 
on its territory and also to allowing a local branch of the Communist party to function 
freely in Georgia. 
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Historians and political scientists studying this period agree that independent Georgia 
“had excellent chances for success” if the Soviet Empire consolidating next door would 
“permit them to demonstrate potential” (Suny 1993, 64). As it happened, however, 
Bolshevik Russia forcibly annexed independent Georgia in February 1921. 
4.1.2 Georgian Nationalism under the Soviet Union 
The exhausted European states had no interest in fighting to keep the Soviet 
Union out of Georgia after World War I, despite many of them having recognized 
Georgia’s independence and some like Germany and Britain having moderate 
geopolitical interests in South Caucasus (Tsereteli 2014, 80, Gachechiladze 2014, 21, 24). 
Whatever peaceful image the new Soviet regime tried to create (at least in its initial 
stage), its annexation of Georgia was violent and bloody. The Georgian army fought for 
several weeks before being defeated by a Soviet invader that had significant numerical 
and technological advantages (Andersen and Partskhaladze 2009, 68-69). Duly-elected 
members of the Georgian government were driven into exile in France by March 1921, 
while those who stayed behind were arrested and executed en masse along with their 
sympathizers (King 2008, 173-174, Andersen and Partskhaladze 2009, 73). This initial 
contact between independent Georgia and the Soviet Union was a markedly negative 
national experience, uniting many Georgians in a shared grievance and engraving the 
Soviet Union (like the Russian Empire a century earlier) as the main enemy of Georgian 
nation and statehood. 
The seventy years of Soviet rule that followed were not uniform, as Moscow’s 
policies toward the Soviet republics varied substantially under different leaders from 
Lenin to Gorbachev. While at times some level of cultural expression was tolerated or 
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even encouraged, political dissent and nationalist ambitions in the republics were guarded 
against. Despite harsh reprisals, Georgian society actively resisted the newly established 
Soviet rule. The first three years of occupation saw sporadic revolts against the Bolshevik 
regime across Georgia, culminating in a large-scale uprising in August 1924 (Benidze 
1991). The August uprising was coordinated by the Committee for the Independence of 
Georgia, which was comprised of members of five political parties, unifying all different 
strides of society with their nationalist and anti-Soviet sentiments (Grdzelidze 1992). 
Georgia’s leaders-in-exile played a significant role in planning and coordinating 
the uprising—their “last desperate effort to regain their freedom”—but despite some 
initial success in western Georgia the August uprising was ultimately suppressed by the 
Red Army, resulting in thousands of executions and tens of thousands of arrests and 
deportations (Lang 1962, 243-244). These events demonstrated both the determination of 
Georgia’s nationalists and the brutality of the Bolshevik rule they opposed. In the 
following years, the government-in-exile led by Noe Zhordania continued denouncing the 
horrors of Bolshevik rule through publications from abroad, and although these efforts 
failed to alter the repressive and totalitarian character of Soviet rule, it offered a counter-
narrative that continued to criticize the legitimacy of Soviet authority in Georgia and to 
provide a strong reference point for undercover pro-independence movements (King 
2008, 73-75, Zhordania 1925). 
The most severe tactics of Sovietization and squelching nationalist sentiments 
among Soviet republics were employed under Stalin’s leadership. His political 
repressions resulted in hundreds of thousands of executions without trial, forced labor 
camps, and general terror across the union. The Great Purge of “enemies of the people” 
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(in the 1930s) wiped out many critics of the Soviet Union and prominent members of the 
intelligentsia, instilling widespread fear (Thurston 1998, Stalin's lists on Georgia 2013). 
Subsequent Soviet leaders were relatively less harsh, but until the 1980s political dissent 
and nationalist mobilization remained sporadic and easily restrained. Nevertheless, large 
scale demonstrations that took place in Tbilisi in 1978 demonstrated the enduring 
potential of Georgian nationalism. The constitution asserted Georgian as the sole official 
language in the republic, and the demonstrations arose in response to Soviet authorities’ 
attempt to change this by giving a similar status to Russian and other languages. 
Thousands of demonstrators, mostly students, were able to pressure the local government 
to maintain the primacy of the Georgian language within the republic (Sakwa 1998, 241). 
In Suny’s (1994, 291) words, “Without gaining the full attributes of political sovereignty, 
Georgians nevertheless remained a cohesive and conscious nationality in possession of its 
own territory and prepared, should the opportunity arise, to improve its social, material, 
and cultural life.” 
As Gorbachev’s Perestroika took shape in the late 1980s, so did the awakening of 
nationalism in different parts of the Soviet Union.3 However, the republics did not 
respond similarly to these relative freedoms; only a handful of them seized the 
opportunity for national mobilization, while others rejected the notion of independence 
and clung to the Soviet Union even as signs of its disintegration became apparent 
(Abdelal 2001, Brzezinski and Sullivan 1997). In the final years of the Soviet Union, as 
 
3 Perestroika literally means restructuring, referring to political and economic reforms 
that took place in the Soviet Union under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev in the 
1980s, associated with the relative liberalization and decentralization of the Soviet 
system. 
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the central leadership was challenged and shaken, Georgia was one of the few Soviet 
republics where leaders of the national liberation movement galvanized society and 
widespread anti-Soviet movements and demonstrations emerged. 
The culmination of the Georgian national movement came on April 9, 1989, when 
a large-scale anti-Soviet demonstration was raided by Soviet troops using sharp shovels 
and toxic gas, killing and injuring peaceful demonstrators. This tragedy further fanned the 
flames of anti-Soviet sentiments (in Georgia and beyond), making it easier for nationalist 
leaders to frame the Soviet Union and its main successor-state, Russia, as Georgia’s 
essential enemy (Beissinger 2002, 80). I argue that Georgia’s strong national 
mobilization—first developed during the nineteenth century, strengthened through 
political independence and state-building in 1917-1921—made Georgian society resilient 
enough even after seventy years of Soviet rule to sustain its unique self-image, animosity 
towards its occupying power, and longing for independence. In the following sections I 
demonstrate how these national sentiments affected Georgia’s foreign policy during the 
early 1990s. 
4.2 Georgia’s Post-Soviet Foreign Policy 
I begin this case study of Georgia’s foreign policy decision-making in 1990, when 
Georgia, still formally under the Soviet rule, began acting as an independent state and 
effectively formulating its own domestic and foreign policies. Georgia’s leader during 
this time was Zviad Gamsakhurdia, a former dissident and leader of the national 
liberation movement in Georgia, who was elevated to national leadership following the 
first multiparty elections in Soviet Georgia on 28 October 1990. Gamsakhurdia’s tenure 
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as a national leader was short-lived, first as chairman of the Supreme Council of Georgia 
and then as president (1990-1992). Nevertheless, during his brief rule Gamsakhurdia 
powerfully shaped the course of Georgia’s post-independence foreign policy towards 
Russia.  
To what extent did Gamsakhurdia’s own nationalist views and high national 
mobilization throughout the country influence Georgia’s foreign policy toward Russia 
during his tenure as leader of the country? The sections that follow examine the decision-
making process of Georgia’s leaders confronting important foreign policy choices in the 
early 1990s, paying particular attention to their perception of Russia and their future 
relationship with it. The analysis is based on primary documents including official 
statements, interviews, correspondence, and most importantly transcripts of sessions of 
the Supreme Council of Georgia, which contain invaluable information regarding 
Georgian leaders’ decision-making processes as they were debating and shaping 
Georgia’s foreign policy. While the primary focus in the following sections is on the 
1990-1992 period and the leadership of Gamsakhurdia, I also extend my analysis to 
incorporate Georgia’s subsequent foreign policy under presidents Eduard Shevardnadze 
and Mikheil Saakashvili in order to demonstrate that the role of Georgia’s strong national 
mobilization endured across such disparate leaders.  
4.2.1 The New Union Treaty 
As the forces that eventually pulled the Soviet Union apart grew increasingly 
severe in the late 1980s, and leaders in Moscow were desperately searching for a formula 
that would keep the simmering union together. Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev 
proposed the New Union Treaty, intending to accommodate the various republics’ 
118 
 
growing needs for autonomy while preventing the dissolution of the union. Several 
visions for a renewed union circulated involving varying degrees of decentralization, but 
as late as 1990 Gorbachev remained hopeful that it was still possible to salvage the union 
by accommodating the republics’ growing demands (Cherni︠ a︡ev 2000, 51-53). 
Although these events occurred under the formal mantle of Soviet rule, they 
represented the formative foreign policy issue for the Soviet republics—indeed, the 
choice whether to chart their own unique foreign policies. Some approached this decision 
willingly and others confronted it only by necessity, but during this period each decided 
how to approach its future relationship with Russia and how much autonomy to demand 
or sacrifice. The various republics met Gorbachev’s initiative with radically different 
responses: some enthusiastically supported his efforts to preserve the union while others 
outright rejected the proposal as an insult to their goal of full independence (Remnick 
1990). Georgia fell in the latter category, and archival transcripts detailing Georgian 
leaders’ decision-making process as they were grappling with how to respond to 
Gorbachev’s invitation reveal that nationalism was the central factor informing their 
decisions. 
Nationalism can affect states’ foreign policy in two ways. First, a leader’s own 
internalized nationalist views may directly influence his/her decision making. Second, 
widespread nationalist views in society may generate popular pressure incentivizing even 
non-nationalist leaders to reflect nationalism in their policies. In the case of Georgia, both 
conditions were met by 1990: a nationalist leader governed an electorate mobilized 
around nationalist sentiments. Before he became the formal leader of Georgia, 
Gamsakhurdia had been involved in anti-Soviet political activism for several decades and 
119 
 
had been arrested several times because of it. By the mid-1980s he became the 
charismatic leader of Georgia’s national liberation movement, galvanizing followers with 
nationalist speeches highlighting the millennial history of the nation, denouncing Soviet 
occupation, and uniting people around the shared goal of independence. Gamsakhurdia’s 
leadership can be described with reference to populism, religiosity, and conservatism, but 
all of these were wrapped in nationalist rhetoric and images of a semi-mythological 
historic Georgia, which he compared to “Lazarus rising from the dead” (Jones 2013, 52, 
Fuller 1993, 342-343). Gamsakhurdia revived old traditions and national symbols in 
numerous aspects of social and political life, restoring the flag, anthem, and emblem of 
the first republic of Georgia. He also promoted Georgian Orthodox Christianity, equating 
it with Georgianness and delivering lectures on the country’s spiritual mission 
(Gamsakhurdia 1990, 1991f). 
It was no accident that Georgia had an overtly nationalist leader as it broke away 
from the Soviet Union. As the preceding sections described, Georgia had a long history 
of national mobilization by the late 1980s. Its mobilized electorate eagerly participated in 
the Supreme Council elections of October 28, 1990, producing a council composed 
primarily of nationalist anti-communist parties. In those first multiparty parliamentary 
elections allowed under Soviet rule, the nationalist Round Table-Free Georgia bloc 
headed by Gamsakhurdia received overwhelming support. Upon becoming the new 
chairman of the Supreme Council on November 19, Gamsakhurdia effectively formed a 
non-communist government of Georgia (Nelson and Amonashvili 1992, 687-688). The 
local communist government lost control over the radical nationalists and in some ways 
was nationalized itself, even adopting stances in line with Georgia’s political liberation. 
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This shift was likely not fueled by any earnest change of heart among communist 
politicians; instead, it represents a strong example of how the acceleration of anti-Soviet 
and pro-independence sentiments in public opinion drove non-nationalist leaders to adopt 
nationalist positions  (Matsaberidze 2019, 178-180). 
Transcripts of the sessions of the Supreme Council of Georgia reveal that 
Gamsakhurdia and other parliamentarians actively denounced and rejected the New 
Union Treaty from the very moment it was proposed by Soviet leadership in November 
1990. At the November 22 session, council members expressed a widespread consensus 
that Chairman Gamsakhurdia should reject Moscow’s invitation to attend the November 
23 meeting of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union, where Gorbachev was expected 
to make a special report regarding the future of the union (Supreme Council of Georgia 
Transcripts-a, 199-200). Far from framing this decision as internal business-as-usual 
between the center and a republic of the Soviet Union, the Georgian parliamentarians 
consciously confronted it as a matter of foreign policy, demonstrating the mindset of an 
independent Georgia even as their council remained formally within framework of the 
Soviet Union. As one of the MPs stated, “Since this [was] about a union treaty, and in 
general about [Georgia’s] relationship with Russia,… it represent[ed] foreign affairs”  
(Supreme Council of Georgia Transcripts-a, 202).  
It is also telling that Georgian parliamentarians rejected the New Union Treaty 
without knowing what it really entailed or what kind of renewed union Gorbachev was 
actually proposing. Only one of the MPs, Georgian diplomat Levan Aleksidze, suggested 
that instead of outright rejection it would make sense to “let this proposal come to 
Georgia… [then] consider it and write a justified rejection”—to first “see what they are 
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offering” since they could “always say no” (Supreme Council of Georgia Transcripts-a, 
2003). Yet the loudest voices in the council argued for rejecting any type of new union 
treaty coming from Russia—an enemy that should not be trusted—and they framed the 
rejection of the New Union Treaty as their duty to the Georgian nation. As one prominent 
MP, Nodar Natadze, put it, “The responsibility of the Supreme Council of Georgia [was] 
to declare unequivocally and clearly that Georgia is not going to join any union treaty,” 
that all new parties representing a majority of the council had been elected on a platform 
championing Georgian independence, and that Georgian independence was 
“incompatible with joining a new union treaty” with Russia (Supreme Council of Georgia 
Transcripts-a, 203-204). 
This discussion preceded any formal invitation for the Georgian republic to join 
the New Union Treaty; indeed, it preceded any council members actually seeing the 
treaty’s contents. Soviet leaders started a promotion campaign highlighting that the New 
Union Treaty would guarantee the sovereignty of all member republics in this renewed 
union, but the Georgian parliamentarians rejected the notion outright, treating any 
proposal emanating from Moscow as a threat to be avoided at any cost. Not only did they 
refuse to consider the New Union Treaty, members of the Georgian parliament advocated 
adopting a formal document that would demonstrate “that Georgia’s Supreme Council 
rejects any proposal of a union treaty” (Supreme Council of Georgia Transcripts-a, 202). 
National duty and responsibility were recalled at every step of this discussion, 
with parliamentarians judging it as their “responsibility to the nation” to formally and 
categorically reject any form of union treaty with Russia and justifying that position as 
“Georgia’s historic interest” (N. Natadze File N1165 No 8 N2892 pp 206-207, 203-204). 
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In contrast to such nationalist invocations, strategic calculations concerning the military 
and economic costs and benefits of refusing to entertain a future union in any form were 
entirely missing from the discussion. Gamsakhurdia summarized the debate by reminding 
everyone that they had not yet received the formal invitation to join the treaty “because 
they do not dare to,” echoing another MP’s sentiment that “maybe they will not even dare 
to ask a parliament with attitudes like ours to join the new union treaty” (Supreme 
Council of Georgia Transcripts-a, 206-207, 205). His comments highlighting the strength 
of the nationalist commitments embodied by Georgia’s newly elected parliament were 
met by applause. 
Shortly after this discussion, the Supreme Council of Georgia received an official 
proposal for the New Union Treaty from Moscow. It responded by drafting and adopting 
an official document declaring Georgia’s rejection of the New Union Treaty and 
outlining the reasoning behind this position. Addressed to Gorbachev, the two-page 
document began by highlighting that the Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia 
had adopted a law declaring its transitional period on November 22, 1990, noting the 
history of Soviet occupation of Georgia since 1921, and emphasizing that although it was 
formally a member of the Soviet Union Georgia was actively pursuing institutional 
reforms towards the full restoration of its independence. The document made inescapably 
clear that Georgia rejected participation in any union treaty that implied even a minimal 
amount of vertical subordination, concluding that it would “reject participation in a 
detailed consideration of the ‘New Union Treaty proposal’ because in any form it is 
unacceptable to the Republic of Georgia, which is only in the early stages of restoring its 
full state independence”(Supreme Council of Georgia Transcripts-b, 105-106). 
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To summarize, the Supreme Council of Georgia’s deliberations surrounding the 
New Union Treaty proposal showed Georgian leaders’ ironclad resolve to reject it sight 
unseen because any union with Russia contradicted their ultimate goal of full 
independence. In line with national mobilization theory, their discussions were filled with 
nationalist sentiments as the chairman and MPs alike were effusive in their dedication to 
Georgia’s independence, using their duty to the country, their historic responsibility, and 
similar concepts to justify their rejection of the union treaty. 
The MPs did not debate the economic or political consequences of their decision 
during these parliamentary discussions. Liberal logic would expect that economically 
weak Georgia, still largely dependent on trade with the Soviet center and the union at 
large, would be concerned about the potential economic consequences of rejecting a new 
union treaty, which was fundamentally concerned with maintaining existing economic 
ties among the Soviet republics. Similarly, realist logic would predict that Georgian 
leaders should have been concerned with the strategic consequences of rejecting a 
renewed union and antagonizing the Soviet leadership, which only one-and-a-half years 
earlier had demonstrated that it was willing to deploy military force to crush Georgia’s 
aspirations for independence. Contrary to assumptions that rational Georgian politicians 
should have heavily weighed the material consequences of their decision, it is telling that 
such concerns went unvoiced during their decision-making process, which was instead 
dominated by nationalists and nationalist sentiments. 
Similarly, no one voiced sentiments regarding the fact that Georgia and Russia 
shared the Orthodox Christian religion in the Georgian Supreme Council of the early 
1990s. Although there had been collaborationists who advanced the idea of cultural 
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similarity throughout the long history of Russo-Georgian relations, any collaborationists 
were sidelined along with the Georgian Communists, a group that itself had little 
credibility on religious matters. As a result, Georgia’s experience with the New Union 
Treaty offers considerable support for national mobilization theory while disconfirming 
the alternative theories, which were defied by Georgian leaders’ rejection of the treaty as 
well as the highly nationalist character of their deliberations and the absence of the 
material and cultural considerations that those alternative approaches would expect. 
4.2.2 The Union-Wide Referendum 
Confronted with Georgia’s refusal to even participate in the drafting of the New 
Union Treaty (along with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova and Armenia) and 
increasing secessionist activity across the Soviet Union, Gorbachev proposed a union-
wide referendum to be held on March 17, 1991. The goal of this referendum was to 
maintain the integrity of the Soviet government by salvaging popular support for the New 
Union Treaty (Austin 1996, 3). This was a significant moment as it was the first (and last) 
time that the Soviet Union asked its population to participate in such a referendum. The 
question proposed for the ballot was: “Do you consider it necessary to preserve the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics, in 
which the rights and freedoms of a person of any nationality will be fully guaranteed?” 
(Hill and White 2014, 19). Such an unprecedented direct appeal to the people of the 
Soviet Union could have been interpreted as a positive effect of Gorbachev’s Perestroika, 
but not all republics saw it in such an attractive light. On the contrary, Georgian leaders 
perceived the idea of a referendum as unequivocally negative—yet another attempt by 
Moscow to stifle their progress toward full independence and to threaten their nation’s 
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sovereignty (Gamsakhurdia, Saqartvelos Respublika, February 5, 1991, 1). Not only did 
they reject the union-wide referendum, Georgian leaders responded by holding an 
alternate referendum asking the people of Georgia to express their opinion on Georgia’s 
full independence from the Soviet Union. The discussions regarding the union-wide 
referendum held during the February 1991 sessions of the Supreme Council of Georgia 
demonstrate the reasoning behind these decisions.  
Gamsakhurdia opened the debate on the proposed Soviet and Georgian 
referendums by observing, “We discussed and thought, that of course we should not 
participate in any referendum regarding the Soviet Union, but I think we can still hold a 
referendum in some form, so that our nation’s will regarding the independence of 
Georgia, regarding the restoration of state independence can be expressed” (Supreme 
Council of Georgia Transcripts-c, 113). The discussion that followed was filled with 
nationalist fireworks and references to Russia as an existential current and future threat to 
the sovereignty of Georgia. As parliamentarian Nodar Natadze stated, Georgia was 
“essentially under two life-or-death threats” from Moscow, one of them the physical risk 
of “expulsion” and “slaughter” and the other “legal, if we willingly agree to stay in the 
Soviet Union.” Therefore, he declared that Gorbachev’s referendum “should be totally 
boycotted” (Supreme Council of Georgia Transcripts-c, 114-115). 
Gamsakhurdia’s own passionate arguments for rejecting the Soviet referendum 
met unanimous approval from the council members. He argued that Georgia did not 
“recognize the Soviet Union and neither its belonging to it,” insisting that there could not 
be a referendum on maintaining the Soviet Union when there had never been a 
“referendum in Georgia regarding joining the Soviet Union” at the time of its conquest in 
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1921 (Supreme Council of Georgia Transcripts-c, 115-116, Supreme Council of Georgia 
Transcripts-d, 108). He considered Georgia’s 1918 “declaration of independence still 
legally valid,” but given the reality of its infringement for 70 years he thought that 
holding an alternate referendum on Georgia’s independence was important “to 
demonstrate to the world society that the Georgian nation want[ed] independence” 
(Supreme Council of Georgia Transcripts-c, 115-116, Supreme Council of Georgia 
Transcripts-d, 108).  
Although there was broad consensus across the Supreme Council on boycotting 
Gorbachev’s union-wide referendum and holding a referendum on Georgia’s 
independence, several members voiced concerns regarding the timing and potential 
turnout rate of their alternate referendum. Some emphasized the importance of producing 
a high turnout and a high percentage of positive responses; the goal was to get “not just 
50% plus one” votes, but “as high a percent as possible, so that the percent itself is a clear 
and impressive” communication of the will of the Georgian nation (Supreme Council of 
Georgia Transcripts-d, 113-114). Some feared that if they failed to achieve “much more 
than two-thirds of the votes” including votes from “non-Georgian citizens, then the 
results of the referendum will have lesser effects both for the international organizations 
and our talks with the center of the empire [Moscow].” Securing a dramatic success, 
therefore, represented a “huge responsibility for [Georgia’s] history” (Supreme Council 
of Georgia Transcripts-d, 114, 133).  
Some parliamentarians noted the harsh economic conditions expected to befall 
Georgia during the upcoming months and worried how this would affect the referendum 
results. Their concern was that many “perceive Georgia’s independence, among all the 
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other things, as the stomach’s sacrifices to the soul” and thus there was much work to be 
done to show Georgia’s citizens that it was “poor not because it is fighting for 
independence, but quite contrary, it is poor because it does not have independence” 
(Supreme Council of Georgia Transcripts-d, 113-114).  One of the parliamentarians, 
Roman Gotsiridze, advised against holding the referendum on independence anytime 
soon, believing that the “economic pocket situation” would determine voters’ “political 
choice” (Supreme Council of Georgia Transcripts-d, 127-129). In contrast to the 
expectations of liberal theory, however, this pessimism was not accompanied by calls to 
prioritize economic recovery by revisiting integration with Russia. Instead, Gotsiridze’s 
skepticism was met with a harsh response from his colleagues who consciously 
prioritized nationalist soul over materialist stomach. They condemned his doubts as a 
“disrespect to the whole Georgian nation,” arguing that any projected referendum results 
must take into account “the national self-awareness and the instinct in Georgian people to 
save their nation, their consciousness, and their future,” and the fact that the “Georgian 
nation [was] ready for this choice” of full state independence (Supreme Council of 
Georgia Transcripts-d, 129-130). 
The Supreme Council’s referendum debate sidestepped not only economic 
concerns but strategic concerns as well. Its speeches neglected the potential effects of 
their decisions on Moscow’s military posture towards Georgia—whether rejecting the 
Soviet referendum and holding their own would actually smooth Georgia’s route to 
independence or instead make it a target for an aggressive crackdown. During this 
parliamentary discussion session only one member warned his colleagues that Georgia 
should prepare for a harsh response, anticipating “economic blockades” or “direct 
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interventions” and suggesting “some kind of union, alliance with the republics that are 
expected to be punished similarly” (Supreme Council of Georgia Transcripts-d, 125). 
These isolated comments reflect the sort of logic realist theory would expect from leaders 
in Georgia’s situation, but they were not echoed by others in the Supreme Council and 
sparked no follow-up debate. 
Ultimately, the Supreme Council of Georgia adopted a resolution boycotting the 
Soviet referendum (planned for March 17) and instead planned its own referendum for 
March 31, in which people would be asked: “Do you support the restoration of the 
independence of Georgia on the basis of the Act of Declaration of Independence of 
Georgia on May 26, 1918?’ (Supreme Council of Georgia Transcripts-d, 108). During the 
month leading up to Georgia’s referendum, the Supreme Council committed to educating 
the public about it through rallies, academic sessions, lectures, and televised programs 
(Supreme Council of Georgia Transcripts-d, 113-114). The Chairman closed the session 
by expressing his confidence that everyone would come to the referendum on Georgia’s 
independence “because this is an extremely important matter, for Georgians this has a 
vital importance, and for non-Georgians too, because non-Georgians expect citizenship, 
land, and normal life conditions” (Supreme Council of Georgia Transcripts-d, 133-134).  
The Georgian referendum was held on March 31 as planned, and the results were 
impressive with over 90% turnout out of which around 99% voted in favor of 
independence and less than 1% voted against (Matsaberidze 2019, 181). On April 9 (the 
two-year anniversary of the Soviet army’s crackdown on Georgia’s peaceful anti-Soviet 
protests), the Supreme Council of Georgia passed the Act of the Restoration of 
Independence of Georgia (Matsaberidze 2019, 183-185).  
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Independence from the Soviet Union was explicitly framed as a restoration of the 
sovereignty that had been lost in 1921. As Gamsakhurdia declared in his 1991 New Year 
Address, “Georgia declared its independence in 1918 and it is still legitimate. Therefore, 
we do not need to announce our independence again” (Gamzakhurdia 1991). In an hour-
long speech before the Georgian Supreme Council preceding the official reading of the 
Act of the Restoration of Independence, Gamsakhurdia explicitly linked post-Soviet 
independence to the pre-Soviet experience of independence, describing the First 
Georgian Democratic Republic (1918-1921) as an indispensable experience of modern 
Georgian statehood and observing its accomplishments in the domestic and international 
arenas as well as its forcible annexation by the Soviet Union. His speech was filled with 
nationalist sentiments emphasizing the experience of statehood, highlighting the 
repressions experienced under Soviet rule and at times invoking religious symbolism and 
cultural uniqueness, contrary to the expectations of theories emphasizing Georgia’s and 
Russia’s shared Orthodox Christianity (Gamsakhurdia 1991d). On May 26, 1991, 
Gamsakhurdia became the first popularly elected president of independent Georgia 
(earning 86.5% of the vote). The date was symbolic: the seventy-fourth anniversary of 
Georgia’s declaration of independence in the beginning of the century. 
In sum, the same Georgia that rejected the New Union Treaty also rejected the 
union-wide referendum that Gorbachev intended to muster desperately needed legitimacy 
for the treaty. The discussions among Georgia’s MPs surrounding their decision to reject 
the referendum were saturated with nationalist sentiments. Their alternative referendum 
on independence, its successful implementation with a high level of turnout and extensive 
support for independence, their declaration of independence and the lion’s share of the 
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surrounding official statements and speeches align with the predictions of national 
mobilization theory. During the Supreme Council’s debates regarding the referendum, a 
few isolated MPs voiced economic and strategic concerns regarding their colleagues’ 
political choices, but their voices were drowned in a sea of nationalist rhetoric about the 
importance of full political independence and a full-hearted rejection of anything coming 
from Georgia’s perceived enemy.  
4.2.3 Pro-Western Foreign Policy 
Georgia’s foreign policy from 1990 onward was not only anti-Russian but also 
firmly pro-Western. Throughout its history Georgia had been influenced by various 
Western and Eastern powers due to its strategic location, but the modern Georgian state 
has been distinctly pro-Western. The first republic of modern Georgia (1918-1921) 
defined its independence and identity in contrast to Bolshevik Russia and consciously 
emulated democratic Europe. As the Chairman of the Government of Georgia Noe 
Zhordania (1920) declared, “Our present and our future path is strongly, directly 
intertwined with the West, and no power can terminate this connection.” After 70 years 
of Soviet rule, Gamsakhurdia and his nationalist parliament reinvigorated that framing of 
Georgia’s independence as constituted in opposition to Soviet Russia and in harmony 
with the European family. Whereas Georgia’s Social Democratic leadership in the early 
twentieth century primarily highlighted their shared democratic ideology with Europe in 
contrast to totalitarian Russia, Georgia’s nationalist leadership during the 1990s 
additionally emphasized their shared Christian civilization with Europe. In so doing, they 
minimized the fact that Russia also represented Christian civilization (even if the role of 
religion in Russian society had been suppressed under Soviet rule). In his animated 
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speeches, Gamsakhurdia routinely stressed Georgia’s “destiny,” “historic mission,” and 
“belonging to Europe and Christian civilization” (Gamsakhurdia 1991c). 
Throughout his short tenure as leader of Georgia, Gamsakhurdia routinely 
appealed to the international community and particularly to the Western powers for their 
support. During its first official session, the Supreme Council of Georgia made clear not 
only its dedication to full independence and sovereignty but also its pro-Western and pro-
European political course. On November 14, 1990, the council drafted and adopted an 
official appeal to the Paris Summit of the heads of the member states of the Commission 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which was scheduled to convene on 
November 19, reminding its participants about Georgia’s seventy years of occupation by 
the Soviet Union and its recent strides towards full independence through “democratic 
and multiparty elections.” It offered those elections as evidence that “Georgia has chosen 
the way, that will bring him back to the family of European people” and ultimately 
promote the “process of European integration” (Supreme Council of Georgia Transcripts-
e, 91-93). The letter further reminded European leaders about the “very spirit of the 
Helsinki process”—aimed to secure the peaceful coexistence of European people—and it 
concluded by expressing Georgia’s hope that the states participating in this Paris Summit 
would “realistically evaluate the processes that are taking place in the European part of 
the Soviet Union—the justified aspirations of the people of the formerly independent 
states to rebuild their statehoods, and not stifle this process of global Euro-integration and 
ultimate stability” (Press Release of the Supreme Council N11, 84-85).  
After declaring Georgia’s independence on April 9, 1991, the Georgian 
parliament adopted several further official appeals requesting recognition of its 
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independence and support from the Western powers and the United Nations (Press 
Release of the Supreme Council N4, 90, 93-94). Already during these first moments of 
Georgia’s independence, President Gamsakhurdia openly contemplated the idea of 
joining NATO despite no official signs that its membership would be considered (Coene 
2016, 31). In yet another official appeal to the United Nations in May 1991, Georgia 
declared its readiness to join and ratify important conventions, declarations, and pacts of 
international law, and it expressed the hope that the United Nations would invite 
Georgian representatives to participate in its various activities (Press Release of the 
Supreme Council N6, 88). During its next session, the Supreme Council of Georgia 
adopted a law providing guidelines for joining and ratifying international treaties and 
conventions (Press Release of the Supreme Council N7, 81-87). 
On August 26, 1991, President Gamsakhurdia warned the Western states and 
particularly the United States about instability within the Soviet Union following the 
August coup in Moscow and the real danger of military aggression faced by the 
democratically-elected governments of the newly independent states in the region. He 
urged the Western states to extend their prompt recognition of those states’ independence 
and to establish diplomatic relationships with them as a way to “safeguard the 
achievements of truly democratic reforms in these countries” (Press Release of the 
Supreme Council N8, 186). The following month, he sent an appeal to UN Secretary 
General Perez de Cuellar in which he once again reiterated Georgia’s commitment to 
international law and asked for the acceptance of Georgia into the United Nations, 
concluding that “Georgia’s entry to the United Nations will greatly enhance peace in the 
Caucasus region” (Press Release of the Supreme Council N9, 29-30). 
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In sum, Georgia’s leaders chose a clear foreign policy orientation of balancing 
against Russia while seeking support from the West from the very formative period of 
their independence in the early 1990s, and they did so despite recognizing the tangible 
threat of economic and military retaliation from Russia. This foreign policy course defies 
realist logic, which expects a small state like Georgia to bandwagon with a threatening 
great power next door  (Walt 1987, 24-25, Waltz 1979, 195). Skeptics might argue that 
realist logic would explain Georgia’s foreign policy if its leaders realistically expected 
the West to provide security guarantees against Russia, but this argument falls apart when 
evaluated against the available evidence. Not only were the United States and the 
Western European states reluctant to provide timely recognition or security guarantees of 
any sort to Georgia (thirty years later they still refuse to admit Georgia to either NATO or 
the EU), but Georgian leaders were well aware of the likely futility of their efforts. Yet 
despite enduring disappointment after disappointment from the West and numerous 
retaliations from Russia, they still refused to bandwagon. 
Transcripts of discussions during the parliamentary sessions of the newly-elected 
Supreme Council of Georgia show that already in November 1990 Georgian leaders were 
well aware that the Western powers held a favorable view of Gorbachev and his reforms, 
making any meaningful support for Georgia inimical to the more important goal of 
maintaining positive relations with Moscow (Supreme Council of Georgia Transcripts-a, 
88-94). Parliamentarians expressed frustration that the West did not really see the Soviet 
Union as an empire, and with Gorbachev proposing to maintain the union by 
transforming it into renewed confederation, Georgia had a tough task ahead to convince 
the West to view the Soviet Union as they did—a “barbarian anachronism” stifling the 
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self-determination of its member republics—and to take the side of “the nations needing 
their own states” like Georgia instead of prioritizing stable relations with reformers in 
Moscow (Supreme Council of Georgia Transcripts-a, 89-90). 
Georgia continued trying to balance against Russia the following year without any 
meaningful security guarantees from the West and with clear understanding of the gravity 
of this lack of support. In May 1991, Gamsakhurdia in his presidential election program 
was once again clear in his assessment that because the West had supported Gorbachev’s 
reforms during the late 1980s, Western leaders were uncertain whether to continue 
supporting “the ‘reformist’ center” or to shift their support to “the ‘radical nationalists’ in 
rebellious republics,” and he hoped that this dilemma would be solved in favor of the 
republics “sooner or later” (Gamsakhurdia 1991c). 
Yet realist logic demands more to justify balancing by such a vulnerable state 
than a vain hope that desired allies would “sooner or later” defy their own strategic 
incentives to cooperate with Moscow and instead support weak Georgia. In 1991, 
Georgia needed immediate external guarantees against Russia, which had tremendous 
economic and military advantages over its southern neighbor, had demonstrated its 
readiness to use both economic blockades and military retaliations, and maintained troops 
on Georgian territory even after its declaration of independence in April 1991 
(Gamsakhurdia 1991b, a). 
Georgia’s high national mobilization drove its foreign policy more than economic 
or strategic calculations or any shared cultural elements with Russia. Both its 
parliamentary discussions during the revolutionary period of 1990-1991 as well as 
Gamsakhurdia’s numerous speeches and interviews during that time show that economics 
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and the balance of power were dwarfed by nationalist sentiments in determining 
Georgia’s foreign policy. Georgian leaders framed their identity in anti-Russian terms 
even on matters of religion and culture, portrayed Georgia’s independence in opposition 
to Russia and as part of the West, represented Russia as an untrustworthy and 
fundamental enemy, and understood any cooperation with Russia as an unacceptable 
sacrifice of Georgia’s long-awaited autonomy. 
4.3 Georgia’s Foreign Policy After 1992 
The formulation of Georgia’s initial foreign policy perspective during the twilight 
and immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union laid the foundations for its policies after 
gaining independence. During those formative years, leaders judged where their state 
stood in relation to Russia, how to orient themselves within the changing world and 
regional politics, and what risks they were ready to take along their chosen route. This 
does not mean that foreign policy is a static phenomenon—it can be influenced by 
numerous factors and can fluctuate over time. That said, some factors can have a strong 
and lasting impact, producing patterns that are crucial for explaining and predicting 
future behavior. In this section, I examine Georgia’s post-1991 foreign policy across 
different leaderships to demonstrate that national mobilization remained an enduring and 
important factor. Despite some clear differences across the successive administrations, 
Georgia’s central foreign policy goal remained balancing against Russia and seeking 
cooperation with the West. 
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4.3.1 Shevardnadze: Communist turned Nationalist  
Gamsakhurdia was ousted on January 6, 1992, by a military coup staged by 
growing opposition allegedly supported by Moscow. He was succeeded by Eduard 
Shevardnadze, who was a peculiar choice for the openly anti-Russian Georgia given his 
heavy Communist past. Shevardnadze was the First Secretary of the Georgian 
Communist Party in 1972-1985 and was later promoted to Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
the Soviet Union (1985-1991). In the West, Shevardnadze was considered a liberal 
politician and praised for his role in Perestroika and the peaceful end of the Cold War, 
but within his native Georgia he needed to convince people that despite his Communist 
background he was there to advance Georgia’s full independence from Russia as well as 
its popular pro-Western vision (Baker 2014). Jones (2013, 249) evaluates Shevardnadze 
as a sophisticated political player under circumstances when “the West was desirable but 
not attainable, and Russia was undesirable but not alienable.” 
As discussed earlier, there are two mechanisms through which national 
mobilization affects states’ foreign policy choices: directly via a nationalist leader and 
indirectly when a nationally mobilized population expects its leaders to adopt policies in 
line with its widely shared national identity and purpose. If Gamsakhurdia emerged 
directly from the national-liberation movement and in many ways represented the very 
embodiment of Georgian nationalist sentiments, Shevardnadze had to adopt a similar 
nationalist identity to appeal to his popular constituency in Georgia. Though perhaps not 
to the extent of other Georgian leaders and with less emotional overtones, Shevardnadze 
too used nationalism and national symbols to garner popular support. In 1992, upon 
returning to his native Georgia, the lifelong Communist Shevardnadze decided to be 
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baptized as an Orthodox Christian, taking as godparents Georgian Patriarch Ilia II and the 
beloved Georgian poet Ana Kalandadze (Jgerenaia 2017, 35). This decision fulfilled the 
political purpose of strengthening his legitimacy and public support by paying tribute to 
Christianity, which had been suppressed under the Soviet Union but was now enjoying 
revitalization as a defining national characteristic in Georgia. 
Shevardnadze continued his predecessor’s practice of honoring the first republic 
of Georgia as an important foundation for modern Georgian statehood, writing about 
Russia’s 1921 conquest of Georgia in his memoir that “the national struggle against the 
occupiers was so heroic that we should transmit every detail of these events to our 
descendants” and that to do so was “the duty of the present independent state” (Jones 
2014, 319). Among the post-Soviet Georgian leaders, Shevardnadze was relatively more 
rational and less populist, trying to steer his country away from militant and destructive 
ethno-nationalism and instead to emphasize citizenship and minority rights 
(Shevardnadze 1992b, a). Yet like the others he oriented Georgia’s foreign policy 
towards the West, albeit more cautiously than other leaders did. 
In October 1993 Georgia was on the verge of failing as a state due to fierce ethnic 
conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as infighting with ex-President 
Gamsakhurdia’s supporters. Hoping to avoid a total military and economic catastrophe, 
Shevardnadze announced that Georgia would become a member of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS). Joining the CIS and accepting its peacekeeping forces on 
Georgian territory were controversial moves viewed by many as compromising the 
country’s sovereignty and violating its anti-Russian stance, even if undertaken as a last 
resort to avoid the country’s potential disintegration. Shevardnadze initially accused 
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Russia of intruding on Georgia’s sovereignty by exacerbating ethnic conflicts on its 
territory, insisting that Georgia did not intend to join the CIS in the near future 
(Brzezinski and Sullivan 1997, 34-36). Yet soon after he declared that due to “Russia’s 
betrayal, I think Georgia will not join the CIS,” Shevardnadze reversed his position and 
decided to join the CIS after all. Admitting that “the situation in Georgia compelled [him] 
to take this step,” he distinguished between two factions within Russia with the hope that 
the democratic side represented by President Boris Yeltsin would prevail (Brzezinski and 
Sullivan 1997, 237) He explained his reversal as follows: “I saw in this decision the last 
chance to rescue my people and my country while preventing its disintegration, 
preventing civil war, and enabling justice to emerge again in Abkhazia” (Brzezinski and 
Sullivan 1997, 238). 
Joining the CIS may be viewed as confirming the realist prediction that under 
extreme security pressures a weak state should bandwagon with its threatening neighbor, 
but this confirmation is partial at best. Georgia was a member of the CIS from March 
1994 until its withdrawal in 2008, yet even within the Russia-led organization it never 
abandoned its pro-Western and anti-Russian foreign policy. On the contrary, under 
Shevardnadze’s leadership Georgia vigorously reinforced and advanced its efforts for 
Euro-Atlantic integration on economic and security matters both in bilateral relations 
with the United States and European states and with intergovernmental organizations 
such as the EU and NATO. During this period it joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
program, the Council of Europe, the IMF, and the World Bank, as well as signing 
numerous other international conventions and treaties. 
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Moreover, in 1997 Georgia along with three other CIS members established the 
organization GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova), a pro-Western subgroup 
consolidated with the intention of integrating with European and transatlantic structures 
and countering Russia’s influence within their respective states (Kuzio 2000, 83). 
Quantitative studies also confirm that Georgia’s temporary membership in the CIS 
(which some describe as a “necessary evil”) did not produce a convergence of Georgian 
and Russian foreign policy preferences. Instead, Georgia consistently displayed one of 
the largest divergences from other CIS states in UN General Assembly voting (along with 
Moldova and Ukraine), especially on security and self-determination issues (Hansen 
2015, 69-73). 
Georgia’s defiant continuation and even acceleration of its pro-Western moves 
cuts against realist logic, since Russia consistently viewed Georgia’s westward 
orientation as negative and stood poised to retaliate at will. Primary documents including 
political briefings, analyses, and reports within the Georgian government show that its 
leaders were well aware of Russia’s disapproval, especially regarding its pro-Western 
overtures in the security arena (Supreme Council of Georgia Transcripts-f, 19-27, 
Supreme Council of Georgia Transcripts-h, 1-2, 20-23). Nevertheless, they proved 
willing to continue down that path despite lacking any tangible security guarantees from 
the West. In September 1995, Georgia’s embassy to the United States sent a report/brief 
back to the Minister of the Foreign Affairs of Georgia based on meetings in the US State 
and Defense Departments, notifying readers about the general plans for the NATO’s 
future enlargement (with no specific countries or timelines yet set), the strict guidelines 
for future states to qualify for NATO membership, as well as Russia’s overwhelming 
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disapproval of NATO’s eastward enlargement and NATO’s preference to accommodate 
and not isolate Russia (Supreme Council of Georgia Transcripts-f, 74-80). 
Despite being uncertain at best regarding Georgia’s prospects of becoming a 
NATO member and absolutely certain of Russia’s disapproval of such a development, at 
no point did this report suggest that Georgia curb its efforts to forge a closer relationship 
with NATO. On the contrary, it outlined specific steps to reinforce those efforts(Supreme 
Council of Georgia Transcripts-f, 76-78). Another report—prepared by the political 
department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia in August 1995—makes clear 
that Georgian leaders were aware that Russia opposed the Euro-integration of central and 
eastern European states, observing that it was particularly concerned with the NATO’s 
eastward enlargement and emphasizing that it “will not tolerate” such moves involving 
the post-Soviet republics (Supreme Council of Georgia Transcripts-g, 27-36). Still, this 
report concluded with guidelines for Georgia to “deepen the cooperation with European 
structures and states,” and—though NATO membership was not yet attainable—
suggestions how to “reinforce the cooperation with the Partnership for Peace program” 
(Supreme Council of Georgia Transcripts-g, 34-36).  
4.3.2 Saakashvili: Nationalism in the Face of War 
Shevardnadze was initially perceived as a stabilizing force who would bring 
security and democratic progress to the chaotic post-Gamsakhurdia country, but he lost 
his popularity and eventually his presidency due to rampant corruption that flourished 
under his watch (Antidze 2014). Mikheil Saakashvili came to power through a peaceful 
revolution in 2003, ousting Shevardnadze who to his credit stepped down in response to 
popular demand and avoided bloodshed rather than attempting to maintain power. 
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Saakashvili revived the use of emotionally charged nationalist rhetoric similar to 
Gamsakhurdia’s, but like Shevardnadze his vision of the nation was more inclusive and 
not limited to one ethno-religious category. His populist promotion of Georgian 
exceptionalism and the importance of Christianity was not always easily combined with 
his parallel emphasis on multicultural civic unity, in which “every citizen who considers 
Georgia as its homeland… is our greatest wealth and treasure” (Saakashvili 2004). 
Especially early in his presidency, Saakashvili took pragmatic steps toward 
modernization and democratization, but the most notable feature of his domestic 
consolidation was nationalism, and his foreign policy was once again defined by its anti-
Russian stance. He tapped into nationalist sentiments by recalling Georgia’s glorious 
medieval kings, its ancient Christian roots, and its destiny among European nations: 
“Georgia is a country of unique culture. We are not only old Europeans, we are the very 
first Europeans, and therefore Georgia holds a special place in European civilization” 
(Saakashvili 2004). Saakashvili maintained bold anti-Russian rhetoric throughout his 
two-term presidency, in the face of Russian intolerance of Georgia’s pro-Western 
orientation and supported by the Georgian public’s enduring conviction to resist the 
influence of its powerful neighbor. 
Saakashvili started his presidency by emphasizing the importance of Georgia’s 
nationhood and its independence lost to the Russian Army in February 1921, as well as 
the sacrifice of the Georgians who died while peacefully demanding national liberation 
from the Soviet Union on April 9, 1989 (Saakashvili 2004). Some might have hoped that 
Russia would not revive an imperial geopolitical perspective after the Soviet Union’s 
dissolution, but Russian politicians and media pundits frankly opined that the 
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“dismemberment of Georgia is a political necessity” and argued that Russia’s main task 
in Caucasus should be de-sovereignization and the annihilation of Georgia’s “centuries-
old statehood” (Rondeli 2014, 39). If there were any doubts about Russia’s intentions 
towards Georgia, the war of August 2008 clarified them, demonstrating its readiness to 
punish detractors in its “near abroad” with military invasion and territorial annexation. 
Moreover, the war demonstrated as clearly as possible that Georgia lacked the Western 
support it needed to have any hope of realistically surviving Russian aggression. Despite 
ideologically and economically supporting Georgian democracy (just like in 1921), the 
flaccid Western response to Russia’s invasion showed that it would not provide security 
guarantees for Georgia that might entail fighting to defend it or even sanctioning Russia 
over its actions.  
The Russo-Georgian War offers a natural experiment to once again test this 
study’s theoretical predictions regarding the foreign policy behavior of weak states—not 
only under the threat of military retaliation but in the face of realized threats. The war is 
commonly depicted as Russian punishment for Georgia’s pro-Western orientation and 
NATO aspirations, following intensified Georgian efforts to become a NATO member 
after it signed an Individual Partnership Action Plan in 2004 and was nearly granted a 
Membership Action Plan in April 2008 (Rondeli 2014, 37, Gvalia et al. 2013, 119, 
Marcus 2008). Russia imposed economic sanctions on Georgian products such as wine 
and mineral waters in 2006 and also raised gas prices, causing significant damage to 
Georgia’s economy, but those punishments failed to deter Georgia’s pro-EU and pro-
NATO aspirations (Newnham 2015, 61). The 2008 war was the ultimate test of Georgia’s 
balancing strategy towards Russia, its military overwhelmed as NATO watched from the 
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sidelines offering little more than rhetorical condemnation. In contrast to realist logic, 
however, even this resounding military defeat, the resulting loss of its territorial integrity, 
and the reality check of Western unwillingness to fight for Georgia did not alter its 
foreign policy orientation. 
In line with the expectations of national mobilization theory, even under physical 
threats Georgia maintained its pro-Western and anti-Russian foreign policy and even 
worked to accelerate its efforts toward membership in the EU and NATO. Saakashvili’s 
speech at the UN General Assembly in 2013 demonstrates Georgia’s persistent Western 
self-identification, emphasizing its unique culture and heritage of statehood and depicting 
Russia as a brutal imperial power that the West should balance against. He declared that 
Georgia is and “should remain a nation united in our historical identity to join the 
European family of democratic nations, the family we should never have been separated 
from in first place” (Saakashvili 2013). Saakashvili noted that Georgia was under attack 
because Russia could not tolerate a democratizing sovereign state next to it, and that it 
perceived Georgia’s successful transformation as a virus in the region. He even framed 
the 2008 defeat as a success in which Georgia’s “statehood and independence survived” 
despite Russia’s full-blown invasion and Georgia’s substantial territorial losses. 
Throughout the speech, Saakashvili reiterated Georgia’s dedication to joining the EU and 
NATO and asked the international community “to help to put an end to the Russian 
annexation” (Saakashvili 2013). 
Despite deepening its economic and political connections with the West across 
thirty years of independence, Georgia remains without any security guarantees from the 
West or any timeline if/when Georgia might join the EU or NATO. In 2019, NATO 
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Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg was asked by the head of Slovenian delegation when 
Georgia, a “great NATO partner and contributor to [its] missions,” would become a “full 
member of NATO,” to which he responded as they “stated, and restated again and again 
at different NATO Summits… Georgia will become a member of NATO, but we have 
not put a timeline to that process yet” (Stoltenberg 2019). According to realist logic, such 
vagaries amount to little more than cheap talk and should certainly not guide rational 
national-security decision making. While the West continues to offer general promises 
without concrete security guarantees and Moscow continues to object its pro-Western 
foreign policy, the durability of Georgian nationalism continues to be tested. 
Even Christianity, which some assume to function as the core of a shared 
civilization with Russia, has continued to be employed by Georgian leaders to highlight 
Georgia’s place in Western civilization as opposed to Russia. In his speech during the 
French president’s visit to Georgia, Saakashvili remarked that “Christianity as well as the 
alliance with the Byzantine Empire and social democracy against Bolshevism were 
European choices… [reflecting Georgia’s European] identity and values.” He made a 
point of declaring “with more confidence and energy – we choose Europe and European 
Democracy” (Toria 2014, 312). 
Not only did Saakashvili and his administration remain pro-Western during the 
war’s aftermath, the Georgian public also maintained its pre-war foreign policy views 
and support for Georgia’s pro-Western orientation, as demonstrated in popular polls 
(Müller 2011, 80-81). A survey of Georgia’s political elites (including security and 
foreign policy experts) demonstrated that they too remained largely united in favor of a 
pro-Western foreign policy and in perceiving Russia as Georgia’s primary threat (Gvalia 
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et al. 2013, 123-124). This popular consensus fundamentally fueled the sustainability of 
Georgia’s anti-Russian and pro-Western positions by maintaining its leaders’ incentives 
to follow through with foreign policies that reflect these nationally-held views. 
Since 2012, Georgia’s government has been controlled by the Georgian Dream 
coalition led by Bidzina Ivanishvili, whose previous business experience in Russia fueled 
some suspicions along similar lines to those of Shevardnadze’s skeptics. Yet public 
vigilance to reject any suspected anti-Western or pro-Russian political moves by 
Ivanishvili’s coalition has remained high during the years since. For example, the 
invitation of a Russian parliamentarian to deliver a speech in Tbilisi about Christian 
brotherhood between the two countries was widely perceived by the public as an insult to 
Georgia, prompting opposition parties to mobilize widespread demonstrations in front of 
the parliament building (Mackinnon 2019).  
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined why Georgia prioritized balancing against Russia after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, an important question for international relations because 
Georgia’s pro-Western and anti-Russian foreign policy defies the expectations of 
conventional theories rooted in realism, liberalism, and cultural similarity. According to 
those theories, a militarily weak and economically dependent Georgia that shared 
Orthodox Christianity with Russia should have been inclined to bandwagon with its 
powerful neighbor, especially in the absence of credible security and economic 
guarantees from external powers. 
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Georgia’s deep national mobilization offers a more persuasive explanation for its 
post-Soviet security strategy than either material factors or cultural similarities. As the 
earlier sections of this chapter demonstrate, Georgia underwent a relatively intense 
process of national mobilization. A country with centuries-old traditions and a long 
historic memory, Georgia consistently offered its leaders strong foundations for modern 
nation-building. Facilitated by accelerating modernization and urbanization as well as 
improved literacy and connectivity among its people, that process was particularly 
pronounced during the second half of the nineteenth century despite Georgia being 
subjected to domination by the Russian Empire at the time. 
The national awakening that occurred during the late nineteenth century was 
effectively translated into political independence in the early twentieth century when 
political upheavals (World War I and the Russian Revolution) provided a window of 
opportunity for Georgia to forge its own nation-state. Georgia’s intellectual elites 
mobilized an intense national identity that was framed explicitly in us-vs.-them terms 
against Russia. Inheriting this identity in the early 1990s, Georgia’s people and leaders 
alike placed an especially high value on their national political autonomy. Its first 
president, Gamsakhurdia, and his successors rejected bandwagoning with Russia as 
entailing an unacceptable sacrifice of autonomy and instead prioritized balancing against 
it. This process played out through two mechanisms: an internal process of nationalist 
leaders dictating foreign policy and an external process of nationally mobilized 
populations constraining leaders to pursue foreign policies in line with widely-held 
nationalist views.  
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In testing national mobilization theory against its alternatives, I analyzed several 
important foreign policy decisions that took place during the 1990-1991 years, the period 
when the post-Soviet states laid the foundations for their subsequent foreign policy 
strategies. Georgian leaders rejected the New Union Treaty, Gorbachev’s proposal to 
save the union by transforming it into federation or confederation, as well as the union-
wide referendum, which offered citizens across the Soviet Union a chance to directly 
express whether or not they wished to preserve the union. National mobilization theory 
offers a compelling explanation for these decisions, which manifested Georgian leaders’ 
commitment to prioritize their national autonomy and their perception of Russia as the 
primary threat to that autonomy. Records of their decision-making processes surrounding 
those two foreign initiatives show that their discussions were overwhelmingly informed 
by nationalism and notably lacking in the sorts of strategic and economic calculations 
expected by conventional theories (not to mention feelings of shared civilization). 
Georgia’s decisions to appeal Western states and organizations during its 
formative period offer further support for national mobilization theory. The debates 
surrounding those decisions and the language of Georgia’s official statements confirm its 
leaders’ strong self-identification with Western culture, which contributed to their 
construction of a foreign policy position that was strongly anti-Russian and pro-Western. 
Having been primed to see Russia as a threatening “other” for centuries under the 
Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, this perspective on the Western European states as 
desired allies was neither new nor simply a reaction to material incentives. Instead, 
Georgia’s pro-Western and anti-Russian views echoed its period of independence 
between 1917 and 1921, when adopted sharply anti-Bolshevik and pro-Western positions. 
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That brief but important period was consistently used by Georgia’s more recent leaders as 
a reference point to define and shape their post-Soviet foreign policies. Georgia did not 
waver from these stances despite having no credible Western security guarantees and 
despite enduring economic and military reprisals from Russia for its pro-Western 
orientation. 
National mobilization theory does not exclude the potential influence of other 
factors or the possibility of changes over time, but it does speak to strong general patterns 
and policy trajectories. Following the short-lived tenure of President Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia, Georgia’s foreign policy under the leadership of Eduard Shevardnadze 
and Mikheil Saakashvili remained robustly anti-Russian and pro-Western despite the 
enduring threat of Russian retaliation and the absence of any Western security 
guarantees, both of which were starkly illustrated during the 2008 war. Public opinion too 
remained generally consistent in supporting this orientation for thirty years after gaining 
independence, and public approval for Georgia’s aspirations to join the EU and NATO 
remains around 75% (NDI Georgia 2019). Even when nationalist policies fly in the face 
of structural and material factors, the robustness of Georgia’s national mobilization has 
proven an enduring force in its foreign policy. 
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CHAPTER 5. UNION OVER AUTONOMY: LOW NATIONAL MOBILIZATION 
AND KAZAKHSTAN’S POST-SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, post-Soviet states displayed radically 
different security strategies towards Russia (Willerton and Cockerham 2003, 25, 36). 
Kazakhstan did not seek independence despite being culturally distinct from Russia, 
economically one of the strongest post-Soviet states with strong potential due to its rich 
oil and gas reserves, and inheriting nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union. Instead, it 
was one of the most enthusiastic supporters of maintaining the union and worked hard to 
preserve strong ties with Russia. Kazakhstan was the very last of the Soviet republics to 
declare independence from the Soviet Union, taking that fateful step only after it had 
become clear that the union was already dissolved, on December 16, 1991 (Olcott 2010, 
25, 36). Its leaders interpreted Russia not as their primary threat but rather as their friend. 
They approached it as an economic and security partner, handing over their nuclear 
capabilities instead of leveraging them to balance against Russia and maintaining a 
consistent pro-Russian foreign policy for decades after independence. 
In this chapter I seek to answer the following question: why did Kazakhstan 
prioritize bandwagoning with Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union? My central 
argument is that Kazakhstan’s relatively low level of national mobilization enabled its 
leaders to drive its post-Soviet foreign policy towards Russia rather than away from it. 
My primary task in this chapter is to establish whether national mobilization theory or an 
alternative theory best explains why its leaders chose to prioritize bandwagoning 
strategies towards Russia. 
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In brief, national mobilization theory predicts that Kazakhstan, having undergone 
a relatively mild process of national mobilization compared to several other post-Soviet 
states, should exhibit a correspondingly lesser us-vs.-them mentality toward Russia. 
Placing a relatively low value on their national political autonomy, Kazakhstan’s people 
and leaders should have perceived bandwagoning policies as less undesirable than their 
counterparts in Georgia did, making them more inclined to adopt those policies rather 
than balancing against their powerful former ruler. Low national mobilization can affect 
states’ foreign policy in two ways. First, it increases the likelihood of seeing the 
emergence of leaders who do not have strong nationalist beliefs, who should be more 
inclined to see the next-door powerful state as a potential partner rather than a security 
threat. Second, if the people are not mobilized by a strong nationalist ideology, they 
should expect and influence their leaders to adopt foreign policy strategies in line with 
public views about the powerful former ruler. In the case of Kazakhstan, if a critical mass 
of the population in the 1990s interpreted Russia as their friend, the leaders of the newly 
independent Kazakhstan should have faced an incentive to reflect those sentiments in 
their foreign policy decision-making. 
The alternative theories considered here each make different predictions. Realist 
logic predicts that Kazakhstan should interpret Russia as its primary threat and try to 
balance against it. Although Kazakhstan’s conventional military capabilities at the time 
of its independence were insufficient to directly counter the much stronger Russia, it had 
a unique opportunity to take advantage of the nuclear weapons it inherited from the 
Soviet Union for this purpose. On its surface, then, Kazakhstan’s bandwagoning strategy 
towards Russia seems to contradict realist predictions, but closer examination is 
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necessary to test whether Kazakhstan leaders’ decision-making was primarily informed 
by their own perceptions of power and threat, which may have driven them to see 
bandwagoning as a rational choice in line with realist logic. 
Liberal logic predicts that Kazakhstan’s leaders should have sought cooperation 
with Russia due to the preexisting economic interdependence among the former Soviet 
states and the urgent economic incentives they faced during and after the breakup of the 
Soviet Union. At first glance, Kazakhstan’s bandwagoning strategy toward Russia 
appears to fit liberal predictions, but thoroughly testing this theory requires establishing 
whether Kazakhstan’s foreign policy choices were made according to a rational decision-
making process in line with its economic interests or whether other considerations proved 
more significant. 
Last, approaches emphasizing cultural similarity expect that Kazakhstan’s leaders 
should have seen Russia as threatening due to the contrast between Russia’s Orthodox 
Christian civilization and their own Islamic civilization. This sharp cultural divide should 
have made them skeptical of Russia’s intentions and more likely to view their border with 
Russia as a geopolitical fault line, prompting them to balance against Russia. While 
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy defies these predictions, further testing is needed to examine 
what role cultural differences may have played in its leaders’ decision-making. 
This chapter tests national mobilization theory against these alternative theories 
by examining Kazakhstan’s leaders’ decision-making processes at several important 
historical junctures. As in the previous chapter, the first section here aims to establish the 
values of the independent variables highlighted by national mobilization theory, 
surveying Kazakhstan’s process of national formation and its lack of formation as a 
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modern nation-state by the time it was absorbed by the Soviet Union (due to external and 
internal factors), leading to a much weaker degree of national mobilization during the 
twilight of the Soviet Union than was observed in the Georgia case. In doing so, it 
examines the relative levels of cultural and political independence and pre-Soviet nation 
building in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Kazakhstan, as well as the lack of 
national mobilization during the struggle for political independence in the late 1980s. 
The second section investigates why Kazakhstan’s leaders adopted bandwagoning 
strategies toward Russia during the twilight and aftermath of the Soviet Union. To this 
end, I examine several important historical episodes when Kazakhstan specifically chose 
cooperation rather than balancing against Russia: the New Union Treaty (1990); 
participation in the union-wide referendum and support of the maintenance of the union 
(1991); the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Kazakhstan’s economic and 
security alliances (1990-1994); and the decision to surrender its nuclear weapons (1991-
1994). Although some of these events occurred under the formal mantle of Soviet rule, 
they represented the formative foreign policy issues for the various Soviet republics on 
their way to independence—the key moments as they decided how to approach their 
future relationship with Russia. In each of these case studies, I examine Kazakhstan’s 
leaders’ decision-making processes to establish the relative persuasiveness of each 
alternative theory as an explanation for their choices. 
5.1 The Historical Absence of Kazakh National Mobilization 
If we look at modern day Russia and Kazakhstan the distinctions between the two 
nations might seem strong. In fact, some scholars have argued that Kazakhstan had 
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“extraordinarily strong cause to separate itself from Russia-dominated union,” citing 
cultural differences and grievances between Kazakhs and Russians, a native Turkic 
language unlike Russia’s Slavic one, Islam as a dominant religion as opposed to 
Orthodox Christianity, and the past experience of a nomadic lifestyle that was countered 
by sedentarization campaigns (Hale 2009, 3-8). Considering these distinctive cultural 
features combined with the numerous grievances Kazakhstan should have had due to its 
history of repression under first the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union, it is 
unsurprising that some would think that Kazakhstan should have forged strong anti-
Russian sentiments by the 1990s. The opposite was the case. 
National mobilization theory is premised on the notion that descriptive national 
characteristics cannot tell us much about the relationships between the two states by 
themselves, despite being important building blocks of a national self-image. The post-
Soviet relationships between Russia and its neighbors offer a testament to this claim, 
offering examples of culturally distinct states that forged strong alliances (e.g., Russia 
with several Central Asian states) and culturally similar states that became adversaries 
(e.g., Russia and Ukraine). National mobilization theory looks at not only the national 
characteristics of states but more importantly the dynamic processes of national 
experiences and the dissemination of national information. These represent the engine 
that forms national consciousness, telling us how widespread and cohesive national 
narratives were and to what degree national self-awareness translated into an “us vs. 
them” mentality towards others and a strong demand for political autonomy. Kazakhstan 
did not produce a level of national mobilization by the 1990s sufficient to drive its 
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leaders to see Russia as a pressing security threat, despite its unique cultural 
characteristics. 
5.1.1 Under the Russian Empire 
When Kazakhstan was annexed by the Russian Empire it was not a unified 
national or political unit. The Kazakh Khanate which emerged in the fifteenth century 
was later divided into three political units—hordes—each of which claimed distinct 
geography and culture (Uyama 2000, 73-76, Sabol 2003, 15-16). Russia incorporated 
these hordes into its empire in phases between seventeenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
The first phase was the relatively peaceful and gradual acquisition of the Small and 
Middle hordes, while the second phase (early nineteenth century) was the full-fledged 
military conquest of the Great Horde and the establishment of colonial rule (Olcott 
1995a, 28). Thus, while the Kazakhs were distinct from their occupier by their ethnic and 
cultural characteristics, members of different hordes did not possess unified national 
awareness. Instead, Kazakhs in the early nineteenth century still identified primarily with 
their narrow clans (Uyama 2000, 73-74).  
Other internal and external barriers also stifled the process of Kazakh nation-
building. One of the central characteristics of Kazakh culture was the nomadic lifestyle, 
which carried a much more fluid idea of habitation and “home.” Even the etymology of 
the word Kazakh is related to nomadism and means “to wander,” “roam,” or “homeless” 
(Ferret 2016, 177). This nomadic lifestyle contrasts with the modern concept of nation-
building and a nation-state, which is strongly intertwined with a relatively fixed concept 
of territory that a group claims as its homeland (Smith 2001, 12-13). Although this past 
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nomadic culture is currently used to strengthen narratives of Kazakhstan’s uniqueness, in 
the early nineteenth century nomadism stifled modern nation-building (Norris 2012).  
Another barrier to nation-building was the lack of urbanization and low literacy 
level which made it impossible for Kazakhs scattered across a vast territory to 
communicate effectively enough to share experiences and construct a unified national 
narrative (Sabol 2003, 61-65). The general disconnectedness among the Kazakh 
population combined with many Kazakhs’ willingness to align with Russia to facilitate its 
Russification efforts and subjugation of the Kazakh hordes (Stevens 2020, 13). Moreover, 
the tsarist governments’ Resettlement Act of 1889 dramatically altered the demography 
of Kazakhstan and caused economic decline by disturbing existing nomadic economy 
(Pianciola 2004, Kesici 2017, 1137). 
While under the tsarist rule in the mid and late nineteenth century, Kazakh 
nationalist intellectuals started to emerge. This process followed a path similar to what 
we see in Georgia around the same time period: well-educated members of the elite 
challenged tsarist rule and the predominant Russian narratives, cultivating national 
sentiments, and highlighting the uniqueness of their respective cultures. As demonstrated 
in the previous chapter, this national revival in Georgia was effective in horizontally 
galvanizing large segments of Georgian society. In Kazakhstan we do not see the same 
effect, however. 
The intellectual class in Kazakhstan was relatively small, with limited resources 
for effective communication, and they lacked the resources and infrastructure to 
disseminate their budding national narratives across the large rural Kazakh territory and 
population (Sabol 2003, 65-72). In relatively small Georgia, the emergence of nationalist 
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intellectuals coincided with a period of rapid urbanization, industrialization, and the 
development of printed press and railroads, but Kazakhstan experienced no such boom. 
As a result, we do not see any widespread activation of national narratives or mass 
mobilization of national identity in Kazakhstan that might have strengthened its people’s 
self-identification and juxtaposed it to Russia as an oppressive occupier. 
In the early twentieth century Kazakh national revival strengthened through an 
increased volume of published nationalist narratives in books and newspapers. Kazakh 
intellectuals of different backgrounds participated in this process of forming a unified 
national vision, but this national awakening lacked a mass character and even more so 
political organization and action (Sabol 2003, 70-72). Even among the more progressive 
intellectuals who were promoting national revival, many remained pro-Russian and only 
advocated for some reforms within the empire, not for the political independence of 
Kazakhstan. 
5.1.2 A Missed Opportunity for National Independence 
The early twentieth century brought a period of turbulence in the Russian Empire 
that saw waves of dramatic socio-political changes galvanize the whole empire. The first 
consequential event of this period was the Russian Revolution of 1905 (also referred to as 
the First Russian Revolution). While it failed to overthrew the tsarist regime, this 
revolution significantly damaged it by establishing a multiparty system and an elected 
legislature capable of voicing the interests of the many (Ascher 1994, 1-3). The 
grievances fueling the mass movement in 1905 were multifaceted, representing social 
strata such as “liberals among the middle class and gentry, industrial workers, peasants, 
and some of the national minorities” (Ascher 1994, 3). Understandably, these processes 
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gave an important push to national awakening that was already on the way in various 
parts of the empire, including in Kazakhstan, though national mobilization remained less 
pronounced in Kazakhstan than in some other parts of the empire such as Lithuania, 
Latvia, or Estonia (Kasekamp 2010, 81-84). 
One notable development in Kazakh society during the 1905-1916 period was the 
emergence of the Alash movement, which was led by Kazakh intellectuals who aimed to 
use a myth of common descent as the basis for modern Kazakh nationhood. The name of 
the movement, Alash, represents “a mythical figure believed to have been the father of all 
three Kazakh zhuz” or hordes (Kesici 2017, 1135). In a society that traditionally revolved 
around a nomadic lifestyle and oral traditions, the Alash movement attempted to turn a 
fluid and sometimes inconsistent oral myth of its people’s origins into a more fixed, 
written, and unifying version that could be used for more coherent modern nation-
building (Kesici 2017, 1140-1143). Although it failed to attract mass support, the Alash 
movement nevertheless emerged as the most viable national voice that could potentially 
seek Kazakh independence in the early twentieth century (Saktaganova et al. 2020, 210-
211). 
The twilight of the Russian Empire sent a series of socio-political shocks across 
its territories. His authority weakened by World War I, the Tsar was overthrown by the 
domestic opposition in early 1917 and replaced by the liberal provisional government. A 
few months later, that government was defeated in another revolution led by the 
Bolsheviks, who took power through a Civil War that lasted until 1923. Some parts of the 
sinking empire used this turbulent period as a window of opportunity to break away and 
establish their own independent states, but the longing for full political independence and 
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the capacity to establish new sovereign nation-states were not uniform across the empire, 
resulting in varied fallouts across its different parts. Kazakh intellectuals had to respond 
to the leadership vacuum following the overthrow of the tsarist regime, and some 
advocated for independence, but in July 1917 the all-Kazakh congress supported more 
limited cultural and political autonomy within Russia. Nevertheless, that December a 
political movement led by Alikhan Bukeikhanov established a provisional independent 
government called the Alash autonomy (Saktaganova et al. 2020, 214).  
The Alash autonomy, or Alash Orda, represented a historical moment for 
Kazakhstan as its first formally independent government. However, the Alash autonomy 
had very limited power, and the government spent most of its short-lived existence 
fighting or negotiating with internal and external opposition until its termination in March 
1920 (Saktaganova et al. 2020, 214-216). Constant external pressure from the 
Bolsheviks, internal political dissent, and a deteriorating economic situation prevented 
the period of Alash autonomy from translating into a meaningful experience that would 
be nationally shared and celebrated at the time (Sabol 2003, 141-150). This contrasted 
with the ability of several other nations, including Georgia, to lay a strong foundation of 
nationhood as they established independent nation states with attributes such as 
international recognition, elections, multiparty governments, written constitutions, and 
responsibility for their internal and external affairs (before their eventual annexation by 
the Soviet Union) (Suny 1994, 185-208). 
Between 1920 and 1945, most of the territories that were occupied by the Russian 
Empire were reoccupied by the Soviet Union. However, some states were forced into the 
Soviet Union after experiencing full-fledged national mobilization and meaningful 
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periods of political independence as modern nation-states, while others’ experiences of 
independence were far more qualified (Suny 1993). Kazakhstan fell into the latter 
category despite the efforts of its intellectuals to conceptualize Kazakh nationhood within 
the Russian Empire and to achieve political autonomy under Alash Orda. Although there 
was a political plurality including anti-Soviet Movement and parties by the time 
Kazakhstan was absorbed by the Soviet Union in 1920, there was neither a strong unified 
national narrative nor a clear “us vs. them” dichotomy towards Russia. Numerous 
legitimate grievances towards tsarist rule did not translate into animosity towards Russia. 
Even the most nationalist Kazakh parties pursued not full independence but autonomy 
under Russian federal rule, and even some members of Alash Orda defected to the side of 
the Bolsheviks by 1920 despite their initial bitterness and their anti-Soviet Struggle 
(Olcott 1995a, 129).  
5.1.3 Under the Soviet Union 
After the Bolshevik government consolidated its power in 1920, it went on to 
formally disband the Alash autonomy. The group was quickly and effectively dissolved, 
its leaders and members either went into exile or cooperated and joined the Bolsheviks. 
The Soviet authorities replaced the Alash autonomy with the Kyrgyz Autonomous Soviet 
Socialist Republic, in 1925 renaming it the Kazakh ASSR, and in 1936 granting it union 
republic status and the new title of the Kazakh SSR (Peimani 2009, 124, Cameron 2018). 
The Soviet rule that lasted 70 years saw varying leadership and policies ranging from the 
appreciation of ethnic diversity in the union (indigenization) to active and at times 
forceful Russification and Sovietization. 
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Having the status of a republic, even if under the Soviet Union, provided 
Kazakhstan with the possibility to continue its yet-unfulfilled process of self-awareness 
and nation-building. Kazakhstan had clear borders within the union as well as local 
administrative bodies responsible for the territory and population, even if in direct 
subordination to the center. Moreover, the previously rural and scattered population of 
Kazakhstan underwent rapid modernization, industrialization, and urbanization under 
Soviet rule, especially from the 1930s onward (Lewis, Rowland, and Clem 1975, 291-
292). These socio-economic transformations are associated with people’s high-level 
mobility and communication and hence represent necessary preconditions for 
nationalism—the emergence of “imagined communities” when local allegiances are 
replaced by national ones (Anderson 1991). 
However, there were other factors and policies in the Soviet Union that undercut 
or influenced these processes of nation-formation and mobilization. In the late 1920s and 
1930s the Soviet policies of collectivization and sedentariztion disturbed Kazakhstan’s 
lifestyle and economy, leading to a famine that decimated over 40 percent of its 
population (Suny 1993, 113, Conquest 1986, 189-196). In addition, decades of mass 
resettlements, deportations, and Soviet labor camps dramatically altered the demographic 
composition of Kazakhstan until by the 1960s ethnic Russians accounted for more than 
40% of its population and ethnic Kazakhs became a minority within their republic (Flynn 
2004, 15). Furthermore, Moscow’s policies of Russification and Sovietization affected 
the process of identity formation by providing alternative or complementary identities, a 
good example of which is Soviet propaganda produced for Kazakh soldiers during World 
War II that aimed at creating a Soviet-Kazakh identity (Carmack 2014, 95). Russification 
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had a mixed record of success in different parts of the Soviet Union, and while there was 
some variation what methods were used in different states, no less important was the 
capacity and willingness of nations to resist these processes (Karklins 1986). The low-
level national mobilization present by the time it became part of the Soviet Union was 
one of the important factors making Russification successful in Kazakhstan, especially in 
linguistic terms. 
After Stalinist repressions and the relative relaxation of censorship in the Soviet 
Union, Kazakh nationalist writers emerged, especially in the 1950s and 1960s. They 
started actively creating and recreating a national mythology in novels with the attempt to 
provide versions of historical continuity by revitalizing and reimagining pre-colonial, 
pre-Russian Kazakh nationhood, while also amplifying more recent historical figures 
who fought against the Russian Empire like Khan Kenesary Kasymov (Kudaibergenova 
2013, 844). If nineteenth-century Kazakh nationalist revival was limited to the elite, the 
twentieth century revival of nationalist literature reached a much wider audience thanks 
to Kazakhstan’s rapid modernization by the mid-twentieth century, which was associated 
with urbanization, a printed press, and improved literacy levels (Kudaibergenova 2013, 
842-843). Nevertheless, this nation-building of Kazakhstan took place within the Soviet 
Union framework, and it was constantly competing with the alternative Soviet narratives 
spreading through various channels of mass media. 
Although this twentieth-century Kazakh nationalist revival provided a clear 
cultural framework of “us” for the nation, it did not translate into mass national 
mobilization for liberation as seen in other parts of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, 
where mass protests demanded political independence and populations saw Russia as a 
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threatening “other.” To be sure, the large-scale Alma-Ata student demonstration in 
December 1986 showed the capacity of Kazakhs to mobilize en masse for political 
action, but the nature of the protests (reactive, lacking organization or durability) and 
content of the grievances (limited to local change, democracy, environmental justice and 
economy) show that it was not national mobilization towards autonomy or independence 
(Beissinger 2002, 75-76). 
I argue that this can be explained by the lack of experience of modern statehood 
in Kazakhstan. The Alash autonomy established in 1917 was too weak and short-lived to 
produce a strong reference point for twentieth-century Kazakh nationalists as the period 
of independence they were robbed of by the Soviet Union and longed to restore. This is 
not to say that twenty-first-century nationalists will not revitalize and recreate the 
meaning of the Alash autonomy for the nation, but rather that in the late 1980s and early 
1990s Kazakh national mobilization was still lacking the intensity and content to produce 
strong pro-independence and anti-Soviet unity. As a result, we see Kazakhstan emerge as 
the most ardent supporter of maintaining the Soviet Union and after this was unattainable, 
supporting a new confederacy and maintaining a strong strategic partnership with Russia. 
The rest of this chapter examines Kazakhstan’s foreign policy decisions at the twilight 
and immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union, testing whether these foreign policy 
decisions stemmed from low national mobilization as expected by national mobilization 
theory. 
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5.2 Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy  
I begin this case study of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy decision-making in 1990, 
when it became clear that the Soviet Union in its original form was in crisis and the 
member republics started formulating separate domestic and foreign policies even as they 
remained still formally under the Soviet rule. The leader of Kazakhstan at that time was 
Nursultan Nazarbayev, who had been ascending through the Communist party leadership 
since early 1980s until he eventually became the party leader, then Chairman of the 
Supreme Soviet of Kazakhstan, and finally its first president—named by the Supreme 
Soviet in April 1990 and later popularly elected in December 1991. The sections that 
follow examine the decision-making process of Kazakhstan’s leaders, but primarily focus 
on Nazarbayev because he was single-handedly responsible for most of Kazakhstan’s 
domestic and foreign policy decisions (Kasenov 1995, 268).  
To what extent did Nazarbayev’s views and the lack of national mobilization in 
Kazakhstan influence Kazakhstan’s foreign policy toward Russia during his long-lived 
tenure as leader of the country? In this analysis I pay particular attention to Nazarbayev’s 
perception of Russia and the future of Kazakhstan’s relationship with it, based on primary 
documents including his official statements and interviews, correspondence, and laws 
adopted during the time period under investigation. 
5.2.1 The New Union Treaty  
In the late 1980s the Soviet Union was in the midst of a crisis pulling it apart and 
the leadership in Moscow had a hard time keeping up with the rapid and immense 
changes. Soviet leaders were trying to contain the wave of nationalism roaming through 
the union by alternating between punishment and appeasement strategies (Sobchak 1993, 
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Beissinger 2002, 360-365, 378-381 ). Meanwhile, Kazakhstan’s dedication to preserving 
the Soviet Union was unmatched among the republics, and even after the dissolution of 
the union Nazarbayev consistently framed its disintegration in negative terms. He bluntly 
criticized Mikhail Gorbachev, the final president of the Soviet Union, saying, “If you are 
the president, then do not let the country collapse! Or else leave, if you think you are 
unable to do so” (Nazarbayev 1996, 58, 52-60). Nazarbayev’s sentiment about the 
breakup of the “country” reflects the fundamental difference between Kazakhstan and 
leaders in some of the other successor states, who did not see the Soviet Union as their 
“country” but as their imperial occupier that needed to be destroyed.  
The New Union Treaty was one of Gorbachev’s major initiatives aimed at 
accommodating the republics’ growing demands for more autonomy while still salvaging 
the Soviet Union, which was confronted with mounting losses of power and legitimacy as 
well as threats of economic disintegration and territorial fragmentation (Saxer 1991, 644-
648). In 1990, Gorbachev invited all of the union republics to participate in drafting a 
treaty to refresh their union, and even the proposed name of the new confederation 
reflected this need to accommodate republics’ increasing demands for more autonomy: 
proposing to replace the original (1922) treaty of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR) with a Union of Sovereign States (USS). By 1990, the secessionist movement 
was very strong in the Baltic republics, Ukraine, and Georgia, whereas several other 
republics supported the preservation of the union. Even among those that favored a new 
union treaty, though, many advocated for sovereignty as a basis for negotiating the new 
form of union (Walker 2003a, 78-80). In Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev was profoundly 
disappointed by the cascade of declarations of sovereignty among the other Soviet 
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republics. He viewed Russia’s declaration of sovereignty in June 1990 as an especially 
important turning point leading to the breakup of the Soviet Union, asking, “But from 
who, from what is Russia sovereign? It is the core of the country” (Nazarbayev 1996, 43). 
The various republics differed substantially in what they meant by “sovereignty,” 
ranging from limited increases in their subnational governmental authority to formulate 
local policies to full-fledged formal independence and the freedom of action that 
accompanied international statehood (Walker 2003a, 7-10). On October 25, 1990, 
Kazakhstan eventually declared sovereignty like the others, seeking to increase the 
authority of its local government. At the same time, however, Kazakhstan’s declaration 
also made explicit its support for a renewed union, emphasizing that the declaration 
served as a step towards (not away from) the completion of the New Union Treaty: “The 
Kazakh SSR is a sovereign state which voluntarily associates with other republics in a 
Union of Sovereign Republics and builds relations with them on a treaty basis” (Furtado 
and Chandler 2019, 486, 485-488). 
Kazakhstan’s enthusiasm for the preservation of the Soviet Union contrasted 
sharply with the strong determination of some other republics to gain full political 
independence, several of which totally rejected the New Union Treaty (Walker 2003a, 
101-102 ). As the center of power started to tilt away from Moscow and toward the 
republics, Nazarbayev, no less than Gorbachev himself, “became preoccupied with the 
search for a formula to keep the union together, which became even more important to 
him than defending Kazakhstan’s interests against Moscow” (Olcott 2010, 35). He 
cooperated actively both with Boris Yeltsin (chairman of the Russian Federation) and 
Gorbachev (president of the Soviet Union) with the goal of maintaining the union and 
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promoting an integrated economic and security sphere within it—as he put it, “I was 
doing everything possible to find common approaches acceptable to all the leaders 
pulling the cart in different directions” (Nazarbayev 1996, 98, 91-101). 
Nazarbayev’s support for the Soviet Union was on full display throughout the 
period of drafting and negotiating a new union treaty. In February 1990, he appealed to 
Kazakhstan’s electorate to support the treaty, clarifying his reasoning for favoring 
bandwagoning instead of balancing in the process: 
Without doubt, in our mutual history there are serious reasons for mutual 
resentments, disillusionments and doubts. These have been given birth by 
decades of rule by a command-administrative system, usurping power in 
our common home, appropriating for itself the right to speak and act in the 
name of peoples. To do away with the totalitarian past is only possible 
together, only uniting efforts. The Kazakh people, and all the people of the 
republic do not conceive of themselves outside our united Fatherland, the 
preservation of which answers both the political and economic interests of 
multinational Kazakhstan. The collapse of the Union would inevitably 
bring with it the complete collapse of the economy of the republic, the 
sharp exacerbation of the standards of living of millions of people, would 
throw us all back whole decades, and would do irreparable harm to 
cooperation with countries of the world community. We do not have 
another path available, other than that towards the renewal of the Union on 
the basis of the conclusion of a Union Treaty between sovereign, equal 
republics. (Hale 2009, 14) 
 
Nazarbayev’s reasoning on display here touches upon several factors relevant to 
our competing theories. First, he directly mentions the “political and economic interests” 
of multiethnic Kazakhstan when arguing for cooperation, which scholars have put 
forward as important determinants of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy (Olcott 2010, Hale 
2009, İpek 2007). Nazarbayev particularly emphasized economic interests, arguing that 
without union the republic’s economy will “collapse.” While this might seem to confirm 
liberal logic that predicts cooperation for economic benefits, however, it is not quite the 
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case for Kazakhstan. Due to its rich energy resources, unlike most other post-Soviet 
states Kazakhstan stood to significantly benefit by achieving economic independence 
from Russia: leaving the ruble zone and switching to world prices would generate much 
higher revenues for Kazakhstan’s exports in the energy sector (Tarr 1994). Thus, 
Kazakhstan’s willingness to stay in the economic union with Russia goes against liberal 
expectation of the primacy of economic incentives. 
Economists assessed the post-Soviet states’ incentives to cooperate with Russia as 
follows: “If there is any prediction to be made from the analysis of the short-term costs 
and benefits of leaving the ruble zone, it is that [the Baltic states] would try to remain in 
the ruble zone, while [Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan]would opt for a new currency” 
(Goldberg, Ickes, and Ryterman 1994, 319-320, 310). Yet the opposite of this prediction 
played out in reality, driving those economists to conclude that the post-Soviet states 
were driven by more than just economic incentives (Goldberg, Ickes, and Ryterman 
1994, 320). 
Besides cost-benefit calculations related to raw energy resources and the benefits 
of shifting to world market prices, high institutional and economic interdependence could 
have driven Kazakhstan to prioritize cooperation with Russia. But high interdependence 
was not unique to Kazakhstan—all fourteen weaker post-Soviet states were highly 
interdependent with over 80 percent of each state’s trade being conducted with Russia 
and the other Soviet republics (Michalopoulos and Tarr 1992, 37). Thus, even if we 
evaluate Kazakhstan’s cooperation with Russia as partially confirming liberal predictions 
of interdependent states’ cooperation, that support is rather slim when considering the 
context: republics with fewer natural resources that were more heavily dependent on 
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Russia prioritized balancing, while energy-rich Kazakhstan prioritized staying in the 
ruble zone and bandwagoning with Russia while sacrificing the tangible benefits that 
would come with economic independence. Economic benefits are therefore at best 
insufficient to explain Kazakhstan’s prioritization of staying in the union. 
Nazarbayev also mentioned Kazakhstan’s multiethnic character, and scholars 
have noted the large percentage of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan as an internal security 
concern that may have affected its prioritization of unionism and cooperation with Russia 
(Olcott 1995b). But this factor too was not unique to Kazakhstan. Latvia and Estonia had 
similarly high percentages of ethnic Russians living within their borders by 1989 (34% 
and 30.4% respectively), yet both forged radically different foreign policies as initiators 
of the secessionist movement in the Soviet Union, rejecting the New Union Treaty and 
sustaining consistent balancing policies towards Russia (Flynn 2004, 15, Kasekamp 
2010). 
National mobilization theory identifies a new necessary factor that can help 
explain Kazakhstan’s strong support for remaining in the union. Several phrases in 
Nazarbayev’s appeal illustrate Kazakhstan’s low national mobilization, which enabled its 
leader to prioritize cooperation. Even as he recognized that there were historical reasons 
for “mutual resentments” and “doubt,” Nazarbayev placed the blame on the “totalitarian” 
system/administration that Kazakhstan had endured for decades without blaming Russia 
itself. Moreover, he called the Soviet Union their “common home,” going even further to 
say that “the Kazakh people, and all the people of the republic do not conceive of 
themselves outside our united Fatherland.” Doing so erased any nascent “us vs. them” 
contours between the Soviet Union and Kazakhstan, demonstrating the latter’s lack of 
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national mobilization by representing it as part of a shared “fatherland” rather than one 
distinct from its neighbors. Given this conceptualization of shared national identity, it 
was natural to view solutions to the USSR’s problems as “only possible together, only 
uniting efforts.” Nazarbayev underscored the importance of joining the New Union 
Treaty by noting, “We do not have another path available”(Hale 2009, 14). 
All of the above is the very opposite of what we would expect from nationally 
mobilized leaders who saw Russia as an enemy occupier and were ready to risk economic 
or other hardships in their pursuit of independence. Skeptics may argue that 
Nazarbayev’s pro-unionist position may not necessarily have reflected the views of the 
Kazakh population more broadly, but the fact remains that within the Soviet republics 
that had been nationally mobilized by that time, leaders were not able to make pro-
Russian statements so freely and openly without being called out as traitors for 
suggesting cooperation with the enemy. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, 
political leaders in Georgia around that time were harshly criticizes by colleagues and the 
public if they dared to suggest cooperation with Russia. 
It is not surprising that Nazarbayev, a Communist leader with a political career 
intertwined with the Soviet Union, genuinely thought that maintaining a strong union was 
not only possible but the right path for Kazakhstan. Not every leader has to be nationalist. 
What is theoretically important here, however, is that Nazarbayev freely voiced his 
unionist positions without getting substantial push back from the Kazakh public. 
Nationalist sentiments were not strong enough or widespread enough within Kazakhstan 
at the time to make it costly for Nazarbayev to openly advocate for maintenance the 
Soviet Union, even calling it—not Kazakhstan—his “fatherland.” National mobilization 
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theory expects that in highly mobilized states leaders have a strong interest in reflecting 
their nations’ dominant views even where their personal convictions diverge. In line with 
this expectation, numerous Communist leaders in different Soviet republics adopted 
nationalist positions during the late 1980s and early 1990s, with local Communist parties 
transforming into new parties and/or adopting new nationalist platforms, and politicians 
who retained pro-unionist positions became marginalized (Beissinger 2002, 98-101). 
In contrast, Nazarbayev never wavered in his support of the union. Even as late as 
2017 he admitted how in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, when nationalist and 
secessionist movements and demonstrations across the Soviet Union were gaining 
strength, he was trying to counteract those forces by promoting a new union treaty: “If 
adopted, the USSR would be transformed into the Union of Sovereign States (USS), 
republics would obtain economic independence and significantly widen their political 
authority, while the all-union center would be responsible for a common foreign policy 
and common security” (Nazarbayev 2017, 30, 17-31). Nazarbayev’s eagerness to 
continue seeing Kazakhstan’s foreign and security policies set in Moscow underscores 
the low priority he placed on national autonomy both during and after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, in stark contrast to the behavior of Soviet republics like Ukraine, Georgia, 
and the Baltics, which craved autonomy from Moscow. 
5.2.2 The Union-Wide Referendum 
The union-wide referendum proposed by Gorbachev and ultimately held in March 
1991 is another important event at the dusk of the Soviet Union that provides a window 
to see where the Soviet republics stood in terms of their attitudes towards the union and 
how they envisioned their independence and future relationships with Russia. As 
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secessionist rhetoric and activities were increasing across the various republics, the 
proposed union-wide referendum was yet another attempt by the center to salvage the 
Soviet Union by appealing directly to the population to boost the popularity of the new 
union treaty (Brady and Kaplan 1994, Alexandrov 1999, 35, Austin 1996, 3). This was a 
significant moment as it was the first (and last) time in the history of the Soviet Union 
that its population was asked to participate in such a referendum.  
The question proposed for the ballot was: “Do you consider necessary the 
preservation of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of 
equal sovereign republics, in which the rights of each nation would be fully guaranteed?” 
(Nohlen, Grotz, and Hartmann 2001b, 492, White and Hill 1996, 153, 157). Not all 
republics interpreted this unprecedented direct appeal to the people of the Soviet Union 
as a sign of good will from the center or a signal of the democratization of the union. 
Georgia’s leaders denounced this referendum as yet another attempt by the center to stifle 
their progress toward independence, six of the republics (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Georgia, Armenia, and Moldova) officially boycotted the referendum, and several 
republics held their own alternate referendums asking for public opinion on the potential 
restoration of full independence from the USSR (Walker 2003b, 49-73, CSCE Report, 
1991).  
Kazakhstan was one of the nine states which administered the union-wide 
referendum, and the overwhelming majority of its population supported the preservation 
of the USSR. That said, there were some reservations even in Kazakhstan. Some Kazakh 
authorities initially did not want to hold the referendum, not because they rejected the 
USSR like some of the other republics, but because they thought there was no need for 
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such referendum in Kazakhstan where the public was not split on the issue of preserving 
the union. Kazakh leaders also expressed their criticism of the central Soviet authorities 
for the lack of consultation with the republics in the decision-making process surrounding 
the referendum (Sheehy 1991). Furthermore, Kazakhstan changed the wording of the 
referendum question simplifying it by taking the “renewed union” part out and replacing 
“republics” with “states” in the text, which presumably expressed the presumption of a 
higher level of sovereignty for Kazakhstan within the union: “Do you consider it 
necessary to maintain the USSR as a Union of sovereign states of equal rights?” (CSCE 
Report 1991, 26, 2, Walker 2003b, 63-65). 
Despite these reservations regarding the process and disagreements on the 
wording of the referendum question, however, a predominant consensus among 
Kazakhstan’s leadership and public favored preserving the Soviet Union. In early March 
1991, preceding the union-wide referendum, Kazakhstan’s leadership held a televised 
meeting of representatives of various political parties and other groups to discuss 
referendum-related questions, issuing an official joint statement of the parties in 
attendance urging the public to vote “yes” on the referendum. At a time when other 
republics were criticizing the Soviet Union as a rudimental colonial creation, 
Kazakhstan’s leaders labeled it their “common home” and emphasized the importance of 
maintaining it. Their statement described the referendum as a vital measure for “the 
preservation of our common home” and “important step on the road to signing a Union 
Treaty” (CSCE Report 1991, 27). 
The union-wide referendum of March 1991 was a particularly informative event. 
The lead-up to the referendum offered a major platform for each republic’s leaders to 
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demonstrate their positions regarding the Soviet Union, and the vote itself enabled their 
publics to directly express their own views on the matter. In Kazakhstan, both the turnout 
for the referendum and public support for the preservation of the Soviet Union were 
among the highest across all republics; at roughly 88% and 95% respectively, both results 
were higher even than Russia’s (Alexandrov 1999, 37). 
Scholars often point to Kazakhstan’s demographics to help explain this outcome. 
Specifically, during the late 1980s it was home to a large ethnic Russian population 
(37%), which many cite as an important driver of both its domestic and foreign affairs 
(Olcott 1995b, 26). However, Kazakhstan’s ethnic composition in 1991 cannot explain 
the results of the referendum and its unionist position. First, the high turnout in the 
referendum and the even higher positive result show that Kazakhstan’s citizens 
overwhelmingly shared the unionist position regardless of their individual ethnic 
backgrounds. Moreover, even if ethnic Russians might on average display pro-unionist 
positions, when we look at the larger regional context we can see significant variation 
even across Soviet republics containing large ethnic Russian minorities. Latvia and 
Estonia also had large ethnic Russian populations, for example, but their turnout and 
referendum results show that a large portion of even the ethnic Russians in those 
republics held anti-unionist and pro-independence positions (Tuminez 2003, 128-130). 
State-level national mobilization offers a stronger predictor of public support for 
independence and antipathy towards the Soviet Union than cultural or ethnic 
similarities—those similarities did not prevent broad majorities from viewing Russia as a 
security threat in states with high national mobilization such as the Baltics, while in less 
nationally mobilized Kazakhstan the ethnically diverse population was largely in 
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agreement in its assessment of the Soviet Union as its home and Russia as its strategic 
partner. 
On a behavioral level, Kazakhstan’s position on remaining in the Soviet Union 
and its cooperation with Russia may appear to be a strategic move: cooperation with a 
militarily and economically stronger neighbor provided security and economic benefits 
for Kazakhstan. But when looking at it more closely, Kazakhstan’s motivations and 
framing of its decisions towards Russia come in tension with realist logic. That logic 
expects small states to see a powerful former ruler as a threat, but it also expects a small 
state to bandwagon with a strong neighbor if it lacks the capability to effectively balance 
against it. Thus, even if Kazakhstan’s cooperation with Russia might seem like the 
strategic move of a smaller state, its enthusiasm for this cooperation contradicts realist 
logic. 
Kazakhstan did not bandwagon with its greatest threat out of desperation, its 
leaders saw the Soviet Union and Russia not as their enemy but as a strategic partner. 
Kazakhstan possessed marked advantages compared to most of the other Soviet 
republics, being economically stronger and holding nuclear weapons, yet it still 
prioritized cooperation over balancing. Nazarbayev’s various public speeches and 
statements offer ample evidence of his interpretation of Russia as a partner instead of an 
enemy. For example, on September 30, 1992, during his address to the Kazakh nation, he 
acknowledged the historic upheavals that Kazakhstan had gone through before becoming 
an independent state and even called the Soviet Union the totalitarian regime, but 
nevertheless he emphasized that the Soviet times were beneficial for Kazakhstan in terms 
of literacy, industrialization, and other areas. “During the very years of Soviet rule we got 
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the opportunity to develop the republic on our … territory, which in the previous century 
was under threat to be disintegrated into three regions, to rebuild its unity, to officially 
clarify and strengthen its borders, and this way to lay a legitimate foundation for creating 
our current independent state” (Qasymbekov 2010, 106). 
While other newly independent states blamed the Soviet Union for their 
stagnation, Kazakhstan directly linked the success of its statehood to Soviet rule, for 
which, its leader argued, the nation should be grateful. On December 16, 1996, during his 
official speech celebrating the 5-year anniversary of Kazakhstan’s independence, 
Nazarbayev again emphasized his perception of Russia as a strategic partner: “The 
current Russia, the tsarist autocracy, and the Soviet Union are principally different states. 
Kazakhstan has signed agreements of friendship and cooperation with all its neighbors, 
including Russia, which it is going to follow resolutely.… It would be unwise to transfer 
the relationships of those past years to the present democratizing Russia, with whom 
Kazakhstan is building a relationship of friendship and cooperation” (Qasymbekov 2010, 
123). 
“Despite the ups and downs of history,” he continued, “Kazakhs formed a 
relationship of brotherhood and trust” with the Russian nation. “Preserving these 
relationships and strengthening them with consideration of current realities represents the 
chief interest of both nations” (Qasymbekov 2010, 123). Nazarbayev’s language here 
went beyond normal strategic cooperation between two states on economic and military 
areas, emphasizing the kinship and trust between the two nations. Leaders of other newly 
independent states that had much higher levels of national mobilization would have 
received strong pushback for such language from publics that saw their former ruler as an 
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overwhelming security threat. In contrast, Kazakhstan’s leader and the lion’s share of its 
population agreed that Russia was not an enemy, and that cooperation between the two 
states was essential. 
5.2.3 The Commonwealth of Independent States 
Despite the efforts of Gorbachev and some unionist leaders to maintain the Soviet 
Union in a renewed confederate form, the union’s dissolution became immanent by the 
winter of 1991. On December 10, in his acceptance speech as newly elected president of 
Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev expressed his disappointment with the disintegration process. “I 
want to tell you honestly: the prospect of signing the new union treaty and forming an 
economic community is now as problematic as ever before. It’s not our fault that it 
happened this way. To my deep regret, the leadership of a number of republics started 
equating sovereignty with autarky” (Qasymbekov 2010, 99). 
During this speech, Nazarbayev also expressed his surprise and disappointment 
regarding the fact that only two days earlier leaders of three republics (Russia, Ukraine, 
and Belarus) had signed the Belavezha Accords (Qasymbekov 2010, 100). Declaring that 
“the Union of SSR as a subject of international law and geopolitical reality ends its 
existence,” the three signatory republics announced that in its place they would “form the 
Commonwealth of Independent States” (Shushkevich 2013, 329). At a time when some 
of the former Soviet republics were celebrating the achievement of the independence they 
had long desired and fought for, Nazarbayev assured his people that Kazakhstan had 
sufficient economic and human resources to thrive as this unsolicited independence was 
thrust upon them (Qasymbekov 2010, 99-100). Consistent with this attitude, Kazakhstan 
was the most reluctant of all the Soviet republics to proclaim its sovereignty and later to 
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declare independence, doing so only after all the others, including Russia, had already 
completed those steps. 
As the initial goal of preserving the Soviet Union became unattainable and the 
unrealized new union treaty was replaced by the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS), Kazakhstan quickly became an ardent supporter of the CIS, even hosting its 
founding ceremony in Alma-Ata on  December 21, 1991 (Voitovich 1993, 404-405). 
Four of the post-Soviet states boycotted the new organization (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, 
and Georgia) while the other eleven joined it on that day. Out of these eleven states, 
Kazakhstan emerged as the most passionate promoter of political and economic 
reintegration under the umbrella of the CIS. In Martha Olcott’s (2010, 36) words, “The 
urge to integrate was almost instinctive for Kazakhstan’s leaders and citizens alike, 
regardless of their ethnic origin… Some in Kazakhstan would even have given up 
independence if a stable union with Russia would have resulted.” 
Kazakhstan’s enthusiasm for the CIS is reflected in the percentage of CIS 
documents it approved. By 1993, Kazakhstan had signed 98% of documents advanced by 
the CIS, a rate of approval almost as high as Russia’s (99%) and far higher than many 
other member states (for example, Ukraine’s approval rate stood at 72% and Azerbaijan’s 
at only 22%) (Hale 2009, 17). Nazarbayev was openly dissatisfied that the level of 
integration within the CIS did not meet his exceptionally high standards. He wanted 
stronger reintegration among the post-Soviet states and to this end Kazakhstan came up 
with and actively advanced various institutional initiatives, the most important one being 
Nazarbayev’s proposal for creating the Eurasian Union as an enhanced version of the CIS 
(Nysanbaev and Dunaev 2010, 22-33). As he attested, “Kazakhstan was guided by the 
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need to maintain economic, political, and simply human ties established in the post-
Soviet sphere.” He argued that “the very idea of the CIS was saved mostly thanks to the 
constructive position of Kazakhstan” and that his proposal of a Eurasian Union was 
“what in part awakened the ‘sleeping’ commonwealth” (Qasymbekov 2010, 130).  
Nazarbayev’s idea of the Eurasian Union, proposed in 1994, entailed a common 
market, common security, common borders, a common foreign policy, and even 
integrated cultural and educational spheres among the member states (Nysanbaev and 
Dunaev 2010, 13-21). In the proposal he bluntly declared that the creation of the Eurasian 
Union and reintegration was “the objective logic of the development of the post-Soviet 
sphere” and “the responsibility” of the post-Soviet nations (Nysanbaev and Dunaev 2010, 
21). Unfortunately for Nazarbayev, the level of unionism he championed was impossible 
to sell to most of the newly independent states, which joined the CIS with various levels 
of reservation and fears that powerful Russia would dominate the organization. Still, 
despite other states’ reservations, Kazakhstan remained consistent in its efforts to 
enhance the reintegration of the post-Soviet states and to sustain strong cooperation with 
Russia. 
Scholars have attributed Kazakhstan’s unwavering support for the preservation of 
the Soviet Union, its unmatched enthusiasm for reintegration under the CIS, and its 
sustained strong cooperation with Russia to concerns for its economy and security (both 
in terms of domestic stability and external threats) (İpek 2007, Karpat 2015, Olcott 2010, 
Hyman 1994, Hale 2009). Nazarbayev’s speeches and proposals on integration certainly 
highlighted these strategic concerns, as he regularly promoted collective economy and 
security. While lobbying other post-Soviet states to support enhanced integration, 
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Nazarbayev routinely argued that “economic interests determine the basis for the 
rapprochement of the independent states” (Nysanbaev and Dunaev 2010, 17). Such 
statements offer some evidence for the logic of liberal theory, which sees economic 
incentives and preexisting institutional interdependence as the main determinants of 
cooperation. 
However, proponents of economic explanations miss an important caveat that 
undercuts the ability of liberal logic to explain Kazakhstan’s post-Soviet foreign policy: 
these economic concerns were not unique to Kazakhstan. The other 13 post-Soviet states 
had just as much to lose economically by leaving the union and antagonizing Russia. If 
anything, Kazakhstan was better positioned to profit from autonomy thanks to its rich 
natural resources than other post-Soviet states with fledgling economies which 
nevertheless opted for balancing against Russia or else advocated much lighter versions 
of economic cooperation and interdependence within the CIS. Thus, Kazakhstan’s 
exceptional enthusiasm for integration and cooperation with Russia despite its natural 
resources remain a puzzle when viewed in the context of economic distributions across 
all the post-Soviet states.   
National mobilization theory provides a more compelling theoretical mechanism 
that explains Kazakhstan’s post-Soviet foreign policy. Kazakhstan’s relatively low 
national mobilization by 1990 made it possible for its leaders to prioritize economic 
interests and cooperation over full independence from the union and Russia. As discussed 
earlier in this chapter, neither Kazakhstan’s leaders nor its population perceived Russia as 
an enemy. Its leaders did not even have to hide from the public that they were 
compromising the country’s sovereignty for the sake of economic benefits. In defense of 
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economic union within the CIS and his decision to stay in the ruble zone (which enabled 
Russia to dictate Kazakhstan’s economic policy), Nazarbayev told Kazakhstan’s 
parliament in 1993 that leaving the ruble zone immediately was “impossible” and “in 
order to become a truly sovereign state… we must now waive part of our sovereignty,” or 
else face “financial collapse” (Hale 2009, 19). 
Nazarbayev prioritized the economic benefits of deeper integration with Russia 
but pursued them by knowingly compromising Kazakhstan’s sovereignty. This is a 
crucial point of the national mobilization theory: all post-Soviet states were concerned 
about their dire economic situations, but they differed significantly in terms of how much 
of their sovereignty they were willing to compromise, potentially endangering their 
newly-gained independence. The post-Soviet states with relatively high national 
mobilization prioritized their state sovereignty over economic benefits associated with 
post-Soviet integration and cooperation with Russia. In these states either leaders 
themselves did not want to cooperate with Russia, or they were constrained by publics 
which would not tolerate positions that traded sovereignty for economic benefits. 
Moreover, if Kazakhstan’s cooperation with Russia was determined by fear of short-term 
economic calamity once left adrift in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union’s 
collapse, we would expect to see its relationship with Russia weaken over time as its 
leaders developed diversified connections with other states. Yet as time went by, Russia 
remained Kazakhstan’s main strategic partner and strong post-Soviet reintegration 
remained Kazakhstan’s enduring goal.  
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5.2.4 The Question of Nuclear Weapons 
Kazakhstan found itself in quite peculiar situation for a newly independent state 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, inheriting some of the Soviet Union’s nuclear 
weapons. It actually became the possessor of the world’s fourth largest nuclear arsenal at 
the time (Norris 1992), with over 1,410 strategic warheads, SS-18 ICBMs, and cruise 
missiles carried by Bear-H bombers (Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and Rajkumar 2005, 366). 
By 1995, however, Kazakhstan transferred all its strategic nuclear weapons to Russia. 
That said, Kazakhstan’s official stance regarding its nuclear status and its intentions of 
denuclearization was not always clear or consistent during the intervening years, 
imposing anxiety on international actors such as Russia and the United States (which 
wanted to see its full denuclearization), along with Ukraine and Belarus (which similarly 
inherited portions of the Soviet nuclear arsenal). Kazakhstan’s decisions regarding its 
nuclear arsenal were affected by both external and internal factors. More than its ultimate 
decision to relinquish its nuclear weapons or even its official stances on the issue 
throughout the early 1990s, historical research into Kazakh leaders’ motivations during 
this process can help shed light on their approach to post-Soviet security. 
In 1990, the Soviet republics drafted their declarations of independence, some 
enthusiastically and others like Kazakhstan more reluctantly. Ukraine, which also 
inherited Soviet nuclear weapons, clearly expressed its intention to become a 
“permanently neutral state” and to adhere to “nuclear free principles” in its 1990 
Declaration of Sovereignty. In contrast, Kazakhstan never mentioned similar intentions 
regarding its nuclear capacities (KSSR Resolution No. 1700, October 25,1990). 
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At first glance it might seem that Kazakhstan, even more than Ukraine, was 
concerned with its security in 1990 and intended to keep the nuclear weapons located on 
its territory as a guarantee of its autonomy. However, closer examination shows that the 
opposite is true. In 1990, both states were still under Soviet rule and thus did not see 
nuclear weapons controlled by officials in Moscow as their own property. Already in 
1990, Ukraine’s leaders envisioned their country’s independence from the Soviet Union, 
and they perceived the nuclear arsenal not as an asset but rather as a burden keeping 
Ukraine connected to Moscow and stifling its full political, territorial, and strategic 
independence (Budjeryn 2016b, 10). 
Kazakhstan, the most ardent supporter of Soviet reintegration and notably lacking 
aspirations for independence, mentioned no intention to get rid of the nuclear weapons on 
its territory in its 1990 declaration not because it wanted to keep them as a security 
guarantee but because it did not even see itself as a separate political unit with its own 
military capabilities by that time. In fact, unlike Ukraine’s, Kazakhstan’s Declaration of 
Sovereignty did not even lay out an intention to create an independent national army, 
instead continuing to adhere to the idea of a strong union and joint security. Considering 
Nazarbyev’s dedication to the union and public support for the new union treaty, we can 
conclude that Kazakhstan did not even see the need to have any elaborated strategic 
position regarding the nuclear weapons on its territory, which it saw as in the custody of 
the Soviet Union. The only related mention in Kazakhstan’s declaration of sovereignty 
concerned a demand for the suspension of nuclear tests on its territory (KSSR Resolution 
No. 1700, October 25, 1990). 
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The situation changed dramatically after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 
December 1991, as the independence of the former Soviet republics rendered several of 
them nuclear powers in their own right. From this point on, Kazakhstan’s leaders were 
forced to make important decisions regarding the future of their nuclear arsenal. Between 
1991 and 1994, they engaged in numerous bilateral and multilateral negotiations, playing 
a part in various international agreements regarding nuclear weapons (Skootsky 1995). 
Although Kazakhstan eventually handed over its nuclear arsenal to Russia, its leaders and 
most notably Nazarbayev made many contradictory claims regarding their intentions for 
that arsenal, adding significant ambiguity to their position (Ayazbekov 2014). 
Realist logic makes the unambiguous prediction in this instance that Kazakhstan 
should keep its nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantee of its future survival. As John 
Mearsheimer writes, those weapons represented “the only reliable deterrent to Russian 
aggression,” and no other country would provide a “meaningful security guarantee” 
(Mearsheimer 1993, 50-51).4 Cultural similarity logic would also expect that 
Kazakhstan, a nation with very distinct ethnic and cultural attributes from Russia, should 
want to keep its nuclear weapons to deter the powerful other next door. On the other 
hand, liberal logic predicts that Kazakhstan should prioritize cooperation, including 
turning over nuclear weapons to Russia, for the sake of economic benefits. Finally, due to 
its low national mobilization, national mobilization theory would expect Kazakhstan to 
see Russia not as a threat, but as a reliable economic and security partner, and hence to be 
more open to turning over its nuclear weapons. Kazakhstan’s eventual handover of its 
 
4 Mearsheimer (1993) made the case for Ukraine’s nuclear deterrence against Russia, and 
though he did not overtly generalize to the other post-Soviet states, his logic is applicable 
to Kazakhstan as well. 
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nuclear weapons contradicts realist and cultural similarity theory but is in line with liberal 
and national mobilization theory. 
Further analysis is needed to demonstrate Kazakh leaders’ motivations behind 
their decision-making process and to uncover the relative importance of the factors each 
theory emphasizes in informing their motivations. For the purpose of testing the 
theoretical predictions the most important questions are: did Kazakhstan see Russia as a 
threat? Did it seriously consider keeping nuclear weapons as a deterrent against Russia? 
Or was the ambiguity surrounding Nazarbayev’s positions regarding the country’s 
nuclear arsenal a bargaining tool to gain economic or other benefits through its eventual 
disarmament? 
The previous section of this chapter demonstrated that Kazakhstan had a strong 
unionist position and saw the Soviet Union and later Russia not as a threat but instead as 
a trusted ally. Why then did its leaders flip-flop regarding their intentions for their 
nuclear arsenal? One of the important initial talks regarding Kazakhstan’s nuclear status 
took place on December 17, 1991, when US Secretary of State James Baker visited 
Kazakhstan with a clear message that the United States did not want to see proliferation 
of nuclear weapons to the successor states of the Soviet Union, did not support a nuclear 
Kazakhstan, and was determined to work towards this goal. This meeting between Baker 
and Nazarbayev produced an uncertain outcome (Hoffman 1991). On one hand, 
Nazarbayev voiced commitment to denuclearize in exchange for US security guarantees 
and support for its accession to international organizations. Then again, in the press 
conference following the meeting with Baker, Nazarbayev stated that Kazakhstan’s 
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denuclearization was conditional on Russia’s denuclearization (Hoffman 1991, 
Nazarbayev 1996). 
Such ambiguity in Kazakhstan’s position was commonplace. Nazarbayev 
regularly reiterated his ultimate goal of denuclearization while also showing a reluctance 
to do so, including demanding a status of “nuclear power” or “temporary nuclear state” 
and the associated seat at the multilateral negotiations. This ambivalent nuclear strategy 
lasted until May 23, 1992, when Kazakhstan joined the Lisbon Protocol to the START I 
(Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) and officially agreed to become a non-nuclear state. 
“The Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine shall adhere to the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968 as non-nuclear 
weapon states Parties in the shortest possible time, and shall begin immediately to take all 
necessary action to this end in accordance with their constitutional practices” (Lisbon 
Protocol to the START I, May 23, 1992).  
International pressure to denuclearize was strong, but it is important to explore 
how Nazarbayev navigated this pressure and how domestic factors informed his thinking 
on security policy (Potter 1995, 35-40). What is most relevant here is that Kazakhstan did 
not see Russia as a threat—its defiant position regarding denuclearization was a 
negotiating tactic intended to get more attention from the various international actors 
involved and to harvest the resulting benefits of international prestige and economic 
gains. Although there were some hardliners in Kazakhstan who supported the idea of 
keeping its nuclear weapons, and even some reports about neighboring Islamic states 
expressing interest in them, these were relatively insignificant voices that represented 
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neither the will of the Kazakh public nor of its political decision-making body 
(Nazarbayev 1996, 64, Budjeryn 2016a, 266-268). 
Nazarbayev made headlines during 1991-1992 for his defiant stands, telling press 
and international leaders that Kazakhstan should have nuclear state status, that 
denuclearization would take ten or fifteen years, and even arguing that other nuclear 
states needed to reciprocate and denuclearize as a condition for Kazakhstan to do so. 
Meanwhile, Kazakhstan was advocating strong interconnectedness and even a shared 
security system within the CIS and promoting active economic and military cooperation 
with Russia and other CIS member states (Nysanbaev and Dunaev 2010). In other words, 
Kazakhstan’s leaders did not see much need for security deterrence from Russia, unlike 
other successor states that were balancing against it, since they were consistently working 
to give up significant parts of their sovereignty to Russia and the CIS in the areas of joint 
economy and security. 
In his 1996 memoir, Nazarbayev admitted that from the beginning he understood 
that “there cannot be alternatives to the nonnuclear status of the country.” At the same 
time, he bragged about how defiant and tough he was in the negotiations with the various 
international actors, most notably Secretary of State Baker, in order to get the best deal 
for Kazakhstan that would provide economic assistance and security guarantees 
(Nazarbayev 1996, 69, 62-75). In the same account, he made clear that Russia was 
Kazakhstan’s primary ally and not a security threat he worried about in any significant 
way: “I informed B. Yeltsin, that in Washington the talks will be about Kazakhstan 
agreeing to taking out rockets from its territory. What conditions Kazakhstan puts 
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forward—this is my question. But before working in this direction, Kazakhstan would 
like to know the opinion of its strategic partner—Russia” (Nazarbayev 1996, 68). 
Nazarbayev never hid his disappointment about the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union or his preference for more parity in the CIS. Kazakhstan’s unionist position was so 
ingrained that the only alternative to nuclear disarmament that Nazarbayev considered 
was within the context of the CIS, where there could be “unified control” over the 
weapons and “joint strategic forces” composed of its various member states (Brzezinski 
and Sullivan 1997, 47-48). Consistent with national mobilization theory, Kazakhstan 
never seriously considered any security strategy that would jeopardize its relationship 
with Russia and its aspirations for the more intertwined union. 
5.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter I argue that Kazakhstan’s full-hearted unionist positions and 
consistent bandwagoning with Russia cannot be explained by conventional theoretical 
arguments and require additional perspective. Kazakhstan’s cooperation with Russia was 
not motivated by the rational strategic calculations of a weak state provoked into 
bandwagoning out of fear or desperation. Nor was its sole desire to achieve economic 
benefits from this cooperation. Instead, Kazakhstan’s relatively low national mobilization 
by 1990s was a necessary factor that can help us explain why both its leaders and the vast 
majority of its population saw Russia as a partner and not as an essential security threat, 
and why they pursued unwavering bandwagoning and economic and military cooperation 
with it.   
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Kazakhstan’s unionism and cooperation with Russia defies cultural similarity 
expectations. Its national attributes (language, religion, nomadic culture) were more 
distinct from Russia’s than those of many other post-Soviet states, and its past conflicts 
and repressions (tsarist Russia or later the Soviet Union) would predict that Kazakhstan 
should interpret the Soviet successor Russia as its most important “other” and its primary 
threat. Yet we see that the opposite is true: despite some hardliner nationalists in the 
country, the widely shared national perception of Russia was of a kindred partner. It is 
important to recall that this attitude was largely shared by all ethnic groups in 
Kazakhstan, not just the ethnic Russians who represented a significant portion of the 
population in the early 1990s (White and Hill 1996). 
The expectations of realist logic are also largely unsupported. First, since that 
logic mostly ignores the internal characteristics of states, it would expect that newly 
independent Kazakhstan would perceive powerful Russia next door as its primary 
security threat. Yet we see the opposite, as its leaders and public alike interpreted Russia 
as a friend and not a security concern. Realist logic also predicts that autonomy is the 
paramount interest of states, but Kazakhstan willingly gave up its autonomy by 
submitting itself to various bilateral or multilateral joint economic and security areas. A 
state that sees balancing as unattainable might bandwagon with a powerful state next 
door, and on the surface one might think that that was the case for Kazakhstan. But here 
too, Kazakhstan’s bandwagoning does not seem to be rooted in desperation but rather in a 
self-driven willingness to do so. When the unique possibility emerged to balance as it 
inherited its nuclear arsenal, Kazakhstan instead opted to hand that arsenal over to 
Russia, not even seriously entertaining the idea of keeping nuclear weapons as deterrence 
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against Russia. Even any possible retention of its nuclear weapons was envisioned within 
the context of a joint collective security with—not against—Russia. 
Liberal logic’s expectations that preexisting interdependence and Kazakhstan’s 
economic interests would make its leaders cooperate with Russia are only partially 
supported. There was a high level of institutional and economic interdependence within 
the Soviet Union, and almost 90% of Kazakhstan’s trade in 1990 was conducted with 
other union republics (Michalopoulos and Tarr 1992, 37). That said, among the fourteen 
weaker post-Soviet states only Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan had a clear incentive to 
pursue economic independence from Russia and move to world prices because it would 
significantly increase their revenue from energy exports (Goldberg, Ickes, and Ryterman 
1994, 310, Tarr 1994, 12-13). Even if Kazakhstan’s leaders failed to appreciate the 
potential benefits of economic independence and genuinely believed cooperation with 
Russia was the more advantageous choice, the context here is important to consider: 
twelve other states were highly dependent on Russia and had much to lose economically 
by leaving the union and antagonizing Russia. Overemphasizing the primacy of economic 
motives in Kazakhstan’s foreign policy thus fails to account for its context and cannot 
convincingly explain why it maintained a strong unionist position while more 
economically vulnerable states risked dire consequences to pursue full independence. 
In contrast, the analysis in this chapter supports national mobilization theory, 
which predicts that due to its low national mobilization by the time the Soviet Union 
collapsed, Kazakhstan should have been more likely than many other post-Soviet states 
to see Russia as a strategic partner and to seek cooperation on economic and security 
matters. Kazakhstan first clung to the failing Soviet Union, being the latest republic to 
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reluctantly declare independence, and from that point it actively engaged in rebuilding a 
new union with extensive interdependence, criticizing the CIS because it was not as 
strong a union as Kazakhstan wished it to be. Kazakhstan consistently interpreted Russia 
as a friend and strategic partner and, unlike states with much higher national 
mobilization, was willing to sacrifice some level of its sovereignty in this process of 
cooperation. 
It is important that Kazakhstan’s foreign policy and relationship with Russia 
cannot be reduced to the positions of its leaders. While Kazakhstan’s president 
Nazarbayev, a former communist leader with strong ties to Moscow and Gorbachev, 
unsurprisingly held unionist and pro-Russian positions, Kazakhstan’s population was also 
largely in agreement with the country’s foreign policy. Kazakhstan’s population widely 
supported staying in the union and later maintaining kindred relationship with Russia. 
Nazarbayev does not get much push back from the population and seems to be in 
agreement with the national will as it forges foreign policy towards Russia (cite – 
memorandum, other public polls). Nationalist hardliners represented an insignificant 
minority in Kazakhstan, and even among them many argued for a higher level of cultural 
autonomy and not political independence from the Soviet Union in 1990s. Thus, 
Kazakhstan’s relative lack of concern for giving up some of its sovereignty to the CIS 
and ultimately to its powerful member Russia, can be better explained by national 
mobilization theory. 
  
191 
 
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
The breakup of the Soviet Union was one of the most momentous international 
political events of the twentieth century, with far-reaching effects at the individual, 
societal, state, and systemic levels. The various post-Soviet successor states had 
dramatically different reactions to the dissolution of the union, and the weaker fourteen 
went on to adopt drastically different security strategies toward Russia. 
The behavior of Georgia and Kazakhstan illustrates the range of variation well. 
Kazakhstan’s president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, saw the breakup of the Soviet Union as a 
great tragedy, a sentiment that was widely shared among his new co-nationals who voted 
overwhelmingly in favor of preserving the union in the March 1991 referendum (over 
94%). In the years that followed Kazakhstan consistently prioritized cooperation and re-
integration with Russia. In contrast, Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia declared 
Georgia’s independence on April 1991 (almost nine months before the formal dissolution 
of the Soviet Union). He greeted independence with a celebratory mood that reflected his 
nation’s overwhelming support for it in the March 1991 referendum (over 99%), and 
Georgia went on to pursue foreign policies aimed at balancing its powerful neighbor. 
Despite copious scholarship on both the causes and consequences of the Soviet 
Union’s dissolution, however, conventional international relations theories fail to explain 
the wide variation in security strategies toward Russia across the fourteen weaker post-
Soviet states. I argue that this failure is largely due to ignoring historic processes of 
national mobilization as an important factor in international relations. This concluding 
chapter begins by summarizing my argument and findings before turning to this study’s 
broader implications and avenues for future research. 
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6.1 The Argument 
This study begins with the premise that nationalism is a significant factor in 
international relations and sometimes assumes a central role in driving foreign policy 
choices. Despite much important research on the causes and consequences of 
nationalism, the most prominent theories of international conflict and cooperation have 
treated it primarily as a constitutive element of the state or a force multiplier and in doing 
so have lagged significantly in incorporating nationalism in their explanations. 
Approaches that base their worldview on states’ military capabilities and material 
incentives while sidelining ideational factors remain common, and while constructivism 
has filled some gaps left by realist and liberal approaches (highlighting the socially 
constructed nature of states preferences and incentives), constructivist research in 
international relations has tended to focus primarily on international norms and culture 
and less so on the domestic and societal factors that shape states’ behavior. 
Building on the foundations laid by constructivism as well as the ample 
scholarship on nationalism, I argue that national mobilization rooted in states’ 
experiences of nation-building affects the foreign policy choices of weak states towards 
their powerful former ruler. More specifically, I argue that the content of national 
identities and the level of national mobilization that had been established in each of the 
post-Soviet states by 1990 largely determined their foreign policy choices toward Russia 
in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s dissolution. In states where national sentiments 
were widely shared and politically activated, leaders and publics alike assigned immense 
normative value to their political autonomy, developed a robust us-vs.-them mentality 
toward their historic significant “other,” perceived Russia as an existential security threat, 
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and prioritized balancing against it. On the other hand, states with low national 
mobilization saw national narratives not widely shared or activated among their 
populations, and as a result they did not assign such great value to the political 
independence they had so recently obtained, did not perceive Russia as an essential 
security threat, and preferred to bandwagon with it. 
6.2 Findings 
This study evaluates the ability of national mobilization theory to explain 
variations in the fourteen weaker post-Soviet states’ security strategies toward Russia 
(from committed balancing to bandwagoning) in comparison to several prominent 
alternative theories of international security. While approaches based on realism, 
liberalism, and cultural similarity are inadequate or at best insufficient to explain those 
variations, substantial evidence supports the predictions of national mobilization theory. 
Realist perspectives that are primarily concerned with the distribution of 
international military power cannot explain why very weak states like Georgia and the 
Baltic states prioritized balancing even in the absence of any reliable prospect of security 
guarantees from external powers, risking Russian military retaliation in the process. It 
also struggles to comprehend why the Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine failed to seize 
the unique opportunity to guarantee their security through nuclear deterrence and instead 
turned over to Russia the nuclear warheads they inherited from the Soviet Union. 
Moreover, two of those states (Kazakhstan and Belarus) emerged as the most enthusiastic 
supporters of bandwagoning and re-unification with Russia. 
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Liberal approaches highlighting the importance of institutional interdependence 
and economic incentives cannot explain why the wide-ranging interdependence that 
existed among the Soviet republics failed to drive them to prioritize cooperation after the 
union dissolved. It also struggles to account for the decisions to sever economic ties with 
Russia by several states that had very clear economic incentives to cooperate, given 
Russia’s ongoing subsidies in the energy and other areas. Lastly, perspectives that 
highlight cultural similarity cannot explain why Orthodox Christian states like Georgia 
and Ukraine chose to balance against Russia while Islamic states preferred to bandwagon 
with it, or why some states containing relatively high percentages of ethnic Russians 
prioritized cooperation but others with similar demographic configurations chose 
balancing. 
In contrast, the empirical analysis offers substantial support for national 
mobilization theory. Those states that had developed strong national identities and that 
exhibited significant national mobilization by the late 1980s were the same ones that 
prioritized balancing against Russia, while states with contested national identities and 
low national mobilization prioritized bandwagoning even at the expense of some 
elements of the sovereignty they had so recently gained. 
Chapter 3 appraised the national mobilization of each of the fourteen weaker post-
Soviet states based on their historic development as modern nations, highlighting factors 
such as emergence of nationalist intelligentsia, the dissemination of nationalist narratives 
among their population, and historical processes of defining the nation against a central 
security threat during its formative years as a modern nation-state. It also surveyed the 
longitude and depth of each state’s experience of independence prior to being absorbing 
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by the Soviet Union, which offered the opportunity to solidify a national identity that 
would later inspire its mobilization in the late 1980s. This analysis identified four highly 
mobilized states (Georgia and the Baltic states), four that displayed medium/contested 
mobilization (Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, and Azerbaijan), and six with low 
mobilization (Belarus and the five Central Asian states). Comparing these results for 
national mobilization to the post-Soviet states’ security strategies reveals a far greater 
correlation than achieved by proxies for any of the three major paradigmatic approaches, 
as all four highly mobilized states rank among the balancers while the six low-
mobilization states all pursued bandwagoning or ambivalent/neutral foreign policies 
toward Russia. 
Chapters 4 and 5 moved beyond this correlational analysis by examining causal 
process evidence via in-depth case studies on Georgia and Kazakhstan. Both of these 
states represent least likely cases for the conventional theories. Georgia was one of the 
weakest post-Soviet states military and economically and shared Orthodox Christianity 
with Russia, yet it defied conventional expectations by emerging as a fervent balancer 
and maintained its anti-Russian foreign policy stance even after enduring sever economic 
and military punishments (including losing territory in the 2008 war). Kazakhstan was 
one of the richest post-Soviet states, one of the few that inherited nuclear weapons, and 
embodied Islam in contrast to Russia’s Christianity, yet against conventional expectations 
it consistently bandwagoned and prioritized reintegration with Russia. The main 
difference between the two states was not military power, economic incentives, or 
civilizational culture, but that Georgia demonstrated deep national mobilization in the late 
1980s while Kazakhstan did not. 
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The case studies test whether the causal logic proposed by national mobilization 
theory was in fact at work in affecting those states’ foreign policy choices during and 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Using primary sources such as transcripts of early 
1990s parliamentary sessions as well as leaders’ speeches and interviews, I assess the 
relative roles of national, military, economic, and cultural factors in driving leaders’ 
decision-making. Georgian leaders routinely emphasized their country’s long history of 
nationhood and its deep though short-lived experience of independent statehood in the 
early twentieth century. They framed Russia as their nation’s primary threat in both past 
and present, an imperial power that had repeatedly threatened Georgia’s independence, 
and they rejected cooperation with Russia almost unanimously, embracing balancing as a 
historic duty that was well worth economic and even physical sacrifices. On the other 
hand, Kazakh elites led by Nazarbayev described Russia as a kindred nation without 
much pushback from their population. They emphasized the common history and destiny 
of the two nations instead of focusing on past repressions by Russia, and they openly 
suggested giving up their nation’s sovereignty altogether in favor of reunification with 
Russia, framing it as returning to a common home for the sake of mutual economic, 
military, and cultural gains.  
6.3 Contributions 
These findings concerning the effects of national mobilization on the security 
strategies of the fourteen weaker post-Soviet states offer important insights for better 
understanding the turbulent post-Soviet region. That region remains an arena of intra- and 
interstate conflict and tension as well as cooperation, and the diverse alignments of the 
post-Soviet states have had both regional and global significance over the decades since 
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the Soviet Union’s collapse. As a result, added clarity in understanding that behavior 
should interest scholars of international relations and foreign policy experts alike. 
The theoretical contributions of this research go beyond its regional and policy-
relevant implications in providing a clear case for the benefits of incorporating 
nationalism and historical processes more fully into the study of international relations. 
While the term “nationalism” has become ubiquitous among scholars and politicians 
alike, scholarship on nationalism began to proliferate during the final decades of the 
twentieth century. Scholars like Ernest Gellner (1983), Benedict Anderson (1991), and 
Miroslav Hroch (1985) produced seminal studies on the origins of nationalism, 
contributing to a growing scholarly consensus on its modern and socially constructed 
nature. 
Research on the effects of nationalism followed but was more fragmented 
especially in the field of international relations, which has traditionally been dominated 
by realist approaches and the privileging of material factors as compared to ideational 
ones. That said, there are some insightful works employing nationalism and national 
identities as central factors driving various political effects. For example, studies by 
Ronald Suny (1993) and Mark Beissinger (2002) explore the role of nationalism and 
political mobilization as factors leading to the breakup of the Soviet Union, Rawi Abdelal 
(2001) has explored the role of national identity in the political economy of the post-
Soviet states, and other works such as those by Paul D'Anieri (1997) and Christopher 
Stevens (2020) have examined nationalism’s effects on state behavior based on studies of 
individual countries or country dyads. National mobilization theory contributes directly 
to this growing body of scholarship. 
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Although this study demonstrates that national identities rooted in historical 
mobilization processes can assume a central role in determining foreign policy choices, I 
do not argue that conventional factors such as distributions of military power, economic 
or institutional interdependence, or cultural similarities are irrelevant. Under certain 
circumstances, however, those factors can fade into the status of secondary 
considerations as nationalism becomes the dominant predictor of behavior. In line with 
constructivist and nationalism scholarship, this study confirms that states preferences are 
not uniform or fixed, and states’ varied experiences of nation- and state-building can 
produce varied preferences—even regarding the value of something as central to 
international relations as national autonomy—leading to different interpretations and 
actions by states facing similar material constraints. 
Scholars who treat nationalism as a marginal factor in international relations 
might assume that its effects are applicable only in outlier cases, interpreting behavior 
that is inspired by nationalism as irrational in the face of contrasting material incentives. 
This is a problematic view. Although nationalism like any factor is not the only or always 
the main factor driving international behavior, the instinct by so-called rationalist 
scholars to label it irrational demonstrates a paradigmatic blind spot. Behavior that runs 
contrary to realist or liberal expectations may be perfectly rational if it serves the state’s 
goals, even if those goals are not limited to the ones prioritized by those paradigms. One 
of the main insights of this research is that states’ preferences are not fixed, they are 
socially constructed and can vary across states and across time. If we take into account 
that states’ preferences are socially constructed and vary across countries and within a 
country over time, then evaluating the rationality of state behavior should be done in 
199 
 
relation to the assessment of the preferences a state holds and its rankings of those 
preferences.  
For example, if during its formation as a modern nation-state Georgia perceived 
Russia as an existential threat—a significant “other”—then its high mobilization should 
lead it not only to acutely prioritize its political independence but specifically to revere its 
independence from Russia, turning that targeted foreign policy priority into an objective 
capable of overriding other more conventional concerns. Georgian leaders’ refusal to 
consider economic and military cooperation with Russia or to participate in Russia-led 
regional organizations might seem irrational from a perspective rooted purely in security 
or economics, but such behavior is readily explainable given due appreciation for the 
nationalism of Georgia’s public and political elite alike. Its national mobilization proved 
strong enough even to risk Georgia’s physical survival by rejecting cooperation with 
Russia, behavior that is unintelligible to perspectives that assume state survival should be 
leaders’ top priority but that makes more sense to leaders who see subordination to the 
enemy as equivalent to national annihilation. 
The Kazakhstan case study reveals that not only high national mobilization but 
low mobilization as well provides important insights into why leaders’ foreign policy 
choices may diverge from conventional expectations. For example, without taking into 
consideration Kazakhstan’s development into a nation-state and its low national 
mobilization by 1990, it is difficult to comprehend why Kazakh leaders did not perceive 
Russia as a threat and did not seriously consider using the nuclear weapons they inherited 
to balance against it. It also defied conventional wisdom by prioritizing economic 
cooperation with Russia instead of cutting ties and moving to world market prices, which 
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would have benefitted Kazakhstan due to its rich oil resources (unlike most other post-
Soviet states). As these examples show, there is great value in more prominently 
featuring national mobilization and ideational factors more broadly in international 
relations scholarship. 
6.4 Future Research 
This study also points to several promising avenues of future research. Although 
it sought to explain the variations in security strategies among the fourteen weaker post-
Soviet states, the resulting national mobilization theory is not specific to the Soviet 
Union. Thus, one potential area for further research would test that theory across 
comparable cases in different regions and time periods. It would be interesting to see how 
well its logic travels to other cases of disintegrating international unions, confederations, 
or empires, and how national mobilization interacts with different institutional 
frameworks and security environments. Such research would help establish the 
generalizability of national mobilization theory while also contributing important insights 
to areas studies within the chosen regions. 
Another related research question concerns the role of an institutional breakup in 
triggering the logic of national mobilization theory. While it is understandable that the 
recent experience of foreign rule should heighten the salience of autonomy from their 
former ruler for newly independent states with histories of nationalism, it is also possible 
that other events or experiences may also prime states for high national mobilization to 
play a predominant role in their foreign policy decision making. For example, do 
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variations in national mobilization among Latin American states affect their security 
strategies vis-à-vis the United States? 
Skeptics may argue that the breakup of the Soviet Union may have been a 
particularly relevant time for the newly independent states’ national mobilization to 
become the most salient factor for their policymaking because it was a period when they 
were faced with an uncertain future and an open window to assert their independence. 
Thus another potential avenue for research would explore the circumstances under which 
nationalism emerges as a particularly relevant factor in foreign policy decision-making. 
Shocks such as interstate conflicts in the region or significant systemic changes in great 
power dynamics may be likely candidates for exploration, but it would be interesting to 
see how the effects of such crises compare to long-term rivalries, simmering territorial 
disputes, and other potential catalysts. 
There are many questions to ask and to answer, but one thing is clear: the growing 
scholarship on nationalism demonstrating its pervasive nature and its effects on 
international politics is a key element of modern political science. National mobilization 
theory and the empirical findings of this study can seek no greater success than to 
contribute to that end. 
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